Conference Paper

Enforcing Non-safety Security Policies with Program Monitors.

DOI: 10.1007/11555827_21 Conference: Computer Security - ESORICS 2005, 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Milan, Italy, September 12-14, 2005, Proceedings
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT We consider the enforcement powers of program monitors, which intercept security-sensitive actions of a target application at run time and take remedial steps whenever the target attempts to execute a potentially dangerous action. A common belief in the security commu- nity is that program monitors, regardless of the remedial steps available to them when detecting violations, can only enforce safety properties. We formally analyze the properties enforceable by various program monitors and nd that although this belief is correct when considering monitors with simple remedial options, it is incorrect for more powerful monitors that can be modeled by edit automata. We dene an interesting set of properties called innite renewal properties and demonstrate how, when given any reasonable innite renewal property, to construct an edit au- tomaton that provably enforces that property. We analyze the set of innite renewal properties and show that it includes every safety prop- erty, some liveness properties, and some properties that are neither safety nor liveness.

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