Conference Paper

An Active Intrusion Detection System for LAN Specific Attacks.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13577-4_11 Conference: Advances in Computer Science and Information Technology, AST/UCMA/ISA/ACN 2010 Conferences, Miyazaki, Japan, June 23-25, 2010. Joint Proceedings
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT Local Area Network (LAN) based attacks are due to compromised hosts in the network and mainly involve spoofing with falsified
IP-MAC pairs. Since Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a stateless protocol such attacks are possible. Several schemes have
been proposed in the literature to circumvent these attacks, however, these techniques either make IP-MAC pairing static,
modify the existing ARP, patch operating systems of all the hosts etc. In this paper we propose an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) for LAN specific attacks without any extra constraint like static IP-MAC, changing the ARP etc. The proposed IDS is
an active detection mechanism where every pair of IP-MAC are validated by a probing technique. The scheme is successfully
validated in a test bed and results also illustrate that the proposed technique minimally adds to the network traffic.

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    ABSTRACT: Spoofing with falsified IP-MAC pair is the first step in most of the LAN based-attacks. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is stateless, which is the main cause that makes spoofing possible. Several network level and host level mechanisms have been proposed to detect and mitigate ARP spoofing but each of them has their own drawback. In this paper we propose a Host-based Intrusion Detection system for LAN attacks, which works without any extra constraint like static IP-MAC, modifying ARP etc. The proposed scheme is verified under all possible attack scenarios. The scheme is successfully validated in a test bed with various attack scenarios and the results show the effectiveness of the proposed technique.
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