Distributed Detection of Clone Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks

Mauro Conti, Roberto Di Pietro, Luigi V. Mancini, and Alessandro Mei

Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are often deployed in hostile environments where an adversary can physically capture some of the nodes, first re-program and then replicate them in a large number of clones, easily taking over the network. A few distributed solutions to address this fundamental problem have been recently proposed. However, these solutions are not satisfactory. First, they are energy and memory demanding: A serious drawback for any protocol to be used in the WSN resource constrained environment. Further, they are vulnerable to specific adversary models introduced in this paper. The contributions of this work are threefold. First, we analyze the desirable properties of a distributed mechanism for the detection of node replication attacks. Second, we show that the known solutions for this problem do not completely meet our requirements. Third, we propose a new self-healing, randomized, efficient, and distributed protocol (RED) for the detection of node replication attacks, and we show that it satisfies the introduced requirements. Finally, extensive simulations show that our protocol: Is highly efficient in communication, memory, and computation; is much more effective that competing solutions in the literature; is resistant to the new kind of attacks introduced in this paper, while other solutions are not.

Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks security, node replication attack detection, distributed protocol, resilience, efficiency.

I. INTRODUCTION

A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of sensors with limited resources that collaborate to achieve a common goal. WSNs can be deployed in harsh environments to fulfil both military and civil applications [1]. Due to their operating nature, they are often unattended, hence prone to different kinds of novel attacks. For instance, an adversary could eavesdrop all network communications; further, an adversary could capture nodes acquiring all the information stored therein—sensors are commonly assumed to be not tamper proof. Therefore, an adversary may replicate captured sensors and deploy them in the network to launch a variety of malicious activities. This attack is referred to as the clone attack [53], [11], [34]. Since a clone has legitimate information (code and cryptographic material), it may participate in the network operations in the same way as a non-compromised node; hence cloned nodes can launch a variety of attacks. A few have been described in the literature [3], [7]. For instance, a clone could create a black hole, initiate a wormhole attack [37] with a collaborating adversary, or inject false data or aggregate data in such a way to bias the final result [50]. Further, clones can leak data.

The threat of a clone attack can be characterized by two main points:

• A clone is considered totally honest by its neighbors. In fact, without global countermeasures, honest nodes cannot be aware of the fact that they have a clone among its neighbors;

• to have a large amount of compromised nodes, the adversary does not need to compromise a high number of nodes. Indeed, once a single node has been captured and compromised, the main cost of the attack has been sustained. Making further clones of the same node can be considered cheap.

To the best of our knowledge, with the exception of the protocol proposed in [45] and reviewed in the following, only centralized or local protocols have been proposed so far to cope with the clone attack. While centralized protocols have a single point of failure and high communication cost, local protocols do not detect replicated nodes that are distributed in different area of the network. In this work we look for a network self-healing mechanism, where nodes autonomously identify the presence of clones and exclude them from any further network activity. In particular, this mechanism is designed to iterate as a “routine” event: It is designed for continuous iteration without significantly affecting the network performances, while achieving high clone detection rate.

In this paper we analyze the desirable properties of distributed mechanisms for detection of node replication attack [17]. We also analyze the first protocol for distributed detection, proposed in [45], and show that this protocol is not completely satisfactory with respect to the above properties. Lastly, inspired by [45], we propose a new randomized, efficient, and distributed (RED) protocol for the detection of node replication attacks, and we prove that our protocol does meet all the above cited requirements. We further provide analytical results when RED and its competitor face an adversary that selectively drops messages that could lead to clone detection. Finally, extensive simulations of RED show that it is highly efficient as for communications, memory, and computations required and shows improved attack detection probability (even when the adversary is allowed to selectively drop messages) when compared to other distributed protocols.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Next section reviews related work; Section III shows the threat model assumed in this paper; Section IV introduces the requirements a distributed protocol for the detection of the clone attack in wireless sensor networks should meet; Section V
describes our randomized, efficient, and distributed solution; Section VI shows some experimental results on RED and compare them with the results obtained in [45] in terms of detection probability, memory overhead, and energy overhead. These results confirm that RED matches the requirements set in Section IV, that RED is more energy, memory, and computationally efficient, and that it detects node replication attacks with higher probability. In Section VII we analyze how malicious nodes can affect the detection protocol performances. Finally, Section VIII presents some concluding remarks.

II. RELATED WORK

One of the first solutions for the detection of clone attacks relies on a centralized Base Station (BS) [33]. In this solution, each node sends a list of its neighbors and their locations (that is the geographical coordinates of each node) to a BS. The same node ID in two lists with inconsistent locations will result in a clone detection. Then, the BS revokes the clones. This solution has several drawbacks, such as the presence of a single point of failure (the BS) and high communication cost due to the large number of messages. Further, nodes close to the BS will be required to route much more messages than other nodes, hence shortening their operational life.

Another centralized clone detection protocol has been recently proposed in [6]. This solution assumes that a random key pre-distribution security scheme is implemented in the sensor network. That is, each node is assigned a set of \( k \) symmetric keys, randomly selected from a larger pool of keys [33]. For the detection, each node constructs a counting Bloom filter from the keys it uses for communication. Then, each node sends its own filter to the BS. From all the reports, the BS counts the number of times each key is used in the network. The keys used too often (above a threshold) are considered cloned and a corresponding revocation procedure is raised.

Other solutions rely on local detection. For example, in [9], [29], [33], [43] a voting mechanism is used within a neighborhood to agree on the legitimacy of a given node. However, this kind of a method, applied to the problem of replica detection, fails to detect clones that are not within the same neighborhood. As described in [45], a na"ive distributed solution for the detection of the node replication attack is Node-To-Network Broadcasting. In this solution each node floods the network with a message containing its location information and compares the received location information with that of its neighbors. If a neighbor \( s_w \) of node \( s_a \) receives a location claim that the same node \( s_a \) is in a position not coherent with the originally detected position of \( s_a \), this will result in a clone detection. However, this method is very energy consuming since it requires \( n \) flooding per iteration, where \( n \) is the number of nodes in the WSN.

