Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1999, Vol. 76, No. 4, 574-586
Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions
(Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes
(Community, Autonomy, Divinity)
Paul Rozin and Laura Lowery
University of Pennsylvania
University of Virginia
It is proposed that 3 emotions—contempt, anger, and disgust—are typically elicited, across cultures, by
violations of 3 moral codes proposed by R. A. Shweder and his colleagues (R. A. Shweder, N. C. Much,
M. Mahapatra, & L. Park, 1997). The proposed alignment links anger to autonomy (individual rights
violations), contempt to community (violation of communal codes, including hierarchy), and disgust to
divinity (violations of purity-sanctity). This is the CAD triad hypothesis. Students in the United States
and Japan were presented with descriptions of situations that involve 1 of the types of moral violations
and asked to assign either an appropriate facial expression (from a set of 6) or an appropriate word
(contempt, anger, disgust, or their translations). Results generally supported the CAD triad hypothesis.
Results were further confirmed by analysis of facial expressions actually made by Americans to the
descriptions of these situations.
Mora) judgment and the condemnation of others, including
fictional others and others who have not harmed the self, is a
universal and essential feature of human social life. Many social
animals respond to violations, attacks, or defections against the
self in dyadic relationships (Trivers, 1971), but something seems
to have happened in the evolution of primate social cognition that
makes primates, particularly human beings, chimpanzees, and
bonobos, exquisitely sensitive to violations of the social order
committed by others against others (de Waal, 1996). In these few
species that exhibit what we might call "third-party" morality,
individuals react emotionally to violations, and these reactions
often have long-term effects on social relationships between vio-
lators and third parties. Could these emotional reactions be part of
the foundation of human morality?
Philosophers have long been divided as to whether human
morality is built on our rationality (e.g., Kant, 1789/1959) or our
emotionality (Hume, 1740/1969). Psychological work on morality
has generally focused on rationality and cognitive development
Paul Rozin and Laura Lowery, Department of Psychology, University of
Pennsylvania; Sumio Imada, Department of Psychology, Hiroshima-Shudo
University, Hiroshima, Japan; Jonathan Haidt, Department of Psychology,
University of Virginia.
Laura Lowery is now in independent practice in Berkeley, California.
This research was supported by grants from the Whitehall Foundation
and from the University of Pennsylvania.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul
Rozin, Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 3815 Wal-
nut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6196. Electronic mail may be
sent to email@example.com.
(e.g., Piaget, 1932/1965; Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983). Moral
development was thought to be driven by the cognitive process of
role taking as the child learns to respect a kind of moral logic (e.g.,
"If I were in her position I would not like this, therefore I should
not do this"). However, since the 1980s, increasing attention has
been paid to the emotional basis of morality. Authors in a variety
of fields have begun to argue that emotions are themselves a kind
of perception or rationality (de Sousa, 1991); that emotions are
embodied thoughts (Rosaldo, 1984); and that "beneath the extraor-
dinary variety of surface behavior and consciously articulated
ideals, there is a set of emotional states that form the bases for a
limited number of universal moral categories that transcend time
and locality" (Kagan, 1984, p. 118; see also Shweder & Haidt,
1993). Cross-cultural work has begun to demonstrate that
cognitive-developmental theories work less well outside of West-
ern middle-class populations and that emotional reactions are often
the best predictors of moral judgments (Haidt, Roller, & Dias,
1993; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987).
We believe that work on the moral emotions has progressed to
the point where we can begin to systematize and taxonomize some
of the moral emotions and relate them in an orderly way to the
structure of the social world. We focus on two principal clusters of
moral emotions that should be of interest to social psychologists,
for they make people care about the social order. The first cluster
of moral emotions is shame, embarrassment, and guilt (SEG), all
of which involve ongoing assessments of the moral worth and fit
of the individual self within a community. These emotions moti-
vate the individual to want to fit in, to behave in a culturally
acceptable fashion, and to avoid harming people. They are self-
focused and are sometimes referred to as the self-conscious emo-
CAD TRIAD HYPOTHESIS
tions (Lewis, 1993). They can be distinguished from each other,
yet they are interrelated (Keltner, 1995; Tangney, Miller, Flicker,
& Barlow, 1996). These emotions may be crucial for human
civilization, for they reflect (or implement) the internalization of
the social order in the individual (Freud, 1900/1976).
