# Quantifying eavesdropping vulnerability in sensor networks.

**ABSTRACT** With respect to security, sensor networks have a number of considerations that separate them from traditional distributed systems. First, sensor devices are typically vulnerable to physical compromise. Second, they have significant power and processing constraints. Third, the most critical security issue is protecting the (statistically derived) aggregate output of the system, even if individual nodes may be compromised. We suggest that these considerations merit a rethinking of traditional security techniques: rather than depending on the resilience of cryptographic techniques, in this paper we develop new techniques to tolerate compromised nodes and to even mislead an adversary. We present our initial work on probabilistically quantifying the security of sensor network protocols, with respect to sensor data distributions and network topologies. Beginning with a taxonomy of attacks based on an adversary's goals, we focus on how to evaluate the vulnerability of sensor network protocols to eavesdropping. Different topologies and aggregation functions provide different probabilistic guarantees about system security, and make different trade-offs in power and accuracy.

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**ABSTRACT:**The eavesdropping security of wireless ad hoc net-works has attracted considerable attention recently. However, most of current studies only consider OMN networks, where each node is mounted with a single omni-directional antenna, which radiates radio signals in all directions and consequently leads to the high eavesdropping possibility. Compared with an omni-directional antenna, a directional antenna can concentrate the radio signals on some desired directions so that it can potentially reduce the eavesdropping possibility. This paper investigates the eavesdropping security of wireless ad hoc networks equipped with directional antennas. In particular, we study the eavesdropping possibility of OMN networks, SDA networks in which each node is equipped with a simplistic directional antenna and RDA networks in which each node is equipped with a realistic directional antenna. More specifically, we identify the eavesdropping activity in wireless networks and propose an eavesdropping model to measure the eavesdropping possibility. We conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the eavesdropping possibility of OMN networks, SDA networks and RDA networks with considering various environment factors, such as path loss attenuation and shadowing effects. Our simulation results show that using a simplistic directional antenna or a realistic antenna in wireless networks can reduce the eavesdropping possibility.the 22nd Wireless and Optical Communications Conference (WOCC); 05/2013 - SourceAvailable from: Hong-Ning Dai[Show abstract] [Hide abstract]

**ABSTRACT:**The eavesdropping attack is a serious security threat to a wireless sensor network (WSN) since the eavesdropping attack is a prerequisite for other attacks. Conventional WSNs consist of wireless nodes equipped with omnidirectional antennas, which broadcast radio signals in all directions and are consequently prone to the eavesdropping attacks. Different from omnidirectional antennas, directional antennas radiate radio signals on desired directions and potentially reduce the possibility of the eavesdropping attacks. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the eavesdropping probability in both single-hop WSNs and multihop WSNs with omnidirectional antennas and directional antennas. We verify the correctness of our analytical model by conducting extensive simulations. We have found that using directional antennas in either single-hop WSNs or multihop WSNs can significantly reduce the eavesdropping probability. The reason of the improved security of WSNs with directional antennas lies in (i) the smaller exposure region of a directional antenna and (ii) the fewer hops to route a packet due to the longer transmission range of a directional antenna. Our results have also shown that the security improvement factor heavily depends on the node density, the antenna beamwidth, and the signal path loss factor.International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 08/2013; 2013. · 0.73 Impact Factor -
##### Conference Paper: The cyber-physical attacker

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**ABSTRACT:**The world of Cyber-Physical Systems ranges from industrial to national interest applications. Even though these systems are pervading our everyday life, we are still far from fully understanding their security properties. Devising a suitable attacker model is a crucial element when studying the security properties of CPSs, as a system cannot be secured without defining the threats it is subject to. In this work an attacker scenario is presented which addresses the peculiarities of a cyber-physical adversary, and we discuss how this scenario relates to other attacker models popular in the security protocol literature.Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security; 09/2012

Page 1

Department of Computer & Information Science

Departmental Papers (CIS)

University of Pennsylvania

Year

Quantifying Eavesdropping Vulnerability

in Sensor Networks

Madhukar Anand∗

Zachary G. Ives†

Insup Lee‡

∗University of Pennsylvania, anandm@cis.upenn.edu

†University of Pennsylvania, zives@cis.upenn.edu

‡University of Pennsylvania, lee@cis.upenn.edu

Postprint version.

is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The

definitive version was published in Proceedings of the 2nd International VLDB Workshop on

Data Management for Sensor Networks 2005 (DMSN 2005), pages 3-9.

Publisher URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080885.1080887

Copyright ACM, 2005.This is the author’s version of the work.It

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons.

http://repository.upenn.edu/cis papers/176

Page 2

Quantifying Eavesdropping Vulnerability in Sensor

Networks∗

Madhukar Anand

Department of Computer and

Information Science

University of Pennsylvania

anandm@cis.upenn.edu

Zachary Ives

Department of Computer and

Information Science

University of Pennsylvania

zives@cis.upenn.edu

Insup Lee

Department of Computer and

Information Science

University of Pennsylvania

lee@cis.upenn.edu

ABSTRACT

With respect to security, sensor networks have a number of con-

siderations that separate them from traditional distributed systems.