In the sybil attack [29], [43], a node claims multiple existing identities stolen from corrupted nodes. Note that both the sybil and the clone attacks are based on identity theft, however the two attacks are independent. The sybil attack can be efficiently addressed with mechanism based on RSSI [21] or with authentication based on the knowledge of a fixed key set [9], [14], [15], [25], [27].

Recent research threads cope with the more general problem of node compromise [19], [51], [47]. However, detecting node “misbehavior” via an approach that is rooted on techniques taken from intrusion detection systems [24] seems to require a higher overhead compared to clone detection. Indeed, in current solutions detecting a misbehaving node implies observing, storing, and processing a large amount of information. However, when mobility can be leveraged, security can improve incurring just limited overhead [13]. In particular, some preliminary solutions start appearing in the literature that allow to recover sensor secrecy after node compromising [16], [23], [28], but these solutions do not cope with replica attacks.

To the best of our knowledge the first not na"ive, globally-aware, and distributed node-replication detection solution appeared in [45]. In particular, two distributed detection protocols leveraging emergent properties [36] have been proposed. The first one, Randomized Multicast (RM), distributes node location information to randomly-selected nodes. The second one, Line-Selected Multicast (LSM), uses the routing topology of the network to detect replicas. In RM, when a node announces (locally broadcasts) its location, each of its neighbors sends (with probability \( p \)) a digitally signed copy of the location claim to a set of randomly selected nodes. Assuming that there is a replicated node, if every neighbor randomly selects \( O(\sqrt{n}) \) destinations, with a not negligible probability at least one node will receive a pair of not coherent location claims. We will call witness the node that detects the existence of a node in two different locations within the same protocol run. The RM protocol implies a high communication costs: Each neighbor has to send \( O(\sqrt{n}) \) messages. To solve this problem the authors propose the LSM protocol.

The LSM protocol is similar to RM but it introduces a remarkable improvement in terms of detection probability. In LSM, when a node announces its location, every neighbor first locally checks the signature of the claim and then, with probability \( p \), forwards it to \( g \geq 1 \) randomly selected destination nodes. As an example, in Figure 1 node \( a \) announces its location and one of its neighbors, node \( b \), forwards the claim to node \( f \). A location claim, when traveling from source to destination, has to pass through several intermediate nodes that form the so-called claim message path. Moreover, every node that routes this claim message has to check the signature, to store the message, and to check the coherence with the other location claims received within the same run of the detection protocol. Node replication is detected by the node (if present) on the intersection of two paths generated by two different node claims carrying the same ID and coming from two different nodes. In the example shown in Figure 1, node \( a' \) is a clone of node \( a \) (it has the same ID of node \( a \)). The claim of \( a' \) is forwarded by node \( c \) to node \( e \). In the example, node \( w \) will then results in the intersection of two paths carrying the claim of ID \( a \) coming from different locations. Node \( w \), the witness, detects the attack and triggers a revocation procedure.

In [52], the authors propose two different protocols with
the aim of increasing the detection probability provided by LSM. The basic idea is to logically divide the network into cells and to consider all the nodes within a cell as possible witnesses. In the first proposed protocol, Single Deterministic Cell, each node ID is associated to a single cell within the network. When the protocol runs, the neighbors of a node \(a\) probabilistically send \(a\)'s claim to the single pre-determined witness cell for \(a\). Once the first node within that cell receives the claim message, the message is flooded to all the other nodes within the cell. In the second proposal, Parallel Multiple Probabilistic Cells, the neighbors of a node \(a\) probabilistically send \(a\)'s claim to a subset of the pre-defined witness cells for \(a\). The proposed solutions show a higher detection probability compared to LSM. However, the same predictable mechanism used to increase the detection probability can be exploited by the adversary for an attack—compromising the witnesses in order to go undetected. In fact, this predictability restricts the number of nodes (and their geographic areas) that can act as witnesses.

Another interesting distributed protocol for replicated node detection that has recently been proposed is the SET protocol [11]. SET leverages the knowledge of a random value broadcast by a BS to perform a detection phase. In particular, the shared random value is first used to generate independent clusters and corresponding clusters heads. The specific clustering protocol used assures that the clusters are in fact Exclusive Subset Maximal Independent Set (ESMIS)—cluster heads are called Subset Leader (SLDRs). Further, within the same protocol iteration used to generate clusters and SLDRs, one or more trees are defined over the network graph. The nodes of the tree correspond to the SLDRs. Then, a bottom up aggregation protocol is run to aggregate the list of nodes belonging to the ESMIS. If a node ID is present in two different independent subsets, than the node corresponding to that node ID has been cloned. The mechanism used by the protocol prevents a node to escape detection by claiming to be managed from a non existing SLDR—hence escaping the tree aggregation protocol. Note that defining such aggregating trees for each protocol iteration comes with a non-negligible cost in terms of messages. However, the main problem of this protocol is that the detection protocol itself is flawed—it can be maliciously exploited by the adversary to revoke honest nodes (that is, nodes that are not cloned). Indeed, a malicious node acting as a SLDR could declare in its ESMIS the presence of a honest node, say \(a\), that eventually exists in some other part of the network (that is, belonging to a different ESMIS). This malicious behavior will lead the network to the “detection”, and possibly to the revocation, of honest node \(a\). Due to the possibility of this attack, in the following we do not consider SET as a benchmark for our protocol.