The second cluster of moral emotions reflects a similar concern
for the integrity of the social order, but now turned outward to
others. Contempt, anger, and disgust, we argue here, are the three
main "other-critical" moral emotions, a cluster of related but
distinguishable emotional reactions to the moral violations of
others. The present study tests the hypothesis that each of these
three emotions is triggered by a violation of a specific part of the
There are good reasons to focus on contempt, anger, and disgust
as a coherent cluster of moral emotions. Izard (1971, 1977)
grouped these three emotions together as the hostility triad and
found that they were often experienced together in day-to-day
interactions. Furthermore, he noted that they all involve disap-
proval of others. However, there are also differences among the
three emotions. Anger has often been studied in animals and in
humans as a nonmoral emotion, a reaction to frustration or goal
blockage, linked to an action tendency that marshals the resources
required to mount an aggressive response to the blockage. Yet this
"primordial" form of anger, visible throughout the animal kingdom
(Plutchik, 1980), seems to have been elaborated among human
beings into a largely moral emotion. Commentators from Aristotle
(trans. 1941) through Lazarus (1991) have linked anger to insults,
transgressions, and rights violations against the self or those close
to the self.
Similarly, disgust has an animal precursor, called distaste, and it
has a nonmoral primordial form, called core disgust (Rozin &
Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993). Core disgust is
best described as a guardian of the mouth against potential con-
taminants. However core disgust appears to have been elaborated
into a more complex moral emotion that we call animal nature
disgust in which actions and events that remind us that we are
animals are repressed, hidden, or condemned. Such regulation of
bodily functions, including sex, eating, defecation, and hygiene,
are often incorporated into the moral codes of cultures and reli-
gions (e.g., the Book of Leviticus in the Old Testament), where
they appear to function as guardians of the soul against pollution
and degradation (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, in press-a).
Disgust is often further elaborated beyond bodily concerns into
what is called sociomoral disgust (Rozin et al., 1993, in press-b).
For Americans, sociomoral disgust is triggered by a variety of
situations in which people behave without dignity or in which
people strip others of their dignity. Miller (1997) suggested that
disgust is the principal emotion that responds to the vices of
hypocrisy, cruelty, fawning, and betrayal. Sociomoral disgust is
often triggered by third-party violations that may not directly
affect the self. For example, when we asked American adults to
describe three events in which they felt disgust, many responses
involved hearing about sociomoral violations such as racism and
child abuse (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). The same
was true for a sample of Japanese adults, although the nature of the
sociomoral events differed from the American events. And the
heavily moralized usage of the English word disgust does not
appear to be a quirk of the English language; it occurs as well in
French, German, Hebrew, Russian, Japanese, Chinese, Oriya (an
Indian language related to Hindi), and many other languages
(Haidt et al., 1997).
Contempt differs from disgust and anger in that it does not have
a clear animal origin. However, like the moral forms of anger and
disgust, contempt is usually said to involve a negative evaluation
of others and their actions. Contempt is often linked to hierarchy
and a vertical dimension of social evaluation. Izard (1977) noted
that contempt is often felt by members of one group for members
of other groups regarded as inferior and that it is therefore impor-
tant in prejudice and racism. Izard added that contempt is the most
subtle and coldest of the three emotions in the hostility triad.
Ekman (1994) expressed a similar view of contempt as disapprov-
ing of and feeling morally superior to someone. Miller (1997)
called contempt a close cousin of disgust, which works with
disgust to maintain social hierarchy and political order. Like Izard,
Miller characterized contempt as cooler than disgust, because it
involves an element of indifference toward the object of contempt.
We are not suggesting that these two clusters of moral emotions
(CAD and SEG) exhaust the list of moral emotions. There is a third
important cluster, which might be called the other-suffering emo-
tions, for it includes emotions triggered by the suffering of others,
such as pity and sympathy. These emotions were at the heart of the
moral theories of David Hume (1739/1969) and Adam Smith
(1759/1966), and they have been well studied in modern times
(e.g., Eisenberg, 1989; Hoffman, 1987). Furthermore, many other
emotions can play a role in moral behavior and cognition—for
example, fear (of punishment) and love or admiration (toward
moral exemplars). However, we think that the two clusters of CAD
and SEG are particularly rich and important because they are so
closely tied to the internalized respect for an external social order.
