Conference Paper

The Logical Handling of Threats, Rewards, Tips, and Warnings.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-75256-1_23 Conference: Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, 9th European Conference, ECSQARU 2007, Hammamet, Tunisia, October 31 - November 2, 2007, Proceedings
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT Previous logic-based handling of arguments has mainly focused on explanation or justification in presence of inconsistency.
As a consequence, only one type of argument has been considered, namely the explanatory type; several argumentation frameworks
have been proposed for generating and evaluating explanatory arguments. However, recent investigations of argument-based negotiation
have emphasized other types of arguments, such as threats, rewards, tips, and warnings. In parallel, cognitive psychologists recently started studying the characteristics of these different types of arguments,
and the conditions under which they have their desired effect. Bringing together these two lines of research, we present in
this article some logical definitions as well as some criteria for evaluating each type of argument. Empirical findings from
cognitive psychology validate these formal results.

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