In [17] the authors point out the desirable properties a clone detection protocol should meet. As shown in [17], the LSM protocol [45] does not meet these properties. In particular, in LSM some nodes have an higher probability to act as witnesses, so weakening the detection itself. The attacker can take control of the node that will act as witness with highest probability. Furthermore, the protocol’s overhead is not evenly distributed among the network nodes. In [18] a randomized, efficient and distributed clone detection protocol has been proposed. The simulation results reported in [18] show that the proposed RED Protocol meets the desirable properties presented in [17].

In this paper we review the contribution of [18] and further thoroughly investigate the feasibility of the RED protocol. The analysis and the further set of simulations presented show that the RED protocol can be actually implemented in sensor network. Also, it can be continuously iterated over the same network, as a self-healing mechanism, without significantly affecting the network performance (nodes energy and memory) and the detection protocol itself. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of an attacker intervening on message routing both for RED and LSM.

III. THE THREAT MODEL

We define a simple yet powerful adversary: It can compromise a certain fixed amount of nodes and replicate one or more into multiple copies (the clones). In general, to cope with this threat it could be possible to assume that nodes are tamper-proof. However, tamper proof hardware is expensive and energy demanding [2], [1]. Therefore, consistently with a large part of the literature, we will assume that the nodes do not have tamper proof components. The adversary goal is to prevent clones from being detected by the detection protocol used in the network. Hence, we assume that the adversary, to reach its goal, also tries to subvert the nodes that will possibly act as witnesses.

To formalize the adversary model, we introduce the following definition.

Definition 3.1: Assume that the goal of the adversary is to subvert the distributed detection protocol by compromising a possibly small subset \(T\) of the nodes. The adversary has already compromised a set of nodes \(W\), while \(\mathcal{N}\) is the initial set of nodes in the network. For every node \(s\), the node appeal \(P_{\text{witness}}(s)\) returns the probability that \(s \in \mathcal{N}\setminus W\) is a witness for the next run of the protocol.

We characterize the adversary by two different points of view: “where” and “how” it operates. As for “where”, the adversary can be:
1) **Localized:** The adversary chooses a convex sub-area of the network and compromises sensors from that area only;
2) **ubiquitous:** The adversary compromises sensors choosing from the whole network.

Intuitively, with the localized adversary describes an adversary that need some time to move from one point to another of the network area, while the ubiquitous adversary, during the same time interval, can capture nodes regardless of their position.

As for the sequence of node capture (that is, “how”), the adversary can be:

1) **Oblivious:** At each step of the attack sequence, the next node to be tampered with is chosen randomly among the ones that are yet to be compromised;
2) **smart:** At each step of the attack sequence, the next node to tamper with is node \( s \), where \( s \) maximizes \( P_{\text{witness}}(s) \), \( s \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{W}} \).

Intuitively, the oblivious adversary does not take advantage of any information about the detection protocol implemented. Conversely, the smart adversary greedily chooses to compromise the node that maximizes its appeal in order to maximize the chance that its replicas go undetected.

**IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DISTRIBUTED DETECTION PROTOCOL**

In this section we present and justify the requirements that a protocol for clone detection should meet.

**A. Witness distribution**

A major issue in designing a protocol to detect clone attacks is the selection of the witnesses. If the adversary knows the future witnesses before the detection protocol executes, the adversary could subvert these nodes so that the attack go undetected. The adversary can in principle use any information on the network to foresee probability \( P_{\text{witness}}(s) \) for a generic node \( s \). Here, we have identified two kinds of predictions:

- ID-based prediction;
- location-based prediction.

We say that a protocol for replica detection is **ID oblivious** if the protocol does not provide any information on the ID of the sensors that will be the witnesses of the clone attack during the next protocol run. Similarly, a protocol is **area oblivious** if probability \( P_{\text{witness}}(s) \), for every \( s \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{W}} \), does not depend on the geographical position of node \( s \) in the network. Clearly, when a protocol is neither ID oblivious nor area oblivious, then a smart adversary can have good chances of succeeding, since it is able to use this information to subvert the nodes that, most probably, will be the witnesses. Furthermore, when a protocol is not area oblivious, then even a localized oblivious adversary (that, at a first glance, seems to be the weakest) can be effective if it concentrates node compromising activities in an area with a high density of witnesses.

**B. Overhead**

Designing protocols for wireless sensor networks is a challenging task due to the resource constraints typical of these networks. Any protocol is required to generate little overhead. However, this requirement alone is not enough. Indeed, even if a protocol shows a reasonably small overhead on the average, it is still possible that a small subset of the nodes experience a much higher overhead. This is bad—these nodes exhaust their batteries very quickly, with serious consequences on the network functionality. Moreover, the problem can be even more subtle when we consider memory. If a high memory overhead concentrates on a small number of nodes, then these nodes can overflow. During an overflow, the node could stop the protocol, or drop packets to free memory. It is very important to understand what kind of an impact this scenario can have on the detection capability of the protocol itself.

We can summarize the above considerations with the general requirement that the overhead generated by the protocol should be small, that is sustainable by the network as a whole, and (almost) evenly distributed among the nodes. To make a real example, in LSM every node that relays a position claim must perform a signature verification and store the claim. As analyzed in [45], every line-segment includes \( O(\sqrt{n}) \) nodes and every node stores \( O(\sqrt{n}) \) location claims. Note that this memory requirement could be impractical in real networks with thousands of nodes.

Table I shows—first row—the asymptotic overhead for one protocol run (also referred to as round in the following) of LSM. The second row reports on the average overhead generated by one round of LSM for a network of 1,000 nodes with 31 neighbors per node (on the average). Finally, the third row shows the maximum overhead experienced by a node, that turns out to be much higher than the average. Detailed discussion on the overhead of LSM and of the protocol we propose and their compliance with the above described requirements are presented in Section VI.

