Conference Paper

A Logic for Coalitions with Bounded Resources.

DOI: 10.1093/logcom/exq032 Conference: IJCAI 2009, Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Pasadena, California, USA, July 11-17, 2009
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT Recent work on Alternating-Time Temporal Logic and Coalition Logic has allowed the expression of many interesting properties of coalitions and strategies. However, there is no natural way of expressing resource requirements in these logics. In this article, we present a Resource-Bounded Coalition Logic (RBCL) that has explicit representation of resource bounds in the language. We give a complete and sound axiomatization of RBCL, a procedure for deciding satisfiability of RBCL formulas, and a model-checking algorithm.

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