Towards an Approach for Weaving Preferences into Web Services Operation

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Abstract—Existing approaches on Web services privacy dominate solutions from a users’ perspective, giving little consideration to the preferences of Web service providers. The integration of service providers’ preferences into Web services’ operations is discussed in this paper. A Web service provider indicates peer Web services that it could interact with as well as the data that they could exchange with. We focus on Privacy and (trust) Partnership preferences based on which, we develop a Specification for Privacy and Partnership Preferences (S3P). This specification suggests a list of exceptional actions to deploy at run-time when these preferences are not met. An integration model of these preferences into Web services design is illustrated throughout a running scenario, and an implementation framework proves the S3P concept.

Index Terms—Composition, Partnership, Privacy, Preference, Web service.

I. INTRODUCTION

Web services play a major role in the development of loosely-coupled business applications that can cross organization boundaries at run-time. This role is witnessed from the widespread adoption of Web services in different initiatives [4, 15, 16, 17, 20, 25]. Composition of Web services handles users' requests that cannot be satisfied by any single, available Web service, which requires combining the available Web services.

In response to the dynamic nature of today's environments, e.g., sudden drop in network bandwidth, mobility of computing resources, and high rate of cyber attacks, we enhanced in the past Web services with mechanisms that allow them for example to reject processing users' requests due to their current heavy loads, and ask for better rewards due to the pressing nature of these requests [13]. In this paper, we continue this enhancement with emphasis on why and how providers of Web services need to express the preferences of their Web services. By preference, we refer to the conditions and terms that regulate the proper (and expected as well) use of a Web service. We consider two types of preferences: partnership that is geared towards composition, and privacy that is geared towards controlling the data flow in composition. As a result, privacy becomes critical when independent Web services are put together in the same composition.

Although there is no substantial research on partnership issues in compositions (issues like semantic disparity and policy incompatibility are assumed properly addressed in this paper), research on privacy issues through the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P, www.w3.org/P3P) and the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL, www.zurich.ibm.com/security/enterprise-privacy/epal) initiatives, is still confined to users, only, who interact with Web sites [2, 24, 26]. A user would like to know the purpose of submitting her credit card number to a Web site, how long this Web site will retain this number, how she could verify that this number was really deleted, etc. This way of analyzing privacy overlooks the concerns of
providers of Web services in terms of (i) what data their Web services can receive, (ii) when their Web services can forward data, and (iii) what data their Web services can store. Similar questions can be asked when partnership is analyzed, e.g., with whom Web services can interact and for how long. For illustration purposes, let us assume two Web services \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) along with their respective partnership and privacy preferences. In compliance with these preferences, \( s_1 \) invokes \( s_2 \) during an agreed upon time period (e.g., 2pm-4pm only) and \( s_1 \) submits data to \( s_2 \) because \( s_2 \) guarantees the deletion of these data within 48 hours. If these preferences cannot be satisfied, either \( s_2 \) is invited to review its preferences or the search for another peer that will interact with \( s_1 \) is initiated.

Previous research on Web services focuses on privacy from a user’s perspective and always guarantees the automatic and continuous participation of Web services in compositions. This should not be the case, as discussed in this paper. First, the providers question the data that their Web services consume and exchange. Second, the providers question the compositions that their Web services take part in. The same questions may apply to security issues as well. However, standards in Web service security have been extensively addressed in the literature. We focus in this paper on privacy issues to illustrate the accommodation of preferences in Web services compositions. The approach we propose is extensible to additional preferences. Our contributions are strictly dedicated to Web services and built upon a Specification for Privacy and Partnership Preferences (S3P). S3P uses tags to represent partnership preferences of component Web services and a privacy flow to represent the restrictions on the data flow between component Web services. Main contributions are summarized as follows:

- Identify arguments that reflect Web services’ partnership and privacy preferences.
- Develop a set of corrective actions to take when partnership or privacy preferences are unsatisfied at run-time.
- Provide graphical means to illustrate partnership and privacy preferences during the modeling of component and composite Web services.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of some related work. Section 3 discusses preference integration into Web services operation through the adoption of the S3P. Examples of preference arguments and satisfaction of these arguments are, also, discussed in this section. Section 4 provides a proof of concept to test the feasibility of the S3P. Finally, Section 5 draws some concluding remarks and identifies some future research work.