**V. RED**

In this section we propose RED (Randomized, Efficient, and Distributed), a new protocol for the detection of clone attacks. RED is similar in principle to the Randomized Multicast protocol [45], but with witnesses chosen pseudorandomly based on a network-wide seed. In exchange for the assumption that we are able to efficiently distribute the seed, RED achieves a large improvement over RM in terms of communication and computation. When compared with LSM [45], a protocol that is more efficient than RM, RED proves to be, again, considerably more energy-efficient. More than that, in the following sections we will show that RED is also more robust against attacks that exploit the uneven distribution of witnesses of LSM.

As in LSM, we assume that the nodes in the network are relatively stationary; that each node knows its own location (for instance, using a GPS or the protocols in [8], [44]); and that all the nodes use a ID-based public-key crypto system [12], [46]. We also assume that the network is loosely time synchronized. Observe that loose time synchronization can be achieved both in a centralized and in a distributed way [31], [32], [45].

RED executes routinely at fixed intervals of time. Every run of the protocol consists of two steps. In the first step...
a random value, $rand$, is shared among all the nodes. This random value can be broadcast with centralized mechanisms (for example, from a satellite or a UAV [40], or other kinds of ground-based central stations), or with in-network distributed mechanisms. For instance, a secure, verifiable leader election mechanism [10], [48], [22] can be used to elect a leader among the nodes; the leader will later choose and broadcast the random value. In the rest of this paper, without loss of generality and to ease exposition, we will rely on a centralized solution for the broadcast of the random value. Furthermore, in this work we assume that a different mechanism is used to enforce nodes not to lie about their physical location. As an example neighbor nodes can physically check the coherence of the claimed location. Such a simple mechanism, also used in [45], has the following drawback: if all the neighbors of a cheating node $c$ are corrupted, they will not identify $c$ as a cheater. Hence, this is a drawback of both our protocol and LSM [45].

In the second step, each node digitally signs and locally broadcasts its claim—ID and geographic location (Procedure BROADCAST_CLAIM in Protocol 1). When the neighbors receive the local broadcast, they execute Procedure RECEIVE_MESSAGE. Each of the neighbors sends (with probability $p$) the claim to a set of $g \geq 1$ pseudo-randomly selected network locations (rows 17–24 in Protocol 1). RED does not send the claim to a specific node ID because this kind of a solution does not scale well: A claim sent to a node ID that is no more present in the network would be lost; nodes deployed after the first network deployment could not be used as witnesses without updating all the nodes. However, RED can easily be adapted to work when a specific node is used as the message destination. Finally, in the following we consider the same geographic routing protocol used in [45] for a fair comparison. Though, RED is actually independent of the routing protocol used in the network.

We assume that the routing delivers a message sent to a network location to the node closest to this location [8], [39]: that the routing protocol does not fail (as done in [45]); and, that message forwarding is not affected by dropping or wormhole attacks (for these kinds of attacks a few solutions can be found in [20], [35], [38]). We also assume that the adversary is able to compute the set of witnesses. However, it cannot immediately compromise them since, by the time it moves to reach those nodes, the protocol run committed. Later, in Section VII, we will see how the protocol performs when malicious nodes can drop packets. To test the protocols, we assume that the adversary has introduced two nodes with the same ID in the network. Clearly, if the adversary introduces more clones of the same node, then the task of detecting the attack is only easier. Within this ideal framework, the probability that the clone attack is detected is equal to the probability that at least one neighbor of each clone sends the claim to the same witnesses. Considering $d$ neighbors, the probability that from a neighborhood a claim message

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Memory Occupancy</th>
<th>Sent Messages</th>
<th>Received Messages</th>
<th>Signature Check</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d \cdot \sqrt{n})$</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d \cdot \sqrt{n})$</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d \cdot \sqrt{n})$</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d \cdot \sqrt{n})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average ($p = 0.1$)</td>
<td>20.33</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td>49.84</td>
<td>21.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max ($p = 0.1$)</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average ($p = 0.05$)</td>
<td>9.98</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>38.60</td>
<td>10.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max ($p = 0.05$)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE I**

LSM OVERHEADS ($n=1000$, $r=0.1$, and $g=1$).
is sent is $1 - (1 - p)^d$, therefore, the detection probability is $(1 - (1 - p)^d)^2$. For example, with $p = 0.1$ and $d = 35$ we have a detection probability of 0.95 in a single run of the protocol. Detection probability will be further discussed in a more realistic framework in Section VI.

The set of witnesses is selected using a pseudo-random function (line 20 of Protocol 1). This function takes in input the ID of the node, that is the first argument of the claim message, the current rand value, and the number $g$ of locations that have to be generated. Using a pseudo-random function guarantees that, given a claim, the witnesses for this claim are unambiguously determined in the network, for a given protocol iteration, while time synchronization is used by the nodes to discern between different iterations. Furthermore, note that the detection probability is mainly influenced by both protocol parameters $p, g,$ and node density. Hence, the results hold even for network with a reasonably small number of nodes, and not only with high probability (whp).

Every node signs its claim message with its private key before broadcasting it (line 3 of Protocol 1). The nodes that forward the signed claim towards destination are not required to add any signature or to store any message. Further, relay nodes do not need to check the signature of the routed message: Signature check will be carried out by the destination only—saving $\Theta(\sqrt{n})$ signature checks per claim sent with respect to LSM. Indeed, while signature check at each node is necessary in LSM for the detection of the attack, it is not in RED. However, these checks can be useful in LSM to prevent the adversary from generating spurious messages. In RED, if the adversary sends out location claims with bogus signatures, the legitimate neighbors will then forward the message throughout the network, and the bad signature will not be detected until it reaches the recipient. This attack does not affect clone detection itself—it's goal is to exhaust the nodes' battery. In this sense, this attack is out of the scope of this paper. However, in the following we sketch a possible countermeasure: Relay nodes can store some bits regarding forwarded messages so that it is possible to trace back the message originator, in case of failure of the signature check at the destination. Note that this countermeasure does not introduce a significant overhead.

