Conference Paper

On Purely Automated Attacks and Click-Based Graphical Passwords.

DOI: 10.1109/ACSAC.2008.18 Conference: Twenty-Fourth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2008, Anaheim, California, USA, 8-12 December 2008
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT We present and evaluate various methods for purely au- tomated attacks against click-based graphical passwords. Our purely automated methods combine click-order heuris- tics with focus-of-attention scan-paths generated from a computational model of visual attention. Our method re- sults in a significantly better automated attack than pre- vious work, guessing 8-15% of passwords for two repre- sentative images using dictionaries of less than 224.6 en- tries, and about 16% of passwords on each of these im- ages using dictionaries of less than 231.4 entries (where the full password space is 243). Relaxing our click-order pat- tern substantially increased the efficacy of our attack al- beit with larger dictionaries of 234.7 entries, allowing at- tacks that guessed 48-54% of passwords (compared to pre- viousresults of 0.9%and 9.1%on the same two imageswith 235 guesses). These latter automated attacks are indepen- dent of focus-of-attention models, and are based on image- independent guessing patterns. Our results show that au- tomated attacks, which are easier to arrange than human- seeded attacks and are more scalable to systems that use multiple images, pose a significant threat.

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