Mapping the Moral Domain
We believe the time is right to map out the moral domains of
contempt, anger, and disgust because of the appearance of an
important new theory of morality (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, &
Park, 1997). Shweder and his colleagues proposed that there are
three distinct ethics that cultures use to approach and resolve moral
issues: the ethics of community, autonomy, and divinity. Each
ethic is based on a different conceptualization of the person: as an
office-holder within a larger interdependent group-family-
community (community), as an individual preference structure
(autonomy), or as a divine creature bearing a bit of God within
(divinity). Depending on which of these three views one holds of
the person, a different set of moral goods and obligations becomes
paramount. To summarize the three ethics, we present here the
exact descriptions we provided to participants in Study 2, de-
1. [The ethics of Autonomy] Individual freedom/rights violations. In
these cases an action is wrong because it directly hurts another person,
or infringes upon his/her rights or freedoms as an individual. To
decide if an action is wrong, you think about things like harm, rights,
justice, freedom, fairness, individualism, and the importance of indi-
vidual choice and liberty.
2. [The ethics of Community] Community/hierarchy violations. In
these cases an action is wrong because a person fails to carry out his
or her duties within a community, or to the social hierarchy within the
community. To decide if an action is wrong, you think about things
ROZIN, LOWERY, IMADA, AND HAIDT
like duty, role-obligation, respect for authority, loyalty, group honor,
interdependence, and the preservation of the community.
3. [The ethics of Divinity] Divinity/purity violations. In these cases
a person disrespects the sacredness of God, or causes impurity or
degradation to himself/herself, or to others. To decide if an action is
wrong, you think about things like sin, the natural order of things,
sanctity, and the protection of the soul or the world from degradation
and spiritual defilement.
Shweder and his colleagues (1997) developed this model by
analyzing explanations by Hindu Indians of the moral status of a
variety of actions. A hierarchical cluster analysis of the themes and
moral concerns showed these three principal clusters, which are
quite intelligible to Westerners, even though they were derived
from Indians. Researchers carrying out ongoing work with this
theory have found it useful for explaining moral differences across
cultures and social classes (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993) and for
understanding such things as the culture wars (Hunter, 1991) that
currently pit liberals and progressivists (whose morality is limited
to the ethics of autonomy) against conservatives and orthodox
(with a broader moral domain, including community and divinity;
Jensen, 1997). It remains to be empirically determined whether
moral issues will cluster as hypothesized in all cultures.
In this study, we propose that the three other-critical moral
emotions align with the three Shweder ethics such that each of
these emotions is specifically aroused by violations of one of the
ethics. In particular, we hypothesize specific linkages between
community and contempt, autonomy and anger, and divinity and
disgust (Table 1). We have previously suggested a linkage between
disgust and divinity (Haidt et al., 1993) and the general form of the
CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1993; Rozin, Haidt, McCauley,
& Imada, 1997), but this article represents the first full statement
of the hypothesis and the first empirical investigation of it. We
cannot resist noting the coincidence that in the English language,
the first letter of each of the Shweder ethics matches the first letter
in the emotion word that we link to it. Given that the three words
Shweder chose have no etymological relation to the names of the
three moral emotions, the probability of this occurring by chance
is less than 1 in 10,000. This phonological correspondence moti-
vates our use of the term CAD to describe the moral-emotion triad
We think these linkages make conceptual sense. Because con-
tempt is often linked to hierarchical relations between individuals
and groups, it makes sense that contempt will often be triggered by
violations of the ethics of community. Because the appraisal con-
dition for anger is often said to be an insult or rights violation, it
stands to reason that anger will often be triggered by violations of
the ethics of autonomy. Finally, because disgust is an emotion that
guards the "soul" from degradation, it makes sense that disgust
will often be triggered by violations of the ethics of divinity.
The moral-emotion triad hypothesis states that there is a map-
ping between the three other-critical moral emotions and Shwed-
er's three moral ethics. Within any culture, actions that are viola-
tions of the ethics of autonomy will be most likely to elicit anger;
violations of the ethics of community will be most likely to elicit
contempt, and violations of the ethics of divinity will be most
likely to elicit disgust. We do not claim that the mapping is perfect,
and we expect to find many individual violations that do not
primarily elicit the predicted emotion. However, we predict that,
averaged across many violations, the relationship will hold and
will be substantial (i.e., not just greater than chance).