## II. RELATED WORK

Web services provide unique opportunities to extend Web applications dynamically, but face some challenges that compromise their effectiveness to cross organization boundaries and computing platforms [20]. These challenges include automated discovery of services, dynamic service reconfiguration, end-to-end security, privacy, to cite just a few. Our literature review on the particular issue of Web services privacy includes a good number of research projects such as [3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28]. We found that [21] is the only project that addresses this issue from the perspective of providers of Web services and not from the perspective of users of Web services.

In [3], Benbernou et al. develop a privacy agreement model for Web services. Despite the increasing number of privacy policies that organizations post on their Web sites, individuals are generally reluctant to disclose their personal data to these Web sites. In response to this reluctance, Benbernou et al.’s privacy-agreement model adopts the WS-agreement specification [1], to stress out the importance of defining rights and obligations of users towards organizations.

In [6], Chafle et al. discuss the centralized orchestration of Web services composition with focus on constraints on the data flows in this composition. In this orchestration, the data are routed through a central coordinator that has access to the input/output data of all the component Web services. Chafle et al. note that (i) in certain business scenarios, Web services may have restrictions on the source (resp., destination) of the data they receive (resp., send) and (ii) handling these restrictions using current security mechanisms (encryption, authentication) is sometimes inefficient. The solution of Chafle et al. uses three modules (decentralizer, topology filtering, and deployment) and splits a composite Web service into a set of partitions, one partition per component Web service. A partition is like a proxy that processes, transforms, and manages the incoming/outgoing data in compliance with the restrictions imposed on a component Web service and the data requirements of a composite Web service.

In [8], Hamadi et al. develop privacy-aware protocols for Web services. Like other researchers, they note that (i) Internet users have concerns about their personal data being collected and managed by various organizations, and (ii) a small number of Web sites offer real Web services that could be used to investigate privacy and its impact on Web services acceptance by the IT industry and users. To remedy this lack of real Web services, Hamadi et al. study some B2C Web sites/portals like Amazon.com along with their privacy policy documents. Their response to privacy is a modeling technique (based on state chart) that (i) captures privacy abstractions while describing the operation of a Web service and (ii) weaves these abstractions into this operation.

In [24], Xu et al. note that privacy concerns of users need to be handled while the development of composite Web services is in progress. The number of people who access the Web continues to grow, which has exacerbated these concerns. To address this exacerbation and P3P shortcomings, Xu et al. develop privacy-conscious composite Web services. When a user submits data to a Web service, the user would make sure that these data are managed according to her privacy preferences. To this end, the user requests the model of a Web service so that
she knows how this Web service processes and shares data. In their work, automated techniques check the compliance of a Web service's model with a user's privacy preferences. If the check succeeds, the user forwards her request to the Web service for processing. Otherwise, the user forwards the violation as an obligation to the composite Web service for further actions.

In [27] Liu et al. emphasize that the increased use of Web services has meant that more and more personal information of consumers is being requested and shared with these Web services’ providers. Thus it is critical to guarantee that the private data of consumers are collected, used and disclosed according to strict policies. The authors suggest developing a minimal privacy authorization that still permits achieving the functional goals. Authorization policies to specify privacy privileges and trust relationships among services are used.

Although the aforementioned approaches offer a snapshot of the initiatives on Web services’ preferences with emphasis on privacy, there is no clear vision that articulates how these preferences should be looked at from the particular perspective of providers of Web services. The work of Rezgui et al. is, to a certain extent, the only one that embraces this perspective by highlighting the concerns of providers in terms of data usage, storage, and disclosure [21]. However questions like what privacy preferences are appropriate for Web services, how these preferences are reviewed in case of no-satisfaction at run time, and how these preferences are modeled, are left unanswered and solutions are provided on a case-by-case basis.