For every received claim, the destination (possible witness of a clone attack):

- Verifies the received signature (line 28);
- checks for message freshness (line 28). This is important to prevent replay of old messages. This check is performed verifying the coherence between the time inserted in the message by the claiming node and the current time. For every genuine message that passes the previous checks the possible witness node extracts the information (ID and location). If this is the first claim carrying this ID, then the node simply stores the message (line 35). If another claim from the same ID has been received, the node checks if the new claim is coherent with the claim stored in memory for this ID (line 32). If it is not, the witness triggers a revocation procedure for the ID (line 33)—the two incoherent signed claims are the proof of cloning.

Here is an example of a run of the protocol. Assume that the adversary clones identity $ID_a$ and assigns this identity to nodes $a$ and $a'$. These two nodes are placed in two different network locations: $l_1$ and $l_2$ respectively. During a RED iteration, the nodes $a$ and $a'$ have to broadcast the same ID, but different location claims ($l_1$ and $l_2$). Indeed, if $l_1 \sim l_2$, then either the neighbors of $a$ or the neighbors of $a'$ will raise an exception (line 14 of Protocol 1).

Let $b$ and $c$ be neighbors of $a$ and $a'$, respectively. Using the pseudo-random function both $b$ and $c$ will select the same set of witness nodes, containing at least a node $w$. In this way, $w$ will receive two incoherent location claims for identity $ID_a$—$l_1$ and $l_2$. This results in clone detection. Hence, $w$ can start a revocation procedure for node $ID_a$. Revocation can be performed by flooding the network with the two incoherent claims received by $w$. Remember that every claim message of a node is signed with the private key of the same node. Therefore, the two claims are a proof that $ID_a$ has been cloned.

The protocol shows one caveat: After the rand value is shared, RED allows the adversary to know the witness set for any given ID. However, note that the witnesses of a node could be anywhere in the network and that witnesses change at every protocol iteration in an unpredictable way. This means that the adversary, in order to prevent RED from detecting the replicas, is required to be extremely fast and to capture all the witnesses of the clones within a window period that can be at most comprised between the disclosure of rand and the end of the protocol round. Considering realistic network sizes and the possible adversary speed, there are few chances for the adversary to perform this attack.

VI. SIMULATIONS

In this section we show that RED meets the requirements described in Section IV: Area-obliviousness; ID-obliviousness; low overhead; overhead balancing; and high replica attacks detection probability. We further compare RED with LSM and show that RED outperforms LSM in several ways.

In the following simulations we consider a unit square deployment area [4], [5], [26]. We fixed $n = 1,000$ nodes in the network and $r = 0.1$ communication radius. We also set $g = 1$ and $p = 0.1$ for both protocols. This means that the two protocols send the same number of location claims per node (on the average). Further, we assume that the nodes are distributed in the network area uniformly at random. We simulate the same geographic routing protocol used in [45]—the relay node is the neighbor closest to destination. The routing stops when no node is closer to destination than the current node: This node will be a witness. Note that this simple version of geographic routing, especially when used in networks that are sparse or deployed in an area that is not convex, has the problem of “dead ends”—places where the message cannot proceed because there is no node closer to destination, while the destination is still far. There are a few solutions to this issue ([30], [8]) that can be used in both protocols to guarantee that the claim reaches the node closest to destination.

The resources required by RED are shown in Table II, for the same parameters used for LSM in Table I. The results in
Table II do not consider the overhead due to the distribution of the random seed. The overhead of the distribution depends on the implementation: It is practically negligible (one receive and one signature check) compared to the cost of one iteration of RED if the seed is broadcast from either a satellite or a UAV; it is also very small (one broadcast operation) if the seed is distributed within the network from a trusted base station. A robust broadcast operation (e.g. [30]) can be easily implemented in such a way that every node is required to receive the message and send at most one local broadcasting message. If this is the case, the per-node additional overhead to RED is at most one send, one receive, and one signature check. Lastly, if a leader election algorithm has to be run, such as the ones in [10], [48], [22], the overhead of the leader election should be taken into account and also its vulnerabilities. A reasonable choice, however, would be to run the algorithm only once and follow a fixed schedule after the initial election. In this way the overhead would be amortized through the many iterations of the RED protocol and the actual overhead would be very similar to a broadcast operation, though the adversary could predict the schedule and get some advantage from this information. To summarize, it seems reasonable that RED should be used when we can implement an efficient solution for the distribution of the seed, either a broadcast from a satellite, from a UAV, or by in-network distribution of a seed from a trusted base-station. This is the assumption that we will be using in the rest of the paper.

A. Witness distribution

Due to randomization, it is straightforward to verify that both LSM and RED are ID-oblivious. In both protocols the IDs of the witnesses are randomly selected among all the nodes in the network. To assess area-obliviousness, we study the witness distribution as follows: We select increasing sub-areas of the network, and for each sub-area we count the number of witnesses present in the area after a run of the detection protocol. Each sub-area from the center of the unit-square towards the external border provides an increment of 5% of the total area. Hence, 20 sub-areas are considered.

In Figure 2, we show an example of one iteration of LSM and RED. The black small filled squares indicate two clones (nodes with the same ID), the black filled small circles indicate nodes that route a claim from the clones, and finally the larger empty circle indicates the witness. Lastly, the square at the center of the network indicates a central area whose size is 20% of the total area of the network. This example suggests that the witness nodes (large not filled circles) are located differently in LSM and RED. In the particular example several claims are forwarded in LSM while only one in RED (this is a real run of the two protocols with the same parameters, on average the number of claims forwarded is the same for the two protocols if the parameters are the same). However, the figure is intended to show that the witness is near the center of the network area for LSM while this is not true for RED, and to suggest that this is not a coincidence. In the following we will see through extensive simulations that this is actually true—witness are mostly in the center of the network with LSM while are uniformly distributed with RED—and that this phenomenon affects the performances of the protocols.

