José Alcalde |
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PhD
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University of Alicante
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Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica
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Research experience
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Oct 1995–
presentResearch: Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de AlicanteSpain · Alicante -
Sep 1993–
Aug 1994Research: Research: Duke University
Duke University · Department of EconomicsUSA · Durham -
Sep 1990–
Aug 1991Research: Pre-Doctotal Visit
Université de Toulouse · Economics · GREQAMFrance · Toulouse -
Sep 1988–
Sep 1993Research: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona · Departamento de Economía y de Historia EconómicaSpain · Barcelona
Education
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Sep 1988–
Feb 1994Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
PhD in EconomicsSpain · Bellaterra
Other
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Journal RefereesEconometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic The, Economic Theory, Journal of Public Eco, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Mathematical Social Sciences, Games and Economic Behavior, American Economic Journal Microeconomics, Economics and Politics, International Journal of Games Theory, Investigaciones Económicas, Mathematical Methods of Operational Research, Mathematics of Operations Research, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Design, Social Choice and Welfare, Southern Economic Journal, Spanish Economic Review, Theoretical Economics, Theory and Decision
Publications (76) View all
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Dataset: citation
José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm -
SourceAvailable from: José Alcalde
Article: MQITE WORKING PAPER SERIES WP # 11-03 Competition for Procurement Shares
José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par-ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma-tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex-penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.MQITE WORKING PAPER SERIES. 01/2012; -
SourceAvailable from: José Alcalde
Article: Competition for Procurement Shares
José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are:(i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive.(ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued.(iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.ERN: Procurement (Topic). 07/2011; -
SourceAvailable from: José Alcalde
Article: Merging and Going Bankrupt: A Neutral Solution
José Alcalde, Maria Del Carmen Marco-Gil, José Silva Reus[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called m-additivity. We find that m-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982).Bankruptcy, Reorganization & Creditors eJournal. 01/2011; -
SourceAvailable from: José Alcalde
Article: Fair School Placement
José Alcalde, Antonio Romero-Medina[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: This paper introduces τ-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School Choice Problems. We show that, by considering a weak notion of equity that we refer to as λ-equity, it is possible to contribute positively to solve an open debate, originated by the efficiency-equity trade-off of the schooling problem. We also suggest a slight modification to some allocative procedures recently introduced in the United States to compute τ-fair allocations and provide support for this (possible) reformulation.ERN: Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis; Externalities (Topic). 01/2011;