Self-awareness and action.

Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, WC1N 3AR, London, UK.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology (Impact Factor: 6.77). 05/2003; 13(2):219-24. DOI: 10.1016/S0959-4388(03)00043-6
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT In this review we discuss how we are aware that actions are self-generated. We review behavioural data that suggest that a prediction of the sensory consequences of movement might be used to label actions and their consequences as self-generated. We also describe recent functional neuroimaging experiments and studies of neurological and psychiatric patients, which suggest that the parietal cortex plays a crucial role in the awareness of action.

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