First, sensor devices are typically vulnerable to physical compro-

mise. Second, they have significant power and processing con-

straints. Third, the most critical security issue is protecting the (sta-

tisticallyderived) aggregate output of thesystem, even if individual

nodes may be compromised. We suggest that these considerations

merit a rethinking of traditional security techniques: rather than

depending on the resilience of cryptographic techniques, in this

paper we develop new techniques to tolerate compromised nodes

and to even mislead an adversary. We present our initial work on

probabilistically quantifying the security of sensor network proto-

cols, with respect to sensor data distributions and network topolo-

gies. Beginning with a taxonomy of attacks based on an adver-

sary’sgoals, wefocuson how toevaluate thevulnerabilityof sensor

network protocols to eavesdropping. Different topologies and ag-

gregation functions provide different probabilistic guarantees about

system security, and make different trade-offs in power and accu-

racy.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [Computer-

Communication Networks]: Security and Protection

General Terms: Security

Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Eavesdropping, Data

Streams, Probability Distribution.

1.INTRODUCTION

As sensor network technology advances, security and privacy

concerns will increasingly move to the forefront. Many real-world

settings in which sensors might be deployed (e.g., security systems,

intelligent buildings, hospitals, automated warehouses) have signif-

icant need not only for privacy policies, but mechanisms for enforc-

ing data security and confidentiality.

∗This work was funded in part by NSF grants IIS-0477972

and CCR-0209024 and ARO grants DAAD19-01-1-0473 and

W911NF-05-1-0182.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for

personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are

not made or distributed for profi t or commercial advantage and that copies

bear this notice and the full citation on the fi rst page. To copy otherwise, to

republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specifi c

permission and/or a fee.

DMSN’05, August 29, 2005, Trondheim, Norway.

Copyright 2005 ACM 1-59593-206-2/05/0008 ...$5.00.

Inthe Aspenn (Abstraction-based Sensor Programming Environ-

ment from Penn) project, we focus on developing the infrastruc-

ture for such rich sensor applications, in which the sensing devices

and networks may be heterogeneous (including smart card readers,

video cameras, and mobile sensors) and the sensor network may in-

teract with external data sources on the Internet. A major emphasis

of our work lies in protecting application data from eavesdroppers

and hackers.

With respect to security, the sensor network domain has several

important characteristics that differentiate it from traditional dis-

tributed systems. First, sensor devices are frequently vulnerable to

physical compromise or local eavesdropping, as they are embed-

ded within an environment. Second, sensor devices have signifi-

cant power and processing constraints, which often prevent them

from running expensive encryption protocols, but which also limit

the amount of “damage” they can do to the overall sensor network

(e.g., by injecting spurious data or snooping on large volumes of

messages). Third, sensor network applications are generally con-

sensus or aggregation-based, meaning that compromising one or a

few nodes may not significantly affect the overall system.

To this point, security techniques have been adapted for the sen-

sor network domain by reducing the computation requirements of

cryptography (generally by pre-distributing keys [18] or reducing

the key size [2]) in order to operate under the limited processing

capabilities of sensor networks. However, cryptography is not the

only means of providing security in a sensor network application

— in fact, if an attacker has sufficient resources, cryptographic

schemes with small key sizes may provide little protection. More-

over, such techniques do not consider the system-wide effects if an

attacker compromises a few nodes.

We advocate a different approach, which takes advantage of the

fact that any real-world attacker is limited by the properties of

the system he or she is attempting to compromise. In this paper

we present an initial framework, taxonomy, and methodology for

quantifying theprivacy and security of sensor network applications,

under the assumption that some nodes may be compromised, and

based on the networks’ size, protocols, and computations. Rather

than providing all-or-nothing guarantees about privacy or security,

our goal is to examine probabilistic guarantees with respect to

compromise, and to understand and improve existing aggregation

strategies with respect to these guarantees. Our focus in this pa-

per is on the problem of eavesdropping, although we are currently

generalizing to other types of attacks. Specifically, we make the

following contributions:

• We propose a taxonomy of attack models for sensor net-

works, based on the goals of the attacker.

Page 3

• We propose what we believe to be the first quantitative ap-

proach to assessing system-level confidentiality and security,

under the possibility that some nodes are compromised.

• We show how our methods can be used to choose between

different protocols and sampling strategies.

• We discuss how cryptographic and non-cryptographic tech-

niques can be used to improve the confidentiality of a sensor

network.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2,

we introduce a taxonomy of attacks in sensor networks. In the sub-

sequent section, we develop a model for cost and accuracy in a

sensor network. Section 4 discusses how we model an attacker’s

ability to determine the output of a sensor network, and also her

cost. Next, we identify and assess potential means of combating

eavesdropping. We discuss related work in Section 6, and in Sec-

tion 7 we conclude by highlighting avenues for future work.

2. TAXONOMY OF ATTACKER MODELS

By compromising nodes, eavesdropping, or spoofing, an adver-

sary may attempt to violate the security of a sensor network appli-

cation. In order to evaluate a sensor application’s security charac-

teristics, we must first understand the potential goals of the adver-

sary’s attack. We define a taxonomy of attack models for sensor

networks, based on the goals of the adversary.