III. PREFERENCE INTEGRATION INTO WEB SERVICES THROUGH S3P

This section consists of three parts. First, we propose some arguments that show Web services’ partnership and privacy preferences. Then, we illustrate these arguments using a running example. Finally, we work out an S3P instance of this example based on these arguments.

A. Preference arguments

In Section 1, partnership and privacy are introduced as types of preferences. In the following, we suggest some arguments per type of preference and show how the operation of a Web service is restricted if these preference arguments turn out unsatisfied at run-time. It should be noted that preference arguments should be defined using a dedicated ontology but this is outside this paper’s scope.

Partnership preferences are related to the compositions that Web services take part in. Some examples of partnership arguments are as the following:

- *Participation-duration* argument: because Web services can engage in long-running compositions that last days and even weeks [12, 19], a Web service sets the maximum time that it will remain committed to a composition whether this composition is complete or not. By doing this, the Web service disengages automatically from the compositions that last more than expected and participates in other compositions should this become possible.

- *Invocation-period* argument: to maintain a certain level of QoS [18, 22], a Web service sets different time periods (e.g., off peak, peak) to process requests. These periods are based on business hours, computing resources availability, etc.

- *Payment-mode* argument: in return to processing requests, a Web service is compensated either (i) instantly after these requests are complete or (ii) deferred until the successful completion of the composition in which this Web service participates now. In case of composition failure, the Web service requests compensation/cancellation charges on top of its regular charges. If the Web service turns out the source of the failure, then it will be subject to financial penalties.

Privacy preferences are related to the data that Web services exchange in compositions. The following are examples of privacy arguments:

- *Data-source* argument: a Web service sets a list of peers from which it accepts data without checking their “credentials” [7, 11].

- *Data-destination* argument: a Web service sets a list of peers for which it forwards data without checking their “credentials” [7, 11].

- *Data-retention-period-at-destination* argument: a Web service sets a time frame for the destination peers to retain its data whether these data are updated or not. Afterwards, these data should be either deleted or forwarded. In the case of data forward, the privacy preferences of both sender and destination peers need to be satisfied. To counter-balance data-retention-period-at-destination argument that a sender Web service announces, each recipient Web service announces its data-retention-period-at-reception argument as well.

- *Data-disclosure-distance* argument: a Web service sets the maximum distance (e.g., number of edges that correspond to dependencies) for its data to be disclosed from one peer to another without seeking its direct approval. For example, in Figure 1 (we adopt state chart in our work [9]; states and transitions correspond to component Web services and dependencies between these component Web services, respectively) data-disclosure-distance for $s_1$ is set to 2, which means data of $s_1$ are disclosed to its direct connected peers (i.e., $s_2$) and the next direct connected peers (i.e., $s_3$ and $s_4$). To counter-balance data-disclosure-distance argument, each recipient Web service announces its data-destination argument so that the sender Web service approves the peers included in this argument.
It should be noted that data-source and data-destination arguments are critical in peer-to-peer-based composition. This is not the case in centralized-based composition where Web services might not know with whom they interact. Interactions in this composition are routed through a central component.

![Figure 1. Illustration of data-disclosure-distance argument](image)

**B. Running example: cookout party**

Our running example identifies a university student who organizes a cookout party for her recent graduation. The list of Web services implementing this party includes:

1. CateringWS: looks for and contacts catering companies according to criteria such as budget allocated, number of guests expected, and type of cuisine.
2. GuestWS: sends invitees invitations, keeps track of the confirmed ones, and follows-up on the unconfirmed ones through reminders.
3. PlaceBookingWS: looks for a place to host the cookout party, books the place, and completes the necessary paperwork like payment.
4. WeatherWS: checks the weather forecast for the day of the cookout party. In case of bad weather, the party takes place at the student’s place.

