Leadership Games in Collective Action

Rationality and Society (Impact Factor: 0.91). 04/1995; DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007002008
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    • "From a game-theoretic perspective, if A>B, the model reflects a battle of the sexes with interaction partners of the other population [99], while simultaneously a stag hunt game (or coordination game) is played with interaction partners of the same population [29], [41]. Note that the structure of a stag hunt game also results when a prisoner’s dilemma game comes along with repeated interactions, reputation effects, or costly punishment [43], [100]. "
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    ABSTRACT: Understanding norms is a key challenge in sociology. Nevertheless, there is a lack of dynamical models explaining how one of several possible behaviors is established as a norm and under what conditions. Analysing an agent-based model, we identify interesting parameter dependencies that imply when two behaviors will coexist or when a shared norm will emerge in a heterogeneous society, where different populations have incompatible preferences. Our model highlights the importance of randomness, spatial interactions, non-linear dynamics, and self-organization. It can also explain the emergence of unpopular norms that do not maximize the collective benefit. Furthermore, we compare behavior-based with preference-based punishment and find interesting results concerning hypocritical punishment. Strikingly, pressuring others to perform the same public behavior as oneself is more effective in promoting norms than pressuring others to meet one's own private preference. Finally, we show that adaptive group pressure exerted by randomly occuring, local majorities may create norms under conditions where different behaviors would normally coexist.
    PLoS ONE 08/2014; 9(8):e104207. DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0104207 · 3.23 Impact Factor
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    • "Many observers of the open source software phenomenon point to the paramount role many leaders have had in the development of an open source software project (Pavlicek 2000). In fact, it has already been argued that various forms of leadership extending beyond simple authoritarian leadership can have a positive effect on motivation of contributors for collective action (see Coloner 1995, Frolich et al. 1971, Salisbury 1969). However, leadership is likely to be very different from the leadership we have observed in the private investment—and perhaps even the collective action model of innovation. "
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    ABSTRACT: Currently, two models of innovation are prevalent in organization science. The "private investment" model assumes returns to the innovator result from private goods and efficient regimes of intellectual property protection. The "collective action" model assumes that under conditions of market failure, innovators collaborate in order to produce a public good. The phenomenon of open source software development shows that users program to solve their own as well as shared technical problems, and freely reveal their innovations without appropriating private returns from selling the software. In this paper, we propose that open source software development is an exemplar of a compound "private-collective" model of innovation that contains elements of both the private investment and the collective action models and can offer society the "best of both worlds" under many conditions. We describe a new set of research questions this model raises for scholars in organization science. We offer some details regarding the types of data available for open source projects in order to ease access for researchers who are unfamiliar with these, and also offer some advice on conducting empirical studies on open source software development processes.
    Organization Science 04/2009; 14(2). DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1410789 · 4.34 Impact Factor
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    • "The members of the group, who enjoy the collective and private benefits that leaders provide, have an incentive, then, to accept and contribute to the beneficial position of the leaders, giving them their support or votes. More recently, Colomer (1995) has found that his analysis "supports the conclusion that leadership can explain the creation of organizations for collective action and that leadership effects reinforce the differences in the relative strength of different kinds of groups" (p.225). While these theories of collective action highlight the significance of leadership they do not follow the broader tradition of inquiry into leadership in delineating its distinctiveness. "

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