1. Eavesdropping. Here, the adversary (eavesdropper) aims to

determine the aggregate data that is being output by the sen-

sor network: it is attempting to see what the system is ob-

serving, e.g., to predict how the owner of the sensor network

will react. The adversary either listens to messages transmit-

ted by the nodes, or directly compromises those nodes. We

further distinguish between two types of eavesdropping:

(a) Passive: The eavesdropper conceals her presence from

the sensor nodes and uses only the broadcast medium

to eavesdrop on all messages.

(b) Active: The eavesdropper actively attempts to discern

information by sending queries to sensors or aggrega-

tion points, or by attacking sensor nodes.

2. Disruption. The intent of the adversary is to disrupt the sen-

sor application. This can be a combination of two types of

techniques:

(a) Semantic: Theadversaryinjectsmessages, corruptsdata,

or changes values in order to render the aggregated data

corrupt or useless.

(b) Physical: The adversary upsets sensor readings by di-

rectlymanipulatingtheenvironment. Forexample, gen-

erating heat in the vicinity of sensors will result in er-

roneous values being reported.

3. Hijacking. This variation on the disruption model is a case in

which the adversary attempts to direct the aggregated output

of the sensor application towards a value of her choosing.

If the adversary gains control of enough sensors, then this

attack is the hardest to counter.

Our focus. In this paper, which forms the first step towards ad-

dressing the attack models of our taxonomy, we focus strictly on

the case of eavesdropping. As stated above, we assume that the

adversary’s goal is to ascertain the aggregated values output by the

network: while subtly different from the alternative definition —

attempting to precisely ascertain information about the sensed en-

vironment — we believe this is a more likely motivation for at-

tacking a sensor network. In our definition, what we are trying to

protect is what the system sees, and thus the ability to predict how

the user of the system might react, as opposed to merely protecting

information about the environment. We note that our methods can

generalize to handling the latter case as well: the two definitions

will essentially coincide if we constrain our sensor network appli-

cation to return the most accurate information possible about the

environment.

In the next two sections, we first define our network model and

means for determining cost; then we discuss how we evaluate net-

works’ vulnerability to eavesdropping — first for height-two ag-

gregation trees, and then for trees of arbitrary depth.

3.SENSOR NETWORK MODEL

We begin by introducing our model of a sensor network, begin-

ning by examining how computation is performed, and then quan-

tifying the quality (accuracy) of the network and its cost. These

factors, aswell as the vulnerability of the network toeavesdropping

(next section) will form the basis of assessing sensor networks.

3.1Streams and Aggregation

Data from sensors is typically continuous and time-varying, as

opposed to actually having discrete values; a formal stream model,

similar to that of [1], is appropriate to capture this aspect of data.

DEFINITION 1. (Sensor Stream) A Sensor Stream R is a possi-

bly infinite sequence of elements, {?id,d,τ,ρ?n}n≥1, where id ∈

Z+is a identifier for the sensor, d is a sensor data structure, τ is

the timestamp and ρ is either ∅ or the location of the sensor.

2

Wereasonabout twoorthogonal typesofaggregationover streams:

in-stream aggregation, which occurs over asingle stream, generally

over a time window, and multi-stream aggregation, which occurs

across the values of multiple streams, either at the same time or

over a time window.

In-stream aggregation can be thought of as aggregation over all

data from a single sensor within some time window. We can also

defineaggregationover streamsofdatafromdifferent sensorswithin

the same time window. We refer to this form of aggregation as

multi-stream aggregation.

3.2Hierarchical Aggregation

Forpurposes offormal analysis, weabstract awayspecificdetails

of sensing, communication and computation and view the network

from a pure data collection and aggregation perspective. The hier-

archical aggregation tree is a recursive structure in which, at each

level of the tree, groups of child nodes send their values to a parent

node that aggregates their values. The base station is the interme-

diate point at the highest level. Our model is consistent with most

proposed aggregation algorithms, e.g. [16, 23, 11].

Finally, we assume that the values observed at each sensor are

not identical, but can be characterized according to some proba-

bilistic data distribution. Data from a sensor network will typically

consist of a number of observed attributes; a probability density

function (pdf) can be used to assign a probability for each possible

assignment to the attributes. Such a model can be learned from data

collected over time, using algorithms such as those in [17]. Learn-

ing a model involves maintaining certain parameters, e.g., the mean

and the variance, and coping with noise, outliers, etc. A significant

literature exists on learning models of streams, (e.g., [3, 5]).

Page 4

Many sensor applications include multiple, dynamic attributes,

and hence correlations and temporal aspects to the data distribution

must also beconsidered. In[8], theauthorsused Markovian models

to learn the time-varying effects of sensor readings. In their model,

given the value of all attributesat timet, it isassumed that the value

of the attributes at time t+ 1 are independent of those for any time

earlier than t. This is generally sufficient to capture the dynamic

nature of the sensor data. The same authors have extended their

work in [7] to consider correlations between streams.