Figure 2 represents the specification of the business logic that underpins the cookout-party composition. Some dependencies include: the party does not take place without checking the weather forecast on a specific date, and the quantity of food to prepare depends on the number of guests confirmed. For illustration purposes, we instantiate the preference arguments of CateringWS and PlaceBookingWS.

![Figure 2. Specification of the cookout-party composition](image)

CateringWS’s partnership preferences are as follows:

- **Participation-duration** argument: 48 hours -- if the execution of the cookout-party composition lasts more than 48 hours, CateringWS will disengage from the composition. A remedy to this “expected” disengagement needs to be planned by the composition engineer by for example negotiating a longer engagement period with CateringWS.
- **Invocation-period** argument: null.
- **Payment-mode** argument: deferred -- CateringWS expects payment after the composition completes successfully. In case of failure that leads into cancelation, CateringWS charges additional fees because of the penalty included in the agreement with the catering company.

PlaceBookingWS’s privacy preferences are as follows:

- **Data-source** argument: null.
- **Data-destination** argument: GuestWS.
- **Data-retention-period-at-destination** argument: up to 1 month from date of receipt.
- **Data-disclosure-distance** argument: 2 -- Data of PlaceBookingWS are transferred through GuestWS up to CateringWS without the approval of PlaceBookingWS.

C. S3P Establishment

In Section 2, we mentioned how Hamadi et al. inject privacy details into the specification (which is based on state chart) of a Web service [8]. Unfortunately, this injection does not comply with the separation-of-concerns principle since the revised specification of this Web service is strongly coupled to privacy details. As a result, changes in these details affect this specification and vice-versa. To address this limitation, our approach for handling Web services’ preferences takes two inputs, namely the specification of a composition and the preferences of each component Web service in this composition, and produces one output, which is the S3P of this composition. An S3P is independent from the specification of a composition (i.e., loosely coupled). In an S3P, tags anchored to component Web services correspond to partnership preferences and the privacy flow corresponds to the application of privacy preferences on the data flow between the component Web services. In the following, we establish the S3P for the cookout-party using CateringWS and PlaceBookingWS.

**Partnership preferences.** They are represented with tags in the S3P. Each tag is structured as follows (Table 1): (i) argument name, (ii) preference type, (iii) corrective actions to take (shown in italic) if the preference is unsatisfied at run time, and (iv) the authority that executes the corrective actions. For example in Table 1, Tag #2 invocation-period argument, CateringWS receives an invocation request from the composite Web service. However, this request does not fall within the invocation period that was agreed-upon between both. As per the corrective actions for this argument, CateringWS either rejects the request or applies extra fees if it accepts to process this request. The extra fees are on top of the regular fees that CateringWS charges and reports using payment-mode argument (Tag #3).
Privacy preferences. Because of the use of state charts (in case of Petri-Nets, places and transitions will be adopted instead of states and transitions) to specify compositions (Figure 2), the privacy flow of the S3P is obtained by (i) adding new direct links (i.e., transitions) between the component Web services (i.e., states), or (ii) adding generic Web services between the component Web services. A generic Web service is limited to conveying data from one Web service to another without acting on these data. Except data-retention-period-at-destination argument that is handled using a tag (Table 1, Tag #4), handling the other privacy arguments calls for developing a dedicated flow (Figure 3):