Shweder's three ethics provide a framework for assessing cul-
tural variation in morality, because cultures vary in the relative
importance or degree of elaboration of each of the three ethics.
However, in practice is appears to be the case that some trace of all
three ethics can be found within most cultures (Haidt et al., 1993;
Jensen, 1997). It appears also to be the case that the three emotions
of contempt, anger, and disgust are universally recognizable, at
least from their facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986;
Haidt & Keltner, in press; but see Russell, 1991, 1994). However
it remains to be seen whether societies that value hierarchy, such
as Japan, make greater use of contempt and community, whereas
societies that expand the personal rights of the individual, such as
the United States, make greater use of anger and autonomy. We
included Japanese as well as American participants in this study
for three reasons: (a) to allow evaluation of the CAD triad hypoth-
esis in more than one culture; (b) to allow for possible linkages
with other research on emotion, which has been frequently studied
in Japanese participants; and (c) because the moral system in Japan
is probably somewhat different from the American system, with
perhaps more emphasis on the morality of community.
The CAD triad hypothesis was assessed directly in Study 1 by
asking American and Japanese participants to read a list of moral
violations and then choose the most appropriate face that an
onlooker would make (from an array of contempt, anger, and
disgust faces) or the most appropriate emotion word to describe an
onlooker's feelings (contempt, anger, or disgust). The situations
were designed to represent clear violations of each of the Shweder
ethics. In Study 2, American and Japanese participants read de-
scriptions of Shweder's three ethics and then assigned them to the
list of moral violations used in Study 1. These classifications
allowed for a second test of the CAD triad hypothesis and also
allowed us to gauge the degree of consensus in moral category
assignment. Study 3 investigated an alternative to the CAD triad
hypothesis—namely, that contempt does not correspond to a do-
main of moral action but rather just to a lesser severity of violation
than does anger. Study 4 used an additional method of testing the
moral-emotion triad hypothesis by asking American participants
to actually pose the faces that would be appropriate for each
instance of a moral violation.
Respect, duty, hierarchy
Individual freedom, rights
Study 1 consisted of two separate tasks, performed by two separate
groups of participants: One group matched situations to emotion faces (the
face task); the other group matched situations to emotion words (the word
task). These two tasks could be considered two separate studies, but they
are analyzed together here because the methodology and results are similar.
CAD TRIAD HYPOTHESIS
Participants. All participants were undergraduate students in psychol-
ogy classes at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia or Hiroshima-
Shudo University in Hiroshima, Japan. Gender was not a variable of
interest in this study; men and women were well represented in all samples.
Among American participants, 90 performed the face task, and 20 per-
formed the word task. Corresponding numbers for Japanese participants
were 103 and 171, respectively.
Most participants performed the matching task during class time or in
the period just after a class ended. The time commitment involved 5 to 15
min. The data were collected in 1993 and 1994.
Materials and procedures. Participants were presented with a printed
list of 46 situations (in English or Japanese), presented from the point of
view of a person participating in or observing an event (see Table 2). The
situations were created primarily by us, informed by Shweder's three moral
ethics, and some were derived directly from an earlier version of Shweder
et al. (1997). The 27 items actually used in the analysis in this article are
listed in Table 2 in an order representing how we categorized these
situations as moral violations.
The study actually had two aims: (a) to test the CAD triad hypotheses
and (b) to examine whether different features of the disgust, contempt, and
anger faces were related to different elicitors. This second purpose influ-
enced some stimulus selection and accounts, in part, for the fact that the
face array contained two different versions of each of the CAD "standard"
facial expressions. Nineteen of the 46 situations originally presented are
not included in the analysis presented here, for one of three reasons: (a)
They were relevant only to the second purpose of the study and had little
or no moral loading (e.g., "Person is eating something with a very bitter
taste"); (b) they were minor variants of other items, inserted to determine
whether one or the other exemplar faces of each emotion was more
associated with stronger elicitors (e.g., for the situation in which someone
edges ahead in line, in the strong form it happens to the person of reference
and in the weaker form this person observes it happening to someone else;
in all cases, we used the stronger [more direct participation] version); or (c)
the items turned out to be factually ambiguous (e.g., an item indicating that
the reference person brushed against a street person on the street was
interpreted by some as a soiling of the person and by others as an
uncalled-for aggressive action of the person). The list of situations in
Table 2 does not include these items.
