Conference Paper

An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_36 Conference: Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009. Proceedings
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT In this paper we study the Nash-equilibrium and equilibrium bidding strategies of the Pooled Reverse Auction for troubled assets. The auction was described in (Ausubel & Cramton 2008(1)). We fur- ther extend our analysis to a more general class of games which we call Summation Games. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash- equilibrium in these games when the utility functions satisfy a certain condition. We also give an ecient way to compute the Nash-equilibrium of these games. We show that then Nash-equilibrium of these games can be computed using an ascending auction. The aforementioned reverse auction can be expressed as a special instance of such a game. We also, show that even a more general version of the well-known oligopoly game of Cournot can be expressed in our model and all of the previously men- tioned results apply to that as well.

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