![Figure 3. Handling Web services’ preferences](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Argument name</th>
<th>Preference type</th>
<th>Corrective actions</th>
<th>Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>participation duration</td>
<td>partnership</td>
<td>If participation-duration exceeded</td>
<td>Composite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Then replace component WS</td>
<td>WS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>invocation period</td>
<td>partnership</td>
<td>If request falls outside the agreed upon period</td>
<td>Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Then reject invocation xor apply extra fees on the</td>
<td>WS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>composite WS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>payment mode</td>
<td>partnership</td>
<td>If late payment</td>
<td>Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Then apply penalties on the composite WS</td>
<td>WS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>data retention period (at</td>
<td>privacy</td>
<td>If retention-duration exceeded</td>
<td>Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>destination)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Then apply penalties on the destination WS</td>
<td>WS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(source)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following, we present two algorithms to handle privacy preferences with focus on data-disclosure-distance and data-retention-period-at-destination arguments. We map a composition specification (e.g., Figure 2) onto a graph \( G=(N,E) \). In this graph the nodes \( N \) and edges \( E \) correspond to Web services and dependencies between these Web services, respectively. Each edge is a couple of the form \( <s_i,s_j> \) where the edge is directed from \( s_j \) to \( s_i \). Furthermore, the graph has two unique nodes: START and END. START node has no predecessors whereas END node has no successors. The graph is supposed to meet two basic conditions: (i) every node in the graph is directly or indirectly reachable from START node, and (ii) END node is reachable from every node in the graph.

In the algorithm for handling data-disclosure-distance argument (Figure 4), the following functions are used: Indirect-Neighbor(s_i), Input-Data(s_i), Output-Data(s_i), Distance(Path(s_i,1[s_i],n,s_j)), Connect(s_i,s_j), and Connect(s_i,s_j,s_k). This algorithm checks the data dependencies between Web services and establishes, if necessary, new connections either direct or indirect, between these Web services so that data-disclosure-distance argument is satisfied at run-time.

1. Indirect-Neighbor(s_i): returns the set of Web services that are indirectly connected to \( s_i \) through other Web services \((0,n)\) with 0 and \( n \) standing for minimum and maximum,
respectively. This set permits forming paths \( \text{Path}(s_i, 0s_j, s_k) \), needs to be pruned from duplicate paths, and could be empty. The set of all the paths is stored for later use. If \( s_i \) and \( s_j \) are directly connected, \( \text{Indirect-Neighbor}(s_i) \) is equal to \( \emptyset \), i.e., zero services between them.

2. \( \text{Input-Data}(s_i) \): returns the set of data that \( s_i \) requires for functioning.

3. \( \text{Output-Data}(s_j) \): returns the set of data that \( s_j \) returns after functioning.

4. \( \text{Distance}(\text{Path}(s_i, 1s_j, s_k)) \): returns a set of numerical values that represent the numbers of Web services that separate \( s_i \) from \( s_j \) (distance at least greater or equal to one). These numbers illustrate the shortest and longest paths between \( s_i \) and \( s_j \).

5. \( \text{Connect}(s_i, s_j) \): permits to form a new direct transition between \( s_i \) and \( s_j \). This transition is added to meet some privacy requirements.

6. \( \text{Connect}(s_i, s_j, s_k) \): permits to form a new indirect transition between \( s_i \) and \( s_j \) through a generic Web service \( s_k \). This indirect transition is added to meet some privacy requirements.

In the algorithm for handling \( \text{data-retention-period-at-destination} \) argument (Figure 5), the following functions are used on top of \( \text{Input-Data}(s_i) \) and \( \text{Output-Data}(s_j) \) that were introduced earlier: \( \text{Direct-Neighbor}(s_i) \), \( \text{Check-Duration}(s_i, s_j) \), \( \text{Pass}(s_i, s_j) \), and \( \text{Relax-Duration}(s_i) \). This algorithm checks the data dependencies between Web services and either authorizes the flow of data between these Web services or invites some Web services to review their retention periods of the data they receive.

1. \( \text{Direct-Neighbor}(s_i) \): returns the set of Web services that are directly connected to \( s_i \).

2. \( \text{Check-Duration}(s_i, s_j) \): verifies that \( \text{data-retention-period-at-destination} \) argument of \( s_i \) is in agreement with \( \text{data-retention-period-at-reception} \) argument of \( s_j \).

3. \( \text{Pass}(s_i, s_j) \): submits data from \( s_i \) to \( s_j \).

