Andreas Umland

Publications (38) View all

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  Available from: Andreas Umland

  Dataset: Берлин, Киев, Москва и новые подводные газопроводы: немецкая геоэкономика в лабиринте российско-украинских отношений

  Andreas Umland
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  ABSTRACT: Высказываю особую благодарность Вилфриду Йилге (Лейпциг) за подробный комментарий, а также полезные предложения к первичному тексту. За оставшиеся ошибки или неправильные истолкования ответственность несу я.
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  Article: Die heutige deutsche Ukrainepolitik in ihrem zeithistorischen und geostrategischen Kontext: Erwägungen zu einer Neuorientierung des Engagements Berlins im östlichen Europa

  Andreas Umland
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  ABSTRACT: Die geringe Aufmerksamkeit der deutschen Elite und Öffentlichkeit für die Ukraine ist vor dem Hintergrund der hohen Opferzahlen der Ukrainer im Zweiten Weltkrieg geschichtsvergessen. Trotz einer Reihe begrüßenswerter deutscher Initiativen bezüglich der Ukraine, bestimmen nach wie vor Naivität und Stereotypen das Verhältnis vieler Deutscher zum zweitgrößten Flächenstaat Europas. Das deutsche Engagement in russischen geoökonomischen Projekten wird in Kiew mit Furcht und Verbitterung wahrgenommen. Eine Reorientierung der Ostpolitik und stärkere Präsenz der Ukraine im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands ist überfällig. Eine intensivere deutsche Beschäftigung mit ukrainischen außen- und innenpolitischen Belangen würde eine schrittweise Heranführung der Ukraine an die EU zum Ziel haben.
  Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte. 12/2012; 16(2):231-266.
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  Article: Russia's New "Special Path" After the Orange Revolution: Radical Anti-Westernism and Paratotalitarian Neo-Authoritarianism in 2005-8

  Andreas Umland
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  ABSTRACT: I mention a number of effects that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine had on the political regime, official discourse and public opinion of Russia, since 2005. These repercussions, I argue, partly modified the nature of Putin’s political system making it somewhat distinct from traditional autocracy. I label this alteration “paratotalitarian,” in that it was reminiscent of certain features of totalitarian states, yet did not result in a real regime change from authoritarianism to totalitarianism. I also briefly touch upon some worrying developments in Russian public opinion which, under the influence of an upsurge of anti-Western propaganda in the Kremlin-controlled mass media after the Orange Revolution and in connection with the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, became pre-dominantly anti-American by the end of the last decade.
  Russian Politics and Law 11/2012; 50(6):19-40. · 0.09 Impact Factor
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  Article: The Origins and Vagaries of Russia's White Revolution

  Olena Tregub, Andreas Umland
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  ABSTRACT: Over the last two decades, Russia has become unfashionable in journalistic and scholarly analyses of international affairs. Whereas the post-war Soviet Union was a pre-eminent theme in specialist and lay discussions of world politics, its official successor state, the Russian Federation, is receiving relatively little attention. Russia today is often seen as a weak, backward, and troubled country that deserves empathy and pity rather than serious concern from security experts. Since the break-up of the USSR, in addition to triumphalism about the West's apparent victory in the Cold War, a fatigue about the potential threat still emanating from Russia's enormous nuclear arsenal has spread among political pundits. Russian affairs appear to belong to the 20th rather than 21st century. They are often perceived as dated and boring in comparison to new, fascinating phenomena such as the rise of China and India, international terrorism, and cyber warfare. Russia is still considered in scenarios concerning the future of humanity. But more often than not, it is listed merely as one of the BRIC or G-20 countries – its membership in the G-8 being treated as an oddity rather than a manifestation of Russia's significance. Moscow's sometimes unconstructive behavior in the UN Security Council and generally erratic foreign policies further increase the perception of Russia as a sometimes frightening, but mostly pathetic ghost from the past. The Relevance of Recent Events in Moscow That Russia still has a dysfunctional socio-economic and unconsolidated political system, and that it is thus hardly a Great Power is doubtlessly true. However, an unprejudiced look at today's world also reveals that Russia still is and will remain key to the future of the world's Northern hemisphere in general and the Euro-Asian space in particular. Russia's stability, responsiveness, and cooperation are crucial in issues of non-proliferation, energy security, environmental protection, the balancing of China, and the containment of Islamic fundamentalism. The most important international aspect of Russia's further development is its role in Eastern Europe and its related future relationship with the European Union. The attention of European politicians and experts is currently absorbed by the Euro crisis and reconfiguration of the EU's institutions. However, there are equally topical or even more salient questions for the continent's future further to the east: How will Russia, the world's largest country, develop domestically? How will it, in the future, relate to the other post-Soviet states, above all Ukraine, as well as to organizations such as the EU, NATO, OSCE and Council of Europe? The Russian-Georgian War has given a glimpse of what a worst-case scenario could look like. Moscow's military response to Tbilisi's intervention in South Ossetia in August 2008 might have had some justification. However, Russia's simultaneous occupation of Abkhazia where no military escalation had happened, and the Kremlin's blatant disregard of the 2008 Medvedev-Sarkozy Agreement's key provision about the withdrawal of troops from the two Georgian break-way regions are troublesome signs. They indicate that the current Russian leadership neither accepts the status quo in the post-Soviet region, nor feels bound by top-level political agreements with the West. This, in turn, suggests that the entire current political and legal arrangement of the post-communist world may be standing on shaky ground. It could quickly collapse in the case of a Russian crisis, with unforeseeable consequences across the entire Northern part of the Eurasian continent. Russia has long borders with a number of states either undergoing or awaiting socio-political transformation, including Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, China and North Korea. It is also involved in the domestic affairs of other transition countries like Moldova, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, that have no direct borders with Russia but whose politics could affect or be affected by Russian domestic affairs. Whatever happens inside Russia, given its multiple international conjunctions, is bound to have direct or indirect effects beyond its borders.
  Harvard international review 06/2012;
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  Article: Die Entstehung des ukrainophonen parteiförmigen Rechtsextremismus in der Ukraine der 1990er

  Andreas Umland, Anton Shekhovtsov
  Ukraine-Analysen. 01/2012;