Article

Physician financial incentives and feedback: Failure to increase cancer screening in Medicaid managed care

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA.
American Journal of Public Health (Impact Factor: 4.23). 12/1998; 88(11):1699-701. DOI: 10.2105/AJPH.88.11.1699
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT A randomized controlled trial evaluated the impact of feedback and financial incentives on physician compliance with cancer screening guidelines for women 50 years of age and older in a Medicaid health maintenance organization (HMO).
Half of 52 primary care sites received the intervention, which included written feedback and a financial bonus. Mammography, breast exam, colorectal screening, and Pap testing compliance rates were evaluated.
From 1993 to 1995, screening rates doubled overall (from 24% to 50%), with no significant differences between intervention and control group sites.
Financial incentives and feedback did not improve physician compliance with cancer screening guidelines in a Medicaid HMO.

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Available from: Edward J. Lusk, May 27, 2014
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