Figure 3 reports, for the two protocols, on the percentage of witnesses present in the incremental sub-areas. We simulate 10,000 different network deployments. For each deployment we randomly select two nodes, assign to them the same ID, and execute a single LSM iteration and a single RED iteration. After each of these iterations we localize the witness nodes for the two different protocols. Finally, for each of the 20 incremental sub-areas we compute the percentage of witnesses with respect to the total number of witnesses. After collecting the outcome of 10,000 experiments, we plot the average. The x-axis of Figure 3 indicates the percentage of the network area considered while the y-axis the corresponding percentage of all the witnesses in that area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Memory Occupancy</th>
<th>Sent Messages</th>
<th>Received Messages</th>
<th>Signature Check</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d)$</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d \cdot \sqrt{n})$</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d \cdot \sqrt{n})$</td>
<td>$O(g \cdot p \cdot d)$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average (p=0.1)</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td>49.85</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max (p=0.1)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (p=0.05)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>39.80</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max (p=0.05)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II

RED OVERHEAD ($n=1000$, $r=0.1$, $g=1$).

Fig. 3. Witness density, $n=1000$, $r=0.1$, $g=1$, $p=0.1$
Fig. 2. Examples of protocols iteration. \(n=1000, r=0.1, g=1, p=0.1\)

In Figure 3 we can see that the central area, corresponding to 20% of all the network area, collects more than 50% of all the witnesses of LSM, while the most external area, corresponding to the 20% of the network area, contains only 1.75% of all the witnesses. Therefore, LSM is not area-oblivious, since \(P_{\text{witness}}(s_i) > P_{\text{witness}}(s_j)\) for an \(s_i\) selected from the central area and an \(s_j\) selected from the most external area. This is a direct consequence of the following fact: Paths are generated having random source and random destination; hence, two paths are more likely to intersect in the middle of the deployment area, than close to the borders. This phenomenon is known in the literature [41], [42] and it is due to the fact that most of the shortest paths generated by a uniform traffic traverse the center of the network. Whereas it is straightforward to prove that the RED protocol, due to the pseudo-random choice of witness nodes, has a uniform witnesses distribution. In fact, Figure 3 also shows how the behavior of RED corresponds to that of an ideal protocol: The witnesses are equally distributed in all the network areas. In other words, RED is area-oblivious.

B. Storage overhead

Figure 4 reports the number of messages that the nodes are required to store for LSM and RED. For a fixed \(x\)-value of messages in memory, we show the percentage of the nodes that need to store that number of messages. The values were obtained averaging the result of 10,000 simulations.

Note that for LSM some nodes could require to store as many as 200 messages. Our experiments show that LSM requires some 1.9% of the nodes to store more than 60 messages, some 7.6% of nodes to store a number of messages between 40 and 59, and some 27.5% of nodes to store a number of messages between 20 and 39. Just some 63% of the nodes are required to store less than 20 messages. As for RED, only a negligible percentage of nodes (0.001%) require to store more than 10 messages. Moreover, some 0.3% of the nodes need to store more than 5 messages and less than 10% of nodes to store a number of messages between 3 and 5. It is interesting to note that 47.7% of nodes need to store only one or two messages while 42.9% of nodes do not require to store any message at all. Finally, observe that for LSM 0.2% only of the nodes do not require to store any message. LSM requires to store a higher number of messages compared to RED. This follows from the fact that, in LSM, every node in a claim path is a possible witness and therefore has to store every claim it relays. In RED, only destinations can be witnesses and thus only destinations are required to store the claims.

C. Energy overhead

To assess the energy overhead of the two protocols we consider both communication and computation intensive operations (that is, public key cryptography: signature generation and signature verification). In particular, we use the energy
model proposed in [49]: A node battery of 324,000 mJ; 15.104 mJ for sending a packet and 7.168 mJ for receiving a packet (assuming packet length of 32 byte, 0.059 mJ for bit sending and 0.028 mJ for bit receiving); and 45.0 mJ for both signature generation and signature verification.

The operating life of a node depends on its battery. Different energy overheads for the two protocols will result in a different pattern of node exhaustion. Figure 5(a) shows this phenomenon. After 100 protocol run executed with the same network topology, some 20% of the nodes are exhausted for LSM, while for RED all the nodes are alive. After 150 iterations, LSM shows 40% of exhausted nodes, while RED only 5%. Finally, after 200 run, LSM shows that half of the nodes of the network are exhausted (further, with such a number of exhausted nodes, the efficiency of LSM as for clone detection drops dramatically), while for RED this percentage is less than 15% and the detection capabilities are still remarkable. It is also interesting to look at the different nodes exhaustion distribution in the network area. Figure 5(b) shows the distribution after 200 protocol iterations. The x-axis indicates the network sub-areas (as plotted in Figure 2(a)), numbered sequentially from the center (numbered 1) to the external one (numbered 20). The y-axis indicates the percentage of exhausted nodes in these areas. For both protocols most of the exhausted nodes are in the center. As observed in Section VI-A, this is due to the phenomenon that nodes in the center of the network are more involved in routing messages in the presence of uniform traffic. In the case of LSM, almost all the nodes in the center are exhausted (except a few isolated ones), and the overhead is transferred to the semi-central areas, leading to the shape in Figure 5(b).

