Competition, Regulation, and Hospital Costs, 1982 to 1986
ABSTRACT We used data on 5490 nonfederal, short-term general hospitals to evaluate the relative effectiveness of regulatory and market-oriented cost-control policies on hospital cost inflation between 1982 and 1986. All-payer rate-regulation programs reduced inflation rates by 16.3% in Massachusetts, 15.4% in Maryland, and 6.3% in New York, compared with the control hospitals in 43 states with neither all-payer rate regulation nor an aggressive market-oriented strategy. New Jersey hospitals experienced a rate of cost inflation similar to the control hospitals. Given the effectiveness of its regulatory program in the 1970s, however, New Jersey began and ended the period from 1982 to 1986 with the lowest costs, controlling for wages and patient mix. California's market-oriented cost-control policy reduced inflation rates by 10.1%. Hospitals with large percentages of patients insured by Medicare's prospective payment system experienced cost inflation rates 16.1% lower than hospitals with small percentages of Medicare patients. Investor-owned hospitals experienced rates of cost increase 11.6% higher than private nonprofit hospitals and 15.0% higher than public hospitals.
- SourceAvailable from: Fran Collyer
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- "Yet the need for strong state regulation is borne out by overseas experience. In the USA during the period between 1982 and 1986, studies show that it was the direct regulation of healthcare prices rather than market competition that led to a slowing of the rate of growth of hospital costs (Biles et al 1980; Robinson and Luft 1988). "
ABSTRACT: Over the past two decades the Australian healthcare sector has been fundamentally restructured by two developments – a redirection of government policy toward privatisation of publicly funded institutions, and a new interest in strategic investment from the corporate sector. Together these developments have dramatically reshaped the healthcare sector. This new healthcare sector is no longer dominated by large public institutions surrounded by a constellation of small, independent, practitioner owned and operated service facilities. In its place stand large corporations tied to government through contract agreements. As a consequence the incomes of these healthcare corporations depend almost entirely on the public purse. The changes to the sector can best be summarised as a transition from a ‘cottage industry’ of owner-operated facilities into a vertically and horizontally integrated ‘medical-industrial complex’ combining general practices, hospitals, insurance companies, research and teaching institutions, and services such as radiology and pathology.
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- "Recent research on the effects of hospital competition and regulation yields ambiguous implications concerning the future of specialized psychiatric services (Luft, Robinson, Garnick, et al. 1986; Robinson and Luft 1988; Melnick and Zwanziger 1988). Both competition and regulation appear to be effective in restraining the rise in hospital costs. "
ABSTRACT: We performed detailed simulations of DRG-based payments to general hospitals for treatment of nonexempt psychiatric and medical/surgical patients under Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS). We then compared these results to calculated costs for the same patients. Hospitals without specialized psychiatric units tend to fare better financially on their psychiatric than on their medical/surgical caseloads, although the levels of gain for these two types of patients are correlated. Hospitals with nonexempt psychiatric units generally have similar rates of gain on psychiatric and medical/surgical patients. Comparing psychiatric treatment in "scatter-bed" sites with that provided in nonexempt units, the higher rate of gain under PPS for treatment in scatter beds results largely from shorter lengths of stay. We discuss hospital behavior and the relationships between treatment of psychiatric illness under DRG-based payment and its treatment in exempt psychiatric units, which are excluded from DRG-based payment.Health Services Research 01/1991; 25(5):785-808. · 2.49 Impact Factor
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ABSTRACT: Long-term acute care hospitals (LTACHs) treat patients with complex medical conditions requiring hospital care for extended periods of time. In the last decade, Medicare saw spiraling costs for post-acute care settings. The Balanced Budget Act mandated the use of Prospective Payment System (PPS) for all post-acute care settings including LTACHs. Medicare shifted to PPS for LTACHs in October 2002. This study analyzes the early effect of Medicare's PPS on the staffing intensity of LTACHs. The study uses panel data of measures of hospital and market characteristics in years 2001 through 2004. The impact of the payment mechanism, market, and organizational variables on the staffing intensity of LTACHs is evaluated using fixed-effects (within-groups) regression analysis. The fixed-effects regression models found that Medicare's PPS was associated with higher staffing intensity of the LTACHs in years 2003 and 2004. Market-level per capita income was significantly positively associated with staffing intensity. No secular trend in staffing intensity was found. The concern that the cost containment incentives of PPS would result in lowered staffing levels of LTACHs was not borne out by this study. Further follow-up is required to assess in the longer term the effects of PPS on staffing and quality of care in LTACHs.Health care management review 01/2008; 33(3):264-73. DOI:10.1097/01.HMR.0000324911.26896.d8 · 1.30 Impact Factor