Rafael Moner Colonques

Publications (57) View all

• Source

  Available from: Rafael Moner Colonques

  Article: Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs

  Pedro Mendi, Rafael Moner-Colonques, José J. Sempere-Monerris
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  ABSTRACT: This article presents a link between tariff rates and industry structure in a dynamic setting. We examine the role of tariffs on final-goods in a firm’s decision to integrate and collude in the presence of competitive imports. It is shown that, under some conditions, the upstream firm has an incentive to engage in vertical integration to introduce profitably a wholesale price above the world input price while not inducing any intermediate or final good imports. Higher tariffs downstream, even with no tariff protection upstream, make this strategy more profitable, and provide a rationale for a positive relationship between tariff protection and vertical integration, which is observed in some industries. KeywordsVertical integration–Monopoly–Tariffs
  Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 04/2012; 2(3):359-378. · 0.29 Impact Factor
• Article: Endogenous Mergers of Complements with Mixed Bundling

  Ricardo Flores-Fillol, Rafael Moner-Colonques
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  ABSTRACT: This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint and separate consumption. After merger, partner firms decrease the price of the bundled system. In addition, when markets for individual components are sufficiently important, partner firms find it strategically advantageous to raise the prices of stand-alone products, thus making substitute ‘mix-and-match’ composite products less attractive to consumers. Even though these effects favor the profitability of mergers, merging is not always an equilibrium outcome. The reason is that outsiders respond by cutting their prices to retain their market share, and mergers can be unprofitable when competition is intense. From a welfare analysis, we observe that the number of mergers that are observed in equilibrium may be either excessive (when markets for individual components are important) or suboptimal (when markets for individual components are less important). KeywordsComplements–Merger–Mixed bundling–Separate consumption
  Review of Industrial Organization 04/2012; 39(3):231-251. · 0.48 Impact Factor
• Article: Theoretical and experimental insights on firms' internationalization decisions under uncertainty

  Nikolaos Georgantzis, Rafael Moner-Colonques, Vicente Orts, José J Sempere-Monerris
  01/2012;
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  Available from: Rafael Moner Colonques

  Article: Vertical Integration and Exclusivities in Maritime Freight Transport

  Oscar Alvarez, Sanjaime Pedro, Cantos-Sanchez Rafael, Moner-Colonques José, J Sempere-Monerris, Pedro Cantos-Sánchez, Rafael Moner-Colonques, José J Sempere-Monerris, Óscar Álvarez-Sanjaime
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  ABSTRACT: A key recent theme in maritime freight transport is the involvement of shipping lines in terminal management. Such investments are costly but allow liners to provide better service. Most of these new terminals are dedicated terminals but some are non-exclusive and let rivals access them for a fee. In this paper, we show that a shipping line that builds its own terminal finds it strategically profitable i) to continue routing part of its cargo through the open port facilities, and ii) to keep its terminal non-exclusive. In this way, the liner investor pushes part of the rival's freight from the open to the new terminal. Besides, under non-exclusivities, the shipping lines offer a wider variety of services, total freight increases and the resulting equilibrium fares are higher than with a dedicated terminal.
  04/2011;
• Source

  Available from: Jose J. Sempere-Monerris

  Article: Vertical integration and exclusivities in maritime freight transport

  Pedro Cantos-Sánchez, Rafael Moner-Colonques, José J Sempere-Monerris, Óscar Álvarez-Sanjaime
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  ABSTRACT: A key recent theme in maritime freight transport is the involvement of shipping lines in terminal management. Such investments are costly but allow liners to provide better service. Most of these new terminals are dedicated terminals but some are non-exclusive and let rivals access them for a fee. In this paper, we show that a shipping line that builds its own terminal finds it strategically profitable i) to continue routing part of its cargo through the open port facilities, and ii) to keep its terminal non-exclusive. In this way, the liner investor pushes part of the rival's freight from the open to the new terminal. Besides, under non-exclusivities, the shipping lines offer a wider variety of services, total freight increases and the resulting equilibrium fares are higher than with a dedicated terminal.
  04/2011;