Different distribution of node exhaustion also implies different clone attack detection probability, as shown in Figure 6. This figure shows the detection probability (y-axis) at different protocol iterations (x-axis). In particular, we plotted the detection probability for the first 200 run. Plotted values were computed averaging the results obtained for 10,000 network deployments. Each single deployment was evaluated for both the LSM and the RED protocol. For all the considered iterations the RED protocol shows a better detection probability compared to that of the LSM. From the 1st to the 50th iteration, LSM shows a probability detection of about 35% while this probability is more than 80% for the RED protocol. However, it is important to note that LSM has been designed to use at least 5 witness nodes. If parameters are set in such a way to make LSM use at least 5 witnesses, the detection probability of LSM gets similar to the detection probability of RED, but with a much higher overhead. Our choice has been to set the parameters in such a way that the overhead of one iteration of RED and one iteration of LSM is similar, in order to make a fair comparison from a performance standpoint. It is interesting to note the tight relationship between the percentage of exhausted nodes (Figure 5(a)) and the detection probability (Figure 6). For LSM, nodes start exhausting after some 50 iterations; at the same iteration number, the detection probability starts decreasing. A similar behavior could be observed for RED as well. It is also possible to note that different slopes of the curves representing node exhaustion correspond to different slopes in curves representing detection probability.

Finally, we simulated the protocol behavior under a coordinated attack: The adversary clones a node into two copies and, in the same period of time, compromises a subset \( w \) of the other remaining nodes. In this setting, we assume that a compromised node forwards messages like a honest one: If not, this behavior could be detected, like in [20], [35], [38]. However, when a compromised node is a witness, we assume that it would not trigger any alarm, and the clones would go undetected for this specific protocol iteration. We investigated how the detection probability is affected under the above scenario, assuming that the adversary “smartly” compromises nodes from a so-called compromising area, which is a squared central area of the network — of increasing size.

When no nodes are compromised, for the first 50 protocol run, the detection probability is 87% for RED and 33.8% for LSM, as shown in Figure 6. When taking into account node compromising, the results of our simulations for LSM and RED are shown in Figure 7(a) and 7(b) respectively. On the x-axis we indicate the number of compromised nodes while on the y-axis the percentage of the total network, starting from the inner area. We can notice that for LSM the detection probability is influenced by both the number of compromised nodes and the size of the compromising area (Figure 7(a)). As for RED, the detection probability is influenced only by the number of compromised nodes (Figure 7(b)). This is due to the following fact: As observed in Figure 3, LSM shows an higher witness density in the most internal areas. For instance, capturing 150 nodes in the 20% central area implies a reduction of detection probability of 25.4% for LSM (from 33.8 to 25.2%), while the performance of RED is reduced by 14% only (from 87 to 74.8%). We can also note that, when the same number of nodes are compromised in all the network areas, the relative resilience of LSM is a little bit higher than RED. For example, with 150 compromised nodes all over the network area, LSM decreases its detection probability by 8.5% only, while it is about 14% for RED. This is due to the
VII. DETECTION PROBABILITY WITH MALICIOUS NODES

In this section we investigate clone detection probability during a sequence of iterations. We assume that the adversary has cloned a node, that it is also already controlling a subset of \( w \) randomly selected other nodes, and that no mechanism for preventing packet dropping is implemented, so that malicious nodes can stop claim forwarding.

Further, we assume that a node (say \( a \)) is cloned and one of its clone (say \( a' \)) is randomly deployed within the network area. Moreover, we assume no routing failure and that from each neighborhood exactly one claim message is sent (we do not explicitly consider \( d \), \( p \) and \( g \) values). We leverage the hypothesis that both claims are sent through path of length \( \ell = c\sqrt{n} \) nodes (with constant network density, the average path length is \( \Theta(\sqrt{n}) \)). The nodes on the two paths (the first one departing from the honest node, \( a \), the second one from the clone, \( a' \)) are those involved in the detection process by the two protocols.

In RED, if just one of these \( 2\ell \) nodes in the two paths is malicious, detection can fail. In fact, note that the corrupted forwarding node can simply drop the received location claim. The probability that at least one malicious node is present in the two paths is:

\[
1 - \left( \frac{n-w}{\frac{n}{2\ell}} \right)^2.
\]

The probability that the attack is not detected using the RED protocol, for a single protocol iteration, is exactly that of Equation 1. To analyze a sequence of iterations, we assume that every iteration is probabilistically independent. Therefore, the probability that the attack is not detected after \( i \) RED protocol iterations is:

\[
\left( 1 - \left( \frac{n-w}{\frac{n}{2\ell}} \right)^2 \right)^i.
\]

The analysis is different for LSM. In fact, even if all the nodes are honest the attack is detected only with a given probability—the probability that two paths starting at \( a \) and \( a' \) intersect on a network node. Following the analysis proposed in [45], this probability is:

\[
\frac{1}{3} \left( 1 - \frac{35}{12\pi^2} \right).
\]

However, note that the probability in Equation 3 refers to geometric line intersection. Then, it is in fact an optimistic upper bound (also still assuming no failure in the routing). In fact, two intersecting paths (geometrically) do not necessarily have a node in common—an example of this case is shown in Figure 8. Despite this fact, in the following we optimistically consider Equation 3 as the probability that the clone is detected when no malicious nodes are present.

Let \( U \) be the event that the attack is undetected for a single protocol iteration. For LSM we have to consider the following two disjoint events. Here, the idea is that malicious nodes can prevent clone detection only if they are in the path before the witness. Let us define:
• event $E_h$: All of the forwarding nodes before the (possibly present) witness are honest;
• event $E_m$: There is at least one malicious forwarding node before the (possibly present) witness.