4. \( \text{Relax-Duration}(s_i) \): is an invitation to the provider of \( s_i \) to relax its \( \text{data-retention-period-at-reception} \) argument.

---

**Proc Data-Disclosure-Distance**

- **Input**: \( \text{INeigh}_i \): set of all indirect neighbors to \( s_i \)
- **Input**: \( \text{Path}_i \): set of all paths that come out of \( s_i \)
- **Auxiliary**: \( i, j \): integer

**Begin**

\( \text{INeigh}_i \leftarrow \emptyset \)

\( \text{Path}_i \leftarrow \emptyset \)

\( \text{INeigh}_i \leftarrow \text{Indirect-Neighbor}(s_i) \)

\( \text{Path}_i \leftarrow \text{Indirect-Neighbor}(s_i) \)

For each \( s_j \) in \( \text{INeigh}_i \) do

- If \( \text{Output-Data}(s_i) \cap \text{Input-Data}(s_j) \neq \emptyset \) then
  
  // \( s_i \) needs data from \( s_j \)

- If \( \text{Data-Disclosure-Distance}(s_i) < \text{Distance}((\text{Path}(s_i, 1s_j, s_k))) \) then

  // \( s_i \) is not supposed to receive data from \( s_j \)

  \( \text{Connect}(s_i, s_j) \)

  //Figure 3-(A) case, establishes a new dependency between \( s_i \) and \( s_j \)

  //this assumes that \( s_i \) accepts to interact directly with \( s_j \)

  //as per data-destination privacy preference

- Else

  If \( (\text{Path}(s_i, 1s_j, s_k)) \) exists

  and \( \text{Distance}((\text{Path}(s_i, 1s_j, s_k))) < \text{Data-Disclosure-Distance}(s_i) \) then

  //Find a path that already connects \( s_i \) and \( s_j \)

  //verify if this path does not violate data-disclosure-distance preference

  \( \text{Use}((\text{Path}(s_i, 1s_j, s_k))) \)

- Else

  \( \text{Connect}(s_i, \text{Generic-WS}, s_j) \)

  //No path exists so establish a new dependency between \( s_i \) and \( s_j \) through a generic WS

  //Figure 3-(B) case

End if

End if

End if

End for

End

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Figure 4. Algorithm for handling \( \text{data-disclosure-distance} \) argument.
D. Formalization

This section formalizes the concepts and definitions given in the previous sections.

1. Based on Figure 2 that shows a state chart-based specification of a composite Web service, we define this specification as a 5-tuple \( \text{CWS} = \langle \text{WS}, \text{L}, \text{T}, \text{ws}_0^{\text{P}}, \text{F} \rangle \) where:
   - \( \text{WS} \) is a finite set of states that correspond to Web services’ names;
   - \( \text{ws}_0^{\text{P}} \) is the initial Web service in \( \text{WS} \);
   - \( \text{F} \subseteq \text{WS} \) is the set of final Web services;
   - \( \text{L} \) is a set of labels;
   - \( \text{T} \subseteq \text{WS} \times \text{L} \times \text{WS} \) is the transition relation. Each transition \( t = (\text{ws}_1^{\text{P}}, \text{l}, \text{ws}_2^{\text{P}}) \) consists of a source Web service \( \text{ws}_1^{\text{P}} \in \text{WS} \), a target Web service \( \text{ws}_2^{\text{P}} \in \text{WS} \), and a transition label \( \text{l} \in \text{L} \).

Example 1: Figure 2 is a state chart of the specification of the cookout-party composite Web service. Several states like \( \text{WeatherWS} \) (initial state) and \( \text{CateringWS} \) (final state) and several transitions like \( \langle \text{WeatherWS, NiceWeather, PlaceBookingWS} \rangle \) are represented. In this transition example, \( \text{WeatherWS} \) and \( \text{PlaceBookingWS} \) are the source and target states, respectively, and \( \text{NiceWeather} \) is the transition’s label.

