José Alcalde

PhD
University of Alicante · Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica

Topics (11) View all

Skills (1)

Research experience

  • Oct 1995–
    present
    Research: Universidad de Alicante
    Universidad de Alicante
    Spain · Alicante
  • Sep 1993–
    Aug 1994
    Research: Research: Duke University
    Duke University · Department of Economics
    USA · Durham
  • Sep 1990–
    Aug 1991
    Research: Pre-Doctotal Visit
    Université de Toulouse · Economics · GREQAM
    France · Toulouse
  • Sep 1988–
    Sep 1993
    Research: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona · Departamento de Economía y de Historia Económica
    Spain · Barcelona

Education

  • Sep 1988–
    Feb 1994
    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
    PhD in Economics
    Spain · Bellaterra

Publications (76) View all

  • Source
    Dataset: citation
    José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm
  • Source
    Article: MQITE WORKING PAPER SERIES WP # 11-03 Competition for Procurement Shares
    José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par-ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma-tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex-penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.
    MQITE WORKING PAPER SERIES. 01/2012;
  • Source
    Article: Competition for Procurement Shares
    José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are:(i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive.(ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued.(iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.
    ERN: Procurement (Topic). 07/2011;
  • Source
    Article: Merging and Going Bankrupt: A Neutral Solution
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called m-additivity. We find that m-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982).
    Bankruptcy, Reorganization & Creditors eJournal. 01/2011;
  • Source
    Article: Fair School Placement
    José Alcalde, Antonio Romero-Medina
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This paper introduces τ-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School Choice Problems. We show that, by considering a weak notion of equity that we refer to as λ-equity, it is possible to contribute positively to solve an open debate, originated by the efficiency-equity trade-off of the schooling problem. We also suggest a slight modification to some allocative procedures recently introduced in the United States to compute τ-fair allocations and provide support for this (possible) reformulation.
    ERN: Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis; Externalities (Topic). 01/2011;

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