Our work assumes that such distributions are given (or can be

reasonably approximated). Based on knowledge of the data distri-

bution, wecan provide specific probabilistic guarantees about sens-

ing and eavesdropping. Additional information, such as the spatial

distribution of sensors, is not assumed, although it can add to the

precision of the metrics we present.

We illustrate an example aggregation tree in Figure 1, where

nodes s0,...,s5 are in a hierarchical group. Each of s1,...,s5

perform aggregation of data in sub-groups and combine their own

data with this before forwarding it to node s0. Node s0, in addition

to recording its own sensor data, is also the final aggregator for all

the data in the network.

s0

s3

s5

s4

s2

s1

Figure 1: Sensor network model

We consider the presence of a powerful adversary who has the

capability of listening to the messages in the sensor network, or of

compromising sensor nodes in an undetectable way, with a certain

probability. The higher a compromised node is in the aggregation

tree, the more power the attacker has.

Notation. We denote the set of all sensor data streams within a

group in the hierarchical network with the symbol S. Some subset,

SC ⊆ S of these data values will be used to compute the stream

aggregate σ (this quantity considers the possibility of dropped mes-

sages, filtering, sampling, etc.). The adversary can eavesdrop on

some set of nodes SA ⊆ S, which may overlap with but differ

from SC.

EXAMPLE 1. Consider, thesituationdepicted inFigure1, where

the top-level group of an activity monitoring sensor network has

nodes s0,...,s5. Assume the sensors s1,...s5perform their local

aggregation tasks and output their values to node s0 once every 5

seconds. Alsoassume that the values from all data streams have the

in-stream aggregation function σ1 to be the mean of all the read-

ings obtained at each node si over the past 4 sampling intervals.

Let the multi-stream aggregation (σ2) be applied every 20 seconds,

as the mean of the readings from s0,...,s5.

If readings from s0 are {4.82,4.81,4.82,4.83}, then σ1(s0) =

4.82. Similarly, if σ1(s1) = 4.93, σ(s2) = 5.17, σ1(s3) = 4.92,

σ1(s4) = 4.87, σ1(s5) = 5.04 and we compute the mean over all

streams, then σ2(S) = 4.96.

2

3.3Quality of the Sample

Given a model of the distribution of data readings in the environ-

ment, there are several possible metrics for estimating the quality

(accuracy) of the sample. We assume that the readings used to

produce a single aggregate stream element occur within some time

window [T,T + ∆]. The length of the window, ∆, is application-

specific, and it corresponds to the common notion of an epoch [16]

during which computations are performed, but it allows readings to

occur at any point within the window.

In statistics, goodness-of-fit is used to measure the distance be-

tween the data and the hypothesis. For example, if the underlying

distribution is normal, then goodness-of-fit can be determined by

using the standard χ2test. We adopt a statistic that works bet-

ter for small samples and is simple to compute, the Kolmogorov-

Smirnov test [12]. To compare a data sample consisting of N

events whose cumulative distribution is SN(x) with a hypothesis

function whose cumulative distribution is Φ(x), the value η is cal-

culated as η = maxx|SN(x) − Φ(x)|.The Cramer-Smirnov-Von-

Mises test is often used to test that a one-dimensional data sample

is compatible with being a random sampling from a given distri-

bution: If the density function of the data is f(x), then, the test

measures the goodness-of-fit by the measure W2, which is given

byR∞

depending on the distribution of data; for details we refer the reader

to a standard textbook on statistics (e.g., [12]).

−∞[SN(x)−F(x)]2f(x)dx. There are many alternative tests,

EXAMPLE 2. If we assume that the data in Example 1 is dis-

tributedN(5,0.1) and use theχ2test asthegoodness-of-fit measure,

we have ∆ = 20s andP5

i=0

that we have a sample close to the actual model.

3.4Cost of Sensing

We can estimate the cost of producing a single output element in

the sensor network by considering the cost of acquiring and com-

municating the sensor readings. Let the time window be T =

[T,T + ∆], the cost of acquiring a reading at sensor node s be

ca(s), and the cost of transmitting a message from sensor s to the

aggregating point s0 be ct(s). Then the cost of acquiring the data

to be aggregated is Ca(T ,S) =P

diate node in the aggregation tree, the cost of transmitting sensor

data is Ct(T ,S) =P

cause there is no transmission involved from s0 to itself). Let the

reception cost for one reading at s0be cr. Then, the total cost of re-

ception Cr(T ,S\S0) = |S\S0|·crwhere S0is the set of readings

obtained at s0. Thus, the total cost for acquiring and aggregating

the data is C(T ,S) = Ca(T ,S) + Ct(T ,S) + Cr(T ,S\S0) for

any set S of nodes that share a single aggregation point s0.

( ¯ si−4.96)

0.1

= 0.911, which implies

2

s∈Sca(s). For each interme-

s∈Sct(s), where ct(s0) = 0. (This is be-

EXAMPLE 3. Let us assume that the cost of sensing for at-

tribute is 0.015J and transmitting and receiving data takes 0.025J

of energy for all the sensors in Example 1. In one epoch, the sen-

sors transmit20

0.015) + 4 × 0.015J + 5 × 4 × 0.025J = 1.36J.

