Self-awareness and action

Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, WC1N 3AR, London, UK.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology (Impact Factor: 6.77). 05/2003; 13(2):219-24. DOI: 10.1016/S0959-4388(03)00043-6
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT In this review we discuss how we are aware that actions are self-generated. We review behavioural data that suggest that a prediction of the sensory consequences of movement might be used to label actions and their consequences as self-generated. We also describe recent functional neuroimaging experiments and studies of neurological and psychiatric patients, which suggest that the parietal cortex plays a crucial role in the awareness of action.

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Available from: Chris D Frith, Aug 23, 2015
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    • "Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009), it has been demonstrated that AHP follows a brain damage located within the same cortical network that is responsible for motor monitoring in the lateral premotor and insular cortex (Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Garbarini et al., 2012; Karnath et al., 2005; Moro et al., 2011; Vocat et al., 2010). Consequently, the well-established framework of a forward model of normal motor control (Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Wolpert et al., 1995) has been employed to predict the pattern of intact and impaired neurocognitive mechanisms pinpointing the distorted motor awareness of AHP patients. The model posits that, when a subject has the intention to move and the appropriate motor commands are selected and sent to the appropriate motor areas, a prediction (forward model) of the sensory consequences of the movement itself is formed on the efference copy of the programmed motor act. "
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