Comparative Strategy Journal Impact Factor & Information

Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

Journal description

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new, potentially hostile regional powers have totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind Western foreign and defense policy. Drawing on historical perspectives and insights from leading international analysts, Comparative Strategy provides a contextual framework for considering the critical security issues of today and tomorrow. Regular features of the journal include: timely commentary by leading U.S. and foreign policymakers comprehensive coverage of Russian and German perspectives on international security issues special issues on key topics such as "Ballistic Missile Defense: New Requirements for a New Century," "Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," The Future of Russia," and "Intelligence Reform" texts of the latest U.S. government, foreign, and NATO documentation on major defense issues, particularly with regard to proliferation and counter-proliferation policies.

Current impact factor: 0.00

Impact Factor Rankings

Additional details

5-year impact 0.00
Cited half-life 0.00
Immediacy index 0.00
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 0.00
Website Comparative Strategy website
Other titles Comparative strategy (Online), Comparative strategy
ISSN 1521-0448
OCLC 47297400
Material type Document, Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Internet Resource, Computer File, Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
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    • On author's personal website or departmental website immediately
    • On institutional repository or subject-based repository after a 18 months embargo
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • On a non-profit server
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to publisher version
    • Set statements to accompany deposits (see policy)
    • The publisher will deposit in on behalf of authors to a designated institutional repository including PubMed Central, where a deposit agreement exists with the repository
    • SSH: Social Science and Humanities
    • Publisher last contacted on 25/03/2014
    • This policy is an exception to the default policies of 'Taylor & Francis (Routledge)'
  • Classification

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the effect of governmental structures on the deterrent calculus of nation-states. It identifies certain governing structures, and their functional relationships, that are likely to influence a particular regime's propensity to take risks and engage in war. The article then explores the institutional dimension of three familiar case studies in which American or Western efforts at deterrence (or compellence) failed: Nazi Germany in the late 1930s; Imperial Japan during the early 1940s; and Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1990 and 2003. These case studies highlight the point that there are significant differences in governmental structure among regimes that are generally classified as “nondemocratic” or “ideological/theocratic.” For instance, Iranian and North Korean governmental institutions, as well as their political cultures, differ in important respects. American efforts to pressure—or, alternatively, accommodate—such hostile regimes can have exactly the opposite effect of that intended, if U.S. policy does not adequately account for the distinctive character of those institutions. Deterrent policies that aim to influence the decisions of particular individuals or agencies within the governmental structure are especially difficult to execute.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2012; 31(3):201-234. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.691848

  • Comparative Strategy 07/2012; 31(3):288-289. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.692244
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    ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to obtain a better understanding of the outcomes of counterinsurgency warfare. It advances the hypothesis that the combined presence of a unified revolutionary force and external sanctuary will significantly increase the chances of victory for insurgents. The variables are tested against Portugal's involvement in the Colonial War, accounting for Portuguese defeat in Guinea-Bissau. The article concludes by extending the hypothesis to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, determining that the ability of the United States to succeed in Afghanistan is limited unless it seals the border with Pakistan and weakens the unity of insurgent forces.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2012; 31(3):235-252. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.691851

  • Comparative Strategy 07/2012; 31(3):287-288. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.692243
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    ABSTRACT: Although the “special relationship” between U.S. and British officials is a fixture of the international scene, recent events have raised concerns about the nature and strength of the partnership. This article explores the issues that animate the dialogue between Washington and London and describes insights gathered from a recent Anglo-American forum held in the United Kingdom. Both countries have shared interests in Afghanistan, Libya, and in the nuclear and intelligence fields more generally. Nevertheless, a changing geopolitical setting, especially increasing U.S. preoccupation with China and the declining British defense budget, suggests that sustaining the special relationship will become more difficult.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2012; 31(3):253-262. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.665722
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    ABSTRACT: The prevailing explanation of the institutionalization of the principles of war is misleading. Although the introduction of the principles into Western doctrine coincided with total war and the need to train unprecedented numbers of soldiers and junior officers in tactics, the fact that the principles disappeared from doctrines immediately prior to and during the Second World War suggests that they were not institutionalized to meet an increased need to educate the military. Instead, we test two other explanations: one drawing on the principles’ military effectiveness and one drawing upon the principles’ explanatory power. We find that neither one of these hypotheses stand. Instead, we conclude by elaborating on how the institutionalization of the principles of war can be made understandable using non-rationalist frameworks, in particular the growth of a particular kind of identity of staff officers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. According to this framework, the two world wars interrupted—rather than promoted—the institutionalization of the principles, since the wars with their large death tolls and mass recruitment increased the difficulties of creating a separate and unique identity for the burgeoning corps of staff officers.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2012; 31(3):263-285. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.692240