5= 4 packets. Hence, C(S) = 5 × 4 × (0.025 +

2

4.MODELING EAVESDROPPING

We now consider the case of an adversary who has access to

some of the sensor readings (either through eavesdropping or com-

promise), and who istrying to determine the aggregate value output

by the sensor network.1We consider the confidentiality of the net-

work, in terms of whether the adversary can estimate the output

1As described in Section 2, this definition is motivated by the fact

thattheeavesdropper ismost likelytobeinterestedinpredictingthe

behavior of the person or application monitoring the sensor data.

Page 5

value within some small tolerance δ. We compute the eavesdrop-

ping vulnerability based on several important parameters. First,

there is the probability that a compromised set of sensor nodes,

SA, greatly resembles the set of nodes that our application is sam-

pling, SC. This probability is a function of the size of SC, the

specific aggregate function σ, and the data distribution of the sen-

sors S. For example, if all sensors produce the same reading, then

the adversary can compromise the system from a single reading.

We formalize the probability based on these parameters.

DEFINITION 2. (Eavesdropping Vulnerability) The eavesdrop-

ping vulnerability (γ) relative to a set of compromised nodes is de-

fined as γ(σ,S,SA,SC,δ) = p(|σ(SC) − σ(SA)| ≤ δ), where σ

is the aggregating function and δ the adversary’s error tolerance.

2

Although we have considered a single aggregate computation

here, the eavesdropping vulnerability can be generalized to sup-

port multiple aggregate computations over different attributes: the

expected value of γ can be obtained by conditioning on different

parameters.

We can compute the expected eavesdropping vulnerability, in

which the specific SA is unknown, as ¯ γ =

I(|σ(SC) − σ(s)| ≤ δ), where I is an indicator function that

evaluates to 1 if the condition is true and 0 otherwise.

This relieson knowledge of the underlying sensor value distribu-

tion of S, and the specific aggregation function, σ. We now show

the derivation of γ values for the most common sensor aggrega-

tion functions (min,max,sum,avg and median) over single at-

tributes with discrete distributions:

P

sp(SA = s) ·

• Min/Max: I(|min(SC) − min(SA)| ≤ δ) = 1 if min(SA)

lies between [min(SC) − δ,min(SC) + δ]. If f is the prob-

ability density function (pdf) and Φ is the cumulative den-

sity function (cdf) of the distribution of S, then, for any j,

f(j) is the probability of obtaining a j and (1 − Φ(j)) is

the probability that a reading is greater than j. Thus in a

sample of size i, j will be the minimum with probability

f(j)(1 − Φ(j))i−1. Therefore:

¯ γ =

|S|

X

i=1

p(|SA| = i)

?min(SC)+δ?

X

j=?min(SC)−δ?

f(j) · (1 − Φ(j))i−1

(1)

Using a similar argument for Max, we get:

¯ γ =

|S|

X

i=1

p(|SA| = i)

?min(SC)+δ?

X

j=?min(SC)−δ?

f(j) · Φ(j)i−1

(2)

• Sum: I(|sum(SC)−sum(SA)| ≤ δ) = 1 if sum(SA) lies

between [sum(SC)−δ),sum(SC)+δ)]. If f|SA|is the pdf

of the sum of variables and Φ|SA|is the cdf of the sum of

variables, we get:

¯ γ =

|S|

X

i=1

p(|SA| = i) ·`Φ|SA|(u) − Φ|SA|(l)´

(3)

where u = (sum(SC) + δ) and l = (sum(SC) − δ).

• Avg: I(|avg(SC) − avg(SA)| ≤ δ) = 1 if sum(SA) lies

between [|SA|(avg(SC)−δ),|SA|(avg(SC)+δ)]. If f|SA|

is the pdf of the sum of variables and Φ|SA|is the cdf of the

sum of variables, then with a similar argument as before, we

get:

¯ γ =

|S|

X

i=1

p(|SA| = i) ·`Φ|SA|(u) − Φ|SA|(l)´

(4)

where u = i(avg(SC) + δ) and l = i(avg(SC) − δ).

• Median: I(|med(SC) − med(SA)| ≤ δ) = 1 if med(SA)

lies in [med(SC) − δ,med(SC) + δ]. If f be the proba-

bility density function (pdf),and Φ is the cumulative density

function (cdf) of distribution of S, then, for any j, f(j) is

the probability of obtaining a j, Φ(j) is the probability that a

reading is less than j, and (1 − Φ(j)) is the probability that

a reading is greater than j. Thus in a sample of size i, j will

be the median with probability,

p(j) =`

?i

2?

Therefore:

i

´· f(j) · Φ(j)?i

2?· (1 − Φ(j))i−?i

2?−1.

¯ γ =

|S|

X

i=1

p(|SA| = i)

?min(SC)+δ?