The list of situations was translated into Japanese by a bilingual
Japanese-English speaker and then confirmed by a back-translation made
by a different Japanese-English bilingual speaker. Two minor changes
were necessary. First, the item FLAG involved burning the American flag
for Americans and the Japanese flag for the Japanese. Second, the item
BIGOT referred to Ku Klux Klan membership for Americans and to a
"secretive terrorist group" for the Japanese. The order of the items was
random and was presented in the original and a completely reversed form.
The position of the items in the original form is indicated in column 2 of
In the face task, each participant was presented with a high-quality
black-and-white photocopy, on 8.5 X 11-in. (21.59 X 27.94-cm) paper, of
six facial photos (one instance is shown in Figure 1). For any participant,
these were photographs of the same person in six different facial poses. The
poses were predetermined by the experimenters. Posers, selected because
they had good control of their facial musculature and no facial hair or
glasses, were precisely instructed for each facial expression. When the
expression reached the desired criterion, as judged by a certified Facial
Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) rater (Laura
Lowery), the picture was snapped. Each picture was subsequently FACS
rated, to make sure that it conveyed the intended muscular actions. The
posers were one female American, one female Indian, and one male
Japanese. Each participant from either culture saw the pictures of one
poser, assigned randomly.
The expressions elicited from the posers and presented to the partici-
pants conformed to standard accounts of the facial features associated with
contempt, anger, and disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1978, 1986; Izard, 1971).
We offered two exemplars of each emotion face because we were inter-
ested in different meanings that the different exemplars might convey and
because there is not complete agreement about the prototypical face for any
of these emotions. For contempt, the critical issue was whether the re-
sponse was a pure unilateral smirk—Action unit (AU) 14, Photo D5 in
Figure 1—or whether it also included a unilateral upper lip raise—AU 10,
Photo Dl in Figure 1. For anger, the critical variation was whether the
anger was portrayed as tight-lipped—AU 23, Photo D3—or teeth bared—
AU 10, Photo D2. For disgust, on the basis of our previous analysis of the
disgust face (Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994), we presented the full disgust
face—gape, AU 25/26; nose wrinkle, AU 9; and upper lip raise, AU 10,
Photo D4—or simply the bilateral upper lip raise—AU 10, Photo D6—
which our research suggests may be more closely related to what we call
Two versions were produced for the six-face array of each poser. The
order of faces on the page was determined by one of two different random
assignments. The six stimuli sheets (three posers by two orders) were
distributed at random, along with the questionnaire (which itself came in
two versions, one the reverse order of the other).
Instructions for the face task were as follows:
Carefully read each situation and decide what FACE is most likely to
be shown by the PERSON in the situation. If you feel that one of these
faces clearly applies to the situation, enter its letter next to the
situation. If you feel that none of these faces is at all appropriate, place
an N next to the situation. If you feel that more than one of these faces
is appropriate, list all of the appropriate faces, placing FIRST, the face
that you consider most appropriate (e.g., Dl ,D5 or S2,S3). DON'T BE
CONCERNED ABOUT HOW MANY TIMES YOU LIST EACH
FACE, OR EVEN IF YOU NEVER LIST ONE OF THE FACES.
Remember, you are to rate the face from the point of view of the
The word task used the same 46-item situation list, in both orders. In this
case, participants were asked to assign the appropriate emotion word
(contempt, anger, disgust, for English; keibetsu, ikari, ken'o for Japanese)
to each situation. Instructions for American participants were as follows:
Carefully read each situation and decide what EMOTION is most
likely to be felt by the PERSON in the situation. Your choice for
emotions is: A = Anger; C = contempt; D = disgust. If you feel that
one of these emotions clearly applies to the situation, enter its letter
next to the situation. If you feel that none of these emotions is at all
appropriate, place an N next to the situation. If you feel that more than
one of these emotions is appropriate, list all of the appropriate emo-
tions, placing FIRST, the emotion that you consider most appropriate
(e.g., AC or DA). DON'T BE CONCERNED ABOUT HOW MANY
TIMES YOU LIST EACH EMOTION, OR EVEN IF YOU NEVER
LIST ONE OF THE EMOTIONS. Remember, you are to rate the
emotion from the point of view of the person.