  • Comparative Strategy 07/2012; 31(3):286-287. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.692241

  • Comparative Strategy 04/2012; 31(2):192-193. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.669265

  • Comparative Strategy 04/2012; 31(2):191-192. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.665726
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    ABSTRACT: History is replete with examples of deterrence failure and war occurring unexpectedly, taking nations by surprise, because of failure to comprehend an adversary's ideology. The modern world has been shaped by failure to comprehend the ideologically driven aggression of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Soviet communism, and Islamic jihadism. The Soviet “war scare” during NATO's nuclear exercise ABLE ARCHER-83 exemplifies how ideology could cause deterrence failure and even nuclear war. Understanding the ideology of potential adversaries must be part of any informed deterrence strategy. U.S. overconfidence in deterrence theory, which is itself an ideological belief system, could contribute to deterrence failure.
    Comparative Strategy 04/2012; 31(2):111-146. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.665714

  • Comparative Strategy 04/2012; 31(2):194-195. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.669266
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Policymakers in Washington still lack a methodology for predicting which revolutionary groups now active in the greater Middle East will succeed in their efforts and which will fail. The methodology presented in this article for gauging how these and other revolutionary groups will fare—and for identifying the ingredients for success in revolutionary movements—fills that void. A revolutionary group's success depends on its ability to overpower a regime's defenses, and four metrics can suggest whether such a group will succeed. (1) Do the rebels possess a guerilla army? (2) Does the group maintain a territorial base? (3) Are the rebels at least ostensibly prodemocratic? And, (4) is the regime that the rebels wish to overthrow democratic or authoritarian. And, if it is authoritarian, does the ruling elite come from an ethnic or religious minority?
    Comparative Strategy 04/2012; 31(2):162-170. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.665710
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: For five decades, the Minuteman ICBM has served the nation well as the most affordable and responsive element of the U.S. nuclear TRIAD. It has secure command and control, high readiness rates, and low operating costs. The existence of the ICBM force provides critical protection for the other legs of the U.S. deterrent. While the ICBM force has thus far survived defense cuts, a follow-on ICBM is needed, design skills are rapidly disappearing, and the solid rocket motor industrial base is shrinking. Maintenance of the nuclear TRIAD is critical, but it is clearly at risk, despite the fact that both the Russians and Chinese are deploying new ICBMs and developing still more modern ones with the intent to deploy them.
    Comparative Strategy 04/2012; 31(2):147-161. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.665720
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    ABSTRACT: Reacting to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, two European states, the United Kingdom and France, contributed large forces and participated in land, air, and sea operations. The contributions of these states varied considerably in their composition and role. The United Kingdom deployed as many forces (45,000 personnel) as the country could manage, while France sent a significant force (15,000) that fell short of its potential. Once in Arabia, the British played a major role in coalition planning, while the French remained operationally aloof. Finally, when it came to launch offensive operations, British forces were central to the coalition's riskiest endeavors, such as special forces raids and preparing a fake amphibious invasion, while French forces played a credible, but less dangerous role. This article tests the ability of realism and historic institutionalism to explain these different responses to the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis. Although realism appears a priori to possess a high degree of explanatory power, a detailed process tracing analysis reveals that historical institutionalism can better account for the different outcomes observed.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2012; 31(1):56-83. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.647524
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    ABSTRACT: Analyses of U.S. strategic force requirements frequently are based on assertions about the requirements for deterrence. A politically attractive position is that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons reliably meets U.S. strategic nuclear requirements. This position, however, is flawed for two reasons: first, the number/types of nuclear weapons required for deterrence cannot be identified with precision because requirements shift dramatically across time and circumstances. Second, strategic forces also are intended to assure allies and limit damage, and these goals entail separate requirements that must be included in any serious calculation of U.S. strategic force requirements.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2012; 31(1):3-17. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.647528

  • Comparative Strategy 01/2012; 31(1):103-104. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.647514

  • Comparative Strategy 01/2012; 31(1):104-105. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.647518
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    ABSTRACT: This article examines the United States government's use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in support of its post–9/11 counterterrorism efforts. To date, existing studies on defense privatization have concentrated largely on the American military's use of contractors in Iraq. Here, the focus is broadened to examine PMSC support for military operations in Afghanistan, covert operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, homeland security, and the intelligence community. Existing understandings of both strategic studies and American counterterrorism are partial, as they ignore the vital, and increasing, role played by private contractors. Overall, the current conduct of American counterterrorism relies heavily on the private sector and this reliