Joseph Emmanuel Mullat

Publications (16) View all

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  Available from: Joseph Emmanuel Mullat

  Conference Proceeding: How to arrange a Singles' Party

  Joseph E Mullat
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  ABSTRACT: In order to find a suitable partner, five single women and five single men are going to participate in Singles Party. To cover arrangements expenses, refreshments, beverages, orchestra and rewards, the entrance fee is 50€ .
  GTM 2013; 06/2013
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  Article: The Public Policy Dilemma of a Negative Income Tax System: Normative Approach

  Joseph E Mullat
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  ABSTRACT: This paper examined the controversy of whether public policy should be just and fair to all citizens. Two key actors/politicians and an implicit partaker took part in negotiations for the well-being of citizens. The first actor, representing social policymakers, advocated for citizens legal and moral rights to primary needs and for the delivery of basic goods. The second, repre-senting public policymakers, campaigned for citizens wants for the delivery of non-primary but vital public goods and services. The implicit partaker, who embodied taxpayers, preferred personal consumption to moral and social understanding. Herewith, taxpayers tried to minimize their tax obligations through voting maneuvering. The maneuvering could put the negotiations at risk of collapse. Based on the assumptions of Negative Income Taxes, the resolution of the controversy went against increasing the social security grants and benefits too high.
  05/2013;
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  Available from: Joseph Emmanuel Mullat

  Dataset: Public Policy Dilemma: Lorenz-Gini Visualization

  Joseph E. Mullat
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  Available from: Joseph Emmanuel Mullat

  Article: How to arrange a Singles' Party: Coalition Formation in Matching Game

  Joseph E Mullat
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  ABSTRACT: The study addresses important issues relating to computational aspects of coali-tion formation. Almost as well known, to find payoffsimputationsbelonging to the core is, even for modern supercomputers, an overly complex, NP-hard problem. The issue becomes uncertain because among other things it is unknown whether the core is non-empty. In the proposed cooperative game, under the name of Singles, the presence of non-empty collections of outcomes (payoffs) similar to the core (say quasi-core) is fully guaranteed. Quasi-core is defined as a collection of coalitions minimal by inclusion among non-dominant coalitions induced through monotone linkage functions, Mullat [1979], Kuznetsov [1982], Kempner et al. [2008]. Monotone linkage functions express conventional super-modularity of characteristic functions, Shapley [1971]. We claim that finding the quasi-core is a version of P-NP problem, which leads to branch and bound heuristic. Results are illustrated by Excel spreadsheet.
  04/2013;
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  Article: The Code of Three Regulations for the Environment Protection Agency or a Saga About 12 Bottles

  Joseph Emmanuel Mullat Sr
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  ABSTRACT: The reader may probably find informative the interaction of the interests of companies and the environment protection agency. One may also think that the efficiency of a solution is powerful enough by being right and proper. However, advancing in the other direction of democratic, i.e., self-governing decision-making process, we still have a chance to make a point.
  CSN: General Cognitive Social Science (Topic). 10/2009;