Situation ordering. The order of presentation of situations
(original or reverse order) did not produce a significant disparity
(with an alpha level of .01) in face category selected in any of
the 27 situations as tested by chi-square (2, T V = 193) for each
situation. The same face category was highest in 24 of the 27
Poser differences. There were some differences in results for
the three different posers, such that for 17 of 27 situations (com-
bining results from Japanese and American students) there was a
significant effect of poser, with an alpha level of <.01, by chi-
Items in Conceptual Order With Predominant Moral Face, Word, and Code Ratings and Percentages
of Participants Who Made the Predominant Choice
3 Study 2 Study 1
Violations of the ethics of community
A PERSON is hearing an 8-year-old student speak to his/her
teacher in the same way that he/she talks to her friends.
A PERSON is seeing a teenager begin to eat dinner before
everyone else at the table is served.
A PERSON is seeing someone burn the American
A PERSON is hearing a 10-year-old child say dirty words to
A PERSON is hearing an oversensitive employee directly
criticizing his/her boss.
A salesman is addressing this PERSON by his/her first name
after just meeting him/her.
A PERSON is watching a company executive refuse to sit
next to a laborer on a train.
A PERSON is seeing and hearing an employee unjustifiably
complain to his/her boss.
A PERSON just discovered a cleaning person, who thinks
no one is watching, sitting in the chair of the company
A PERSON is seeing and hearing an employer scold
someone on his/her staff who regularly leaves work an
hour early when no one else is around.
A PERSON is seeing a 16-year-old refuse to give up his/her
seat on the bus to a crippled old lady.
A PERSON is hearing about someone who doesn't go to
his/her own mother's funeral.
C58C C20 D19
C73C C30c D24
A55C A45C C21
A48C C=D30 D26
C48C C15C C19C
C65C C25C D54C
C60c C60c C50c
C54° A35 C36C
C54C D5 C10c
C69° C65C C30c C33C
C45 C=A45 A51C
C38C C30 C48
C57C C63C 1.7
C57C C72= 0.8
C47C C36C 1.9
C46C C44<= 2.2
C43C C32C 1.0
C25 A40c 0.5
A37C A40 2.6
D8 D28° 1.3
C31C C16C 0.6
C30c C44C 0.5
C75C C50c 2.4
C37 D34 2.4
Violations of the ethics of autonomy
A PERSON is scolding a child who hit another child.
A PERSON is hearing about a man who comes home drunk
and beats his wife.
Someone is edging ahead of this PERSON in a long line.
A PERSON is hearing about someone who put cyanide in a
container of yogurt in a supermarket.
A PERSON is seeing someone steal a purse from a blind
A PERSON is being told that an acquaintance is a bigot
who is a member of the Ku Klux Klan [a secretive
A PERSON is being told about an acquaintance who
embezzled from a bank.
A PERSON is being told that someone he/she knows faked
an injury after an automobile accident in order to collect
A nonsmoker/PERSON is sitting near a stranger who is
smoking in the no-smoking section of a small waiting
A PERSON is looking at a picture of the inmates at a World
War II concentration camp being led into the gas chamber
by the Nazis.
A44 C47 A65C A67C C50c C45C 2.6
A61C A64C A55C A43C A42C D34 3.3
Violations of the ethics of divinity
A PERSON is eating a piece of rotten meat.
A PERSON (is shaking hands with someone who) has an
A PERSON is touching a corpse.
A PERSON (is watching someone as he/she) bites into an
apple with a worm in it.
A PERSON is hearing about a 70-year-old male who has
sex with a 17-year-old female.
a Position among the 46 items in the original set of situations for Japanese and American participants. For half of participants, the item was in the 47-X
position, where X is the original position.
score (as given in the item) is greater than or equal to the sum of the scores for the two other moral systems and is greater than 15%.
In Study 1, C = contempt, A = anger, D = disgust; in Study 2, C = community, A = autonomy, D = divinity.
b Items are arranged by our a priori classification into three moral codes. c Meets the criterion that the highest