Note that $E_h$ and $E_m$ form a partition of the probability space, hence

$$P[U] = Pr[U|E_h] Pr[E_h] + Pr[U|E_m] Pr[E_m].$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

$Pr[U|E_h]$ is the probability that the attack is undetected when there are no malicious nodes in the paths. According to [45], this is equal to

$$1 - \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{35}{12\pi^2}\right) = \frac{1}{3} \left(2 + \frac{35}{12\pi^2}\right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

We can assume that $Pr[U|E_m] = 1$, since the malicious node before the witness can discard the claim and stop the detection. $Pr[E_m] = 1 - Pr[E_h]$ is similar to Equation 1, taking into account that the malicious nodes should appear before the witness. On the average, the witness is in the middle of the paths, therefore we can estimate this probability as follows:

$$Pr[E_m] = 1 - \frac{(n-w)}{\ell}.$$  

Putting it altogether, we can compute $P[U]$ as follows:

$$Pr[U] = 1 + \left(\frac{(n-w)}{\ell}\right) \left(\frac{35}{36\pi^2} - \frac{1}{3}\right).$$

Therefore, the probability that the attack is not detected after $i$ LSM protocol iterations is:

$$\left[1 + \left(\frac{(n-w)}{\ell}\right) \left(\frac{35}{36\pi^2} - \frac{1}{3}\right)\right]^i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Figure 9 shows the analytical results for RED and LSM on non-detection probability. Remind that, while the analysis for RED is essentially tight, the one for LSM is optimistic, since it depends on the assumption that paths that geometrically intersect have a node in common. This is not true, especially when the network is dense. The actual detection rate depends on several factors like node density, for example. Nonetheless, RED outperforms LSM even in the presence of malicious nodes that can stop the protocol. Figure 10 shows the analytical results for several values of $\ell$ ($\ell$ controls the length of the average random path in the network, being $\ell = c\sqrt{n}$) of the non-detection probability. We considered subsequent protocol iterations (x-axis). We plotted the result for $c = 0.1, 0.2, \ldots, 1$.

It is interesting to note how $w$ and $c$ influence the detection probability. Larger $c$ means longer paths and thus higher probability that one of the malicious nodes can stop clone detection. Larger $w$ means that the adversary can often thwart the protocols and influence detection probability considerably, especially when $c$ is large. In all cases, it is clear that RED can converge to very high detection probability very quickly. Note that RED is more influenced than LSM by path lengths, since a malicious node can stop the protocol wherever it appears in the paths. However, experiments show that, for a network of 1000 nodes and communication range 0.1 in a network area of.
side 1, $c$ is about 0.35. Therefore, we can conclude that RED has better detection probability and converges faster than LSM for all practical values of the network parameters.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper we presented and justified a few basic requirements an ideal protocol for distributed detection of node replicas should have. In particular, we have introduced the preliminary notion of ID-obliviousness and area-obliviousness that convey a measure of the quality of the node replicas detection protocol; that is, its resilience to a smart adversary. Moreover, we have indicated that the overhead of such a protocol should be not only small, but also evenly distributed among the nodes, both in computation and memory. Further, we have introduced new adversary threat models. However, a major contribution of this paper is the proposal of a self-healing, randomized, efficient, and distributed protocol (RED) to detect node replication attacks. We analytically compared RED with the state of the art solution (LSM) and proved that the overhead introduced by RED is low and almost evenly balanced among the nodes; RED is both ID-oblivious and area-oblivious; furthermore, RED outperforms LSM in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Extensive simulations confirm these results. Lastly, also in the presence of compromised nodes, we can analytically show that RED is more resilient in its detection capabilities than LSM.

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REFERENCES

Fig. 10. Non-Detection Probability for both RED and LSM. $w=5,10,20$. 
Roberto Di Pietro is currently an Assistant Professor at the Department of Mathematics of Universit di Roma Tre - Roma, Italy. He received the Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Universit di Roma "La Sapienza", Italy, in 2004. In 2004 he also received from the Department of Statistics of the same University a Specialization Diploma in Operating Research and Strategic Decisions. He received the M.Sc. in Computer Science from the University of Pisa, Italy, in 1994. He has been visiting scholar at the UNESCO Chair in Data Privacy (URV), Institut EURECOM, and George Mason University-CSIS. His main research interests include: security for mobile, ad-hoc, and underwater wireless networks; security for distributed systems; access control (role mining); virtualization and cloud security; computer forensics, and applied cryptography.

Luigi V. Mancini received the PhD degree in Computer Science from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, in 1989, and the Laurea degree in Computer Science from the University of Pisa, Italy, in 1983. From 2000, he is a full professor of Computer Science at the Dipartimento di Informatica of the University of Rome La Sapienza. His current research interests include: computer network and information security, secure multicast communication, public key infrastructure, authentication protocols, system survivability, computer privacy, wireless network security, fault-tolerant distributed systems, and large-scale peer-to-peer systems. He published more than 80 scientific papers in international conferences and journals such as: ACM TISSEC, IEEE TC, IEEE TKDE, IEEE TPDS, and IEEE TSE. Luigi V. Mancini is the founder of Information and Communication Security (ICSecurity) Laboratory, and, currently, he is the director of the Master degree programs in Information and Network Security at the University of Rome La Sapienza.

Alessandro Mei received the laurea degree in computer science with highest honors from the University of Pisa, Italy, in 1994. He continued his studies as a PhD student at the Department of Mathematics of the University of Trento, Italy, and as a visiting scholar at the Department of EE-Systems of the University of Southern California during 1998 and part of 1999. He received the PhD in mathematics at the University of Trento in 1999. After holding a postdoctoral position at the same university for one year, he joined the faculty of the Computer Science Department at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. His main research interests include computer system security and parallel, distributed, and networked systems. He was presented with the Best Paper Award of the 16th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium in 2002, the EE-Systems Outstanding Research Paper Award of the University of Southern California for 2000, and the Outstanding Paper Award of the Fifth IEEE/ACM International Conference on High Performance Computing in 1998. He is a member of the ACM and the IEEE, a past associate editor of the IEEE Transactions on Computers (2005-2009), and the general chair of IEEE IPDPS 2009, Rome, Italy.