X

j=?min(SC)−δ?

p(j)

(5)

2

EXAMPLE 4. To evaluate the expected value of γ for the ap-

plication in Example 1, let us assume that the probability of the

adversary eavesdropping onasingle node is0.2 and thedataisdis-

tributed as N(5,0.1). Also, let the tolerance δ = 0.1. Noting that

we have σ2(S) = 4.96, we can use Equation (4) to evaluate the

expected probability. We get ¯ γ =P5

2, which on evaluation yields ¯ γ = 0.2499. This agrees with our

intuition that if the adversary is able to compromise one node, then

she is far from being able to estimate the aggregate of the network

consisting of 5 nodes.

i=1pi· (Φ(5.06) − Φ(4.86))

2

4.1Hierarchical Aggregation

Thus far, we have only considered aggregation within a group

with a single aggregation point. We now generalize to eavesdrop-

ping over hierarchical groups: the goal is to consider how close the

adversary gets to an aggregate value higher in the tree when she

eavesdrops on data in the lower levels comprising that group. (If

we assume that the adversary eavesdrops only at one level, then

this problem is identical to the one considered above.) The higher

the adversary listens, the closer she gets to aggregate of the whole

network.

An example scenario is depicted in Figure 1, where we assume

thattheadversaryhaseavesdropped ongroups withnodes s1,...,s5

as the nodes responsible for aggregation. Now, we want to know

how close she gets to the aggregate at s0.

The probability of adversary learning the result of aggregation

at a level l is called the eavesdropping vulnerability over a hier-

archy and is denoted by γl, where l indicates the hierarchical level

from which the adversary listenswiththe goal of compromising the

overall system. As with γ, γlwill be a function of Sl,Sl

and δ. We consider the effect of a lower-level compromise on a

higher-level node to be a “partial compromise” of the higher node,

i.e., we define Sl

set at level l is the union of sets σ(Sl−1

fact that the sensor values at level l will be aggregates of values at

level l − 1.

A,Sl

C,σ

A=S

iσ(Sl−1

Ai),l > 1. Note that the adversary’s

Ai), which accounts for the

2These values can be found by converting it into standard normal

form for which Φ is well tabulated.

Page 6

DEFINITION 3. (Eavesdropping VulnerabilityoveraHierarchy)

The eavesdropping vulnerability (γl) for the adversary over a hier-

archy isdefined asγl(σ,Sl,Sl

where σ is the aggregating function and δ is the error in estimate,

and Sl

A,Sl

C,δ) = p`|σ(Sl

C) − σ(Sl

A)| ≤ δ´,

A=S

iσ(Sl−1

Ai),l ≥ 1.

2

Note that with this definition, γ = γ0. We can compute γl by

conditioning onvarious parameters. Forexample, knowing σ,Sl,Sl

and δ, we can compute:

C

γl=

X

Sl−1

A1,...,Sl−1

An

p(Sl−1

A1,...,Sl−1

An) · I(d ≤ δ)

(6)

where d = |σ(Sl

Computing γl, in general, involves knowing how much the data

from different groups are related. If the data from different groups

at level l−1are correlated, then computing γlcan be quitedifficult.

Correlations between groups are also undesirable because they can

help the adversary can make a good estimate by eavesdropping on

only a few groups.

Although the exact computation of γl is generally difficult, an

approximate answer bymakingsomesimplifyingassumptions, such

as simultaneous eavesdropping in all the groups. The example be-

low illustrates this idea.

C) − σ(Sl

A)|.

EXAMPLE 5. Consider the scenario in Example 1. Let us as-

sume that each of the nodes s0,...,s5are themselves aggregating

data in their groups and that the distribution in each group is as

follows: s1 : N(4.9,1), s2 : N(4.8,1), s3 : N(4.8,1), s4 :

N(5,1), s5 : N(5.2,1), and the data from node s0 is distributed

N(5,1). If the data at this level is being averaged, the resulting av-

erage will be normally distributed with mean5+4.9+4.8+4.8+5+5.2

and a standard deviation

N(4.95,0.16). Now, if the probability of eavesdropping simulta-

neously in every group is 0.5, the eavesdropping vulnerability for

δ = 0.1 isP5

4.2Performance Ratio

The eavesdropping vulnerability γ or γlgives us the probability

that anadversary canobtainagoodestimateof theactual aggregate.

Obviously, we would like to design sensor networks that minimize

this probability; however, to do this, we will generally have to incur

additional overhead.

If we use benefit to mean how close an estimate is to the tar-

get (in the case of our application, this is the “real” aggregate;

in the case of the adversary, this is our network’s aggregate), we

can define a performance ratio to compare different sensor network

schemes. We define the performance ratio of the adversary relative

to a set of compromised nodes, ρA, as: ρA(σ,S,SA,SC,δ,C) =

γ(σ,S,SA,SC,δ)

Cr(SA)

. The increase in cost incurred to reduce γ can be

measured by

tolerant data protocol and C is the cost model for the standard

streaming model, as defined earlier. We can now define the per-

formance ratio of a sensor network, ρ, as:

6

1+1+1+1+1+1

36

, which has distribution

i=1(0.5)i· (Φ(5.06) − Φ(4.86)) = 0.4599.

2

C(S)

C?(S). Here, C

?isthecost model foranyeavesdropping-

ρ(σ,S,SA,SC,δ,C,C

?) =

1

ρA(σ,S,SA,SC,δ,C)·C(S)

C?(S)

(7)

Wecancalculate theexpected value of ρby conditioning on various

parameters. Ideally, we would like to design our data protocol to

maximize ρ as much as possible.