2. A preference model, \( \text{PM} \), is denoted as \( \text{PM} = \langle \text{PAP}, \text{PRP} \rangle \) where:
   - \( \text{PAP} \) is the set of partnership preferences. Given a composite Web service specification \( \text{CWS} \), a partnership preference \( \text{pap} \) of a component Web service \( \text{WS} \) in \( \text{CWS} \) is a tuple \( \text{pap}_{\text{WS}} = (\text{name}, \text{value}, \text{description}, \text{c.action}, \text{authority}, \text{Ont}) \) where:
     i. \( \text{name} \) is the name of the partnership preference.
     ii. \( \text{value} \) is a value (numerical, string, etc.) assigned to the partnership name.
     iii. \( \text{description} \) is a narrative description of the partnership preference.
     iv. \( \text{c.action} \) is a list of corrective actions to take when the partnership preference is unsatisfied.
     v. \( \text{authority} \) is the body in charge of executing the list of corrective actions when the partnership preference is unsatisfied.
     vi. \( \text{Ont} \) refers to the ontology defining the partnership preference.
   - \( \text{PRP} \) is the set of Privacy Preferences. Its definition is similar to \( \text{PAP} \).

3. A privacy flow, denoted as \( \text{PF} \), of a composite Web service \( \text{CWS} \) is a 5-tuple \( \text{PF}_{\text{CWS}} = \langle \text{WS}_{\text{Pr}}, \text{L}_{\text{Pr}}, \text{T}_{\text{Pr}}, \text{ws}_{\text{Pr}}^0, \text{F}_{\text{Pr}} \rangle \) where:
   - \( \text{WS}_{\text{Pr}} \) is a finite set of states that correspond to Web services’ names; three exclusive cases could exist (\( |\text{PS}| \) represents the cardinality of the set \( \text{PS} \)):
     i. \( |\text{WS}_{\text{Pr}}| = |\text{WS}| \): the number of Web services in the privacy flow is equal to the number of Web services in the specification of the composite Web service.
     ii. \( |\text{WS}_{\text{Pr}}| < |\text{WS}| \): the number of Web services in the privacy flow is less than the number of Web services in the specification of the composite Web service. The privacy flow requires less Web services (Figure 3-(A)).
iii. $|WS_{PF}| > |WS|$; the number of Web services in the privacy flow is greater than the number of Web services in the specification of the composite Web service. The privacy flow requires more Web services (Figure 3-(B)).

- $WS_{PF}^0$ is the initial Web service in $WS_{PF}$;
- $F_{PF} \subseteq WS$ is the set of final Web services;
- $L_{PF}$ is a set of labels; like the three cases that feature the relationship between $WS_{PF}$ and $WS$, similar cases apply to $L_{PF}$ and $L$.
- $T_{PF} \subseteq WS_{PF} \times L_{PF} \times WS_{PF}$ is the transition relation. Each transition $l_{PF} = (WS_{PF}^{src},l_{PF},WS_{PF}^{tgt})$ consists of a source Web service $WS_{PF}^{src} \in WS_{PF}$, a target Web service $WS_{PF}^{tgt} \in WS_{PF}$, and a transition label $l_{PF} \in L_{PF}$.

Example 2: Figure 3 is a state chart of the specification of the privacy flow of the cookout-party composite Web-service. Several states like $WeatherWS$ (initial state) and $CateringWS$ (final state) and several transitions like $(WeatherWS,B_1,GenericWS)$ are included. In this transition example, $WeatherWS$ and $IntermediaryWS$ are the source and target states, respectively, and $B_1$ is the transition's label.

IV. APPROACH VALIDATION

To validate the integration of preferences into Web services, we describe in this section the architecture of the system through a proof of concept which we implemented. The implementation is designed as a Web application based on JEE framework. JSP (Java Server Pages) is used to create interfaces for providers to design and compose Web services. Java Servlets are used for managing the flow of service composition.

