Conference Paper

Effects of Neighbourhood Structure on Evolution of Cooperation in N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77226-2_95 Conference: Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning - IDEAL 2007, 8th International Conference, Birmingham, UK, December 16-19, 2007, Proceedings
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT In multi-agent systems, complex and dynamic interactions often emerge among individual agents. The ability of each agent to
learn adaptively is therefore important for them to survive in such changing environment. In this paper, we consider the effects
of neighbourhood structure on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in the N-Player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (NIPD). We
simulate the NIPD as a bidding game on a two dimensional grid-world, where each agent has to bid against its neighbours based
on a chosen game strategy. We conduct experiments with three different types of neighbourhood structures, namely the triangular
neighbourhood structure, the rectangular neighbourhood structure and the random pairing structure. Our results show that cooperation
does emerge under the triangular neighbourhood structure, but defection prevails under the rectangular neighbourhood structure
as well as the random pairing structure.

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