EXAMPLE 6. Consider the application in Example 1 with the

cost as computed in Example 3. We assume that the probability of

the adversary eavesdropping on a node is 0.2, yielding a cost of

0.025 ∗ 4J = 0.1J.

P5

i=1

now be computed as,

for the adversary increases the ratio ρ. If we make it harder for

the adversary to eavesdrop, say reducing the probability of eaves-

dropping on a single node to 0.1, then we will have, ¯ ρ = 1.2248.

Techniques for increasing performance ratio are discussed in the

next section.

(Φ(5.06)−Φ(4.86))·pi

0.1i

1.799·1.36

= 1.799. ¯ ρ can

1

1.36= 0.5558. Intuitively, higher cost

2

Toincrease thequality of the sample, weneed more observations

(SC), which, however, increases both cost and (if the distribution

of values remains the same) γ. Hence, we can identify a trade-off

between quality, cost, and having a eavesdropping vulnerability.

5.COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST

EAVESDROPPING

Given our understanding of the factors that affect eavesdropping

potential, we now present some general techniques to thwart ad-

versaries. We distinguish between traditional, cryptographic tech-

niques and non-cryptographic schemes.

5.1Cryptographic techniques

Encryption and authentication using cryptographic techniques

makes a system significantly more secure against eavesdropping

and other attacks. Encryption can be used to keep data secure

from the adversary, and authentication can be used to safeguard

against spurious data. In essence, these techniques attempt to en-

sure system-level confidentiality by protecting all links. For the

sensor network environment, symmetric key techniques are most

commonly used, but it is unclear how to manage keys and how to

justifytheoverhead of encryption. Among themany prior works on

cryptographic techniques for privacy in wireless sensor networks,

[18] and [15] describe methods to achieve authenticity and confi-

dentiality.

However, many approaches (e.g., [19, 9]) assume a pre-key dis-

tributionwhichimpedesnetwork creationand makesdynamicmem-

bership difficult. In [4], Chan and Perrig advocate that end-to-end

encryption is not possible for sensor networks and foresee new

methods as the solution. Moreover, encryption may not help if the

nodes themselves can be compromised. Taking our cue from these

points, we briefly suggest several alternatives below.

5.2Non-cryptographic techniques

Non-cryptographic techniques make it harder to eavesdrop by

reducing the chance that an adversary’s sensor data sample SA

matches the system’s sample SC.

Data Filtering or Compensation. One technique is to deliber-

ately send spurious data (or data with spurious offsets) from the

sensors, and to filter the noise at the aggregating point. After fil-

tering, the resulting data set will comprise legitimate information

about the underlying network. The adversary, who is not aware of

this shared information, will see data that follows a different distri-

bution.

One such idea, which we are investigating extensively, is termed

confusion [6]. Under such a scheme, whenever the sensor wishes to

transmit a message, it appends the shared secret (token) to the mes-

sage. A set of confusion-generating nodes then could inject spuri-

ous data, which is indistinguishable to a third party, into the net-

work. Such confusion messages could be generated either by third

party nodes or be a subset of sensors themselves. At the receiving

end, the secret can be used to separate the legitimate message from

the noise. Yet while the aggregate node can filter out superfluous

Page 7

messages from confusers, an eavesdropper with incomplete knowl-

edge cannot make such distinctions. Since the eavesdropper is not

aware of which tokens belong to the sensors and which belong to

the confusers, she cannot identify the legitimate messages. Thus, if

she ends up accepting the “noise,” she will end up with a different

distribution of the data in the network.

As with encryption techniques, a confusion-based technique as-

sumes a shared secret unique to a sensor, but it may may require

less computational power per sensor node, it is tolerant to the com-

promise of a few nodes, and it is resistant to active eavesdropping.

The savings on per-device power in the confusion-based approach

comes fromthefact that thereisno need forthe expensive exponen-

tiation operations involved in encryption. Confusion does require

more message transmissions, but these can be amortized by adding

greater numbers of devices.

EXAMPLE 7. Consider the application in Example 1. Suppose

the sensors double their transmission rate by injecting a spuri-

ous value for every legitimate one. Assume that the legitimate

data is distributed within the range N(5,0.1), while the spuri-

ous data ensures the adversary’s sample will be uniformly dis-

tributed in [4,7]. Given the model of Example 6, the cost is C(S) =

8×5×(0.025+0.015)+4×0.015+8×5×0.025J = 2.66J.

P5

i=1

0.1i

1

0.1492·

the vulnerability of the network, when compared to the baseline

model’s ¯ ρ = 0.5558.

(Φ(5.06)−Φ(4.86))·pi

= 0.1492. ¯ ρ can now be computed as,

2.66= 3.4267. Clearly, this technique greatly reduces

1.36

Data cloaking [10] has been proposed as another approach to

achieving privacy in sensor networks. Cloaking of data involves

perturbing the data by a predefined offset. This has been used to

achieve anonymity within a network. A similar idea can also be

used to counter eavesdropping: 1) First, nodes are partitioned into

disjoint subsets. 2) Then, based on a shared secret, each node

within a partition is assigned an offset. This offset is added to

the actual sensor reading before transmission. Ideally, this offset

should be unique to a partition. 3) At the point of aggregation, the

appropriate offset is subtracted from the reading before aggrega-

tion.

