Article

The relationship between the World Trade Organisation and the Office International des Epizooties.

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Brussels, Belgium.
Revue scientifique et technique (International Office of Epizootics) (Impact Factor: 0.69). 05/1997; 16(1):13-6.
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT The provisions of the World Trade Organisation Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures are designed to extend the liberalisation of trade, without increasing the risk to public, animal or plant health. The international standards set by the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) will be used as a benchmark by World Trade Organisation panels and committees when evaluating national sanitary-based regulations. For a significant liberalisation of trade to be achieved, Member Countries are faced with a dual mandate: a) each country must put these concepts into practice when making import/export decisions; and b) each country must make the commitment to support the OIE in its efforts to develop and review sanitary standards. Of equal importance to the application of standards is the cultural change that trade and regulatory communities must undergo. The author examines the role of Member Countries and the OIE in the implementation of this important agreement.

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