A. System Architecture

The modules that constitute the architecture of the system are shown in Figure 6. These modules are: $ServiceDesignInterface$, $BusinessLogicModeler$, $InteractionPreferencesModeler$, and $ServiceManager$.

The first module provides a Graphical User Interface for service engineers (or providers) to design Web services. The second module assists service engineers specify and edit the business logic of compositions. The third module takes the specification of a Web service and injects it with preferences. The last module manages the registration and repository of composite Web services.

B. Implementation Prototype

The prototype is implemented with a two-fold objective which is to prove the architectural feasibility of injecting preferences into Web services and to validate the satisfaction of these preferences at run-time. The implementation is designed as a Web application. JSP (Java Server Pages) is used to create interfaces for providers to design and compose Web services. Operations of various modules are implemented with Java Servlets for managing the composition, flow of services and injecting preferences. For illustrative purposes we explain the $InteractionPreferencesModeler$ module here.

The following assumptions are made: i) only one instance of each Web service is considered and ii) the flow of preferences for this implementation is as shown in Figure 3, without the branching to the $GenericWS$.

A set of preferences for participating Web services are defined where each individual preference has a name, description and properties as XML tags. The properties define attributes of a particular preference.

The $InteractionPreferencesModeler$ module executes the functionalities of tagging the component Web services with partnership preferences and adding the privacy flow to the initial specification. This shows the consequences of applying privacy preferences on the data exchange between the component Web services. Once the preferences are set, these are injected by the $InteractionPreferencesModeler$ into the respective component Web service.

The component Web service injected with the preferences will be positioned as a part of the Web composition based on the Business Logic given by the providers. An example of the preferences that could be injected is shown below.

![Figure 6. System Architecture](image-url)
The flow diagram shown in Figure 7 for service composition describes an operation of InteractionPreferencesModeler module.

C. Discussion

With the design and implementation of the proposed system architecture, the various possibilities using S3P for Web service composition were explored. It was realized that the use of a standard protocol for specifying and injecting preferences, universally accepted, would enable the widespread use and control of Web service composition. It is evident that the number of participating Web services and the respective preference parameters affect the turnaround time for the successful composition of Web services. The use of a business modeling language such as BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) would enhance the standardization of the architecture for integration of business processes with Web services. This also improves the possibilities of modeling preferences of participant behavior in business interactions. With the dynamic changes in preferences and the changes in policy we achieved varying the composition partnership and privacy information flow at runtime. Integrating the composition of Web services with the preferences of the providers using S3P was successfully demonstrated using this framework.

V. CONCLUSION

In a dynamic environment like the Internet software components including Web services need to be given the opportunity of specifying their preferences: with whom they like to interact, what data they like to release, what requests they like to process, etc. Through the S3P we assisted Web services in defining and verifying their preferences at run-time. We suggested two types of preferences, partnership geared towards satisfying composition requirements, and privacy geared towards satisfying data exchange requirements. In terms of contributions, we identified arguments that illustrate Web services’ preferences, developed corrective actions to take when these preferences are not satisfied, and last but not least provided graphical means to model the integration of these preferences into Web services design. These means correspond to tags that label Web services and a privacy flow that shows how data flow between Web services. The privacy flow complies fully with the separation of concerns principle. It is loosely coupled to the business logic of compositions, and hence can be amended with no impact on these compositions.

In term of future work, we plan to continue enhancing the corrective actions per type of restriction and further improve the prototype. Another direction is about the second algorithm concerns “data-retention-period-at-destination” privacy preference that aims at restricting the use of the sender’s data beyond a certain time period. Checking the implementation of such restrictions assumes that the recipient is trustworthy and takes the needed actions in responses to the restrictions that are put on the data it receives. For instance, it could send notification when data are deleted or forwarded. In the opposite case, the recipient could retain data for longer periods of time, change data if it is of type task-driven, etc. In that case, the sender Web service could time-stamp its data with a validity period.
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