Although thisschemerequiresmaintaininganode-to-offset map-

ping at the aggregating point, it can easily be obviated by having

all the nodes within a partition transmit within a time slot. With

such a routing protocol, only the mapping of different time slots to

the offset would have to be stored and this information is modest

compared the original mapping.

The adversary, who has no information about the offset, will be

readily misled by the transmitted information. Even if she man-

ages to compromise a few nodes and learn the offset information,

the damage is limited to members of the partition with the compro-

mised nodes.

EXAMPLE 8. Consider the scenario in Example 1. Let us as-

sume that the nodes s1,...,s5 are themselves aggregation point

of their groups and their data is distributed as N(5,1). Also,

let the data at node s0 be also distributed N(5,1). If average is

the aggregation function used, it will be normally distributed with

mean

6

= 5 and standard deviation

sume that the probability of eavesdropping on a single message is

0.5, the eavesdropping vulnerability isP5

Φ(4.86)) = 0.9843 × 0.4553 = 0.4482.

Now, if we assume that each sensor i,i ∈ {0,...,5} adds an

offset 0.1i, which is subtracted out at s0, then the average will

be normally distributed with mean5+5.1+5.2+5.3+5.4+5.5

5×6

1×6

36

= 0.16. If we as-

i=1(0.5)i· (Φ(5.06) −

6

= 5.25

and standard deviation

ping vulnerability will beP5

0.9843 × 0.1101 = 0.1083. which is a clear reduction in eaves-

dropping vulnerability from 0.4482 without using the offsets.

1×6

36

= 0.16. In this case, the eavesdrop-

i=1(0.5)i· (Φ(5.06) − Φ(4.86)) =

2

Attribute-value Correlation. Yet another possibility is to use cor-

relations between different attributes. If the application at hand is

temperature monitoring and a sensor’s temperature and voltage are

correlated, then, for instance, the sensors might transmit voltages

in certain cases, and temperatures the remainder of the time. If we

assume that the adversary does not have the correlation model, then

such data will be useless to her. Constructing correlations between

attributes has been previously studied (e.g., [7]), with the objec-

tive of reducing the cost for the network. Here we use it as shared

information. Importantly, it takes a considerable amount of time,

energy, and node samples to learn this correlation model, mean-

ing that an attacker would need to devote significant resources to

compromising a large portion of the system.

EXAMPLE 9. Again consider Example 7, with the modification

that with probability 0.5, the sensors send voltage readings. Fur-

ther, they also output as many spurious messages as temperature

readings, in order to ensure that the adversary’s distribution is uni-

formly distributed in [4,7]. In this case, C(S) = (1

5×(0.025+0.015)+4×0.015+1

1.76J, ¯ ρ can now be computed as,

is better than strictly using the filtering/compensation approach.

2×8+1

2×4)×

2×8+1

1

0.1492·1.36

2×4)×5×(0.025) =

1.76= 5.1791. which

6.RELATED WORK

Prior works on sensor security [22, 14] present attack models,

but our focus and attack taxonomy are a more general classification

based on the goals of the adversary, and our focus is on the security

of theoverall systemeven when individual nodes arecompromised.

There is also a significant literature on quantifying security in

a context-specific way. [13] presents a quantitative model of the

security intrusion process based on attacker behavior: their model

is based on empirical data collected from intrusion experiments.

[20] quantifies security strength and risk using economic criteria.

It should be noted that though these are general methods, their ap-

plicability to sensor networks is uncertain. Our approach, in con-

trast, is based on data models for different applications of sensor

networks.

The idea of developing a probabilistic model for data aggrega-

tion in sensor networks was introduced in [8]. We can use the same

techniques to learn a model from the data. However, our focus is

on using the model to understand the security vulnerabilities of a

sensor network, as opposed to minimizing power usage in com-

puting aggregates. This slightly resembles the resilient techniques

for data aggregation of [21], although we focus on quantitatively

ascertaining robustness in the presence of an adversary.

7.CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented an attacker taxonomy for sensor networks

which has three main classes of attackers: eavesdropping, disrup-

tion, and hijacking. So far as we know, our work is the first to

focus on quantifying system-level eavesdropping vulnerability. We

first study asingle-level aggregation tree (γ) and then a hierarchical

network (γl), developing a probabilistic scheme for assessing their

eavesdropping vulnerability. We then consider trading off power

consumption versus security and data quality/accuracy. Finally, we

propose a series of solutions using cryptographic techniques, data

filtering, and attribute correlation.

Page 8

This paper represents an initial step in a much broader plan.

First, we are extending our model to the disruption and hijacking

models. We are also developing a comprehensive characterization

of common sensor network protocols and aggregation functions

with respect to their robustness. We ultimately hope to consider a

range of other issues, such as unreliable networks, temporary out-

ages, and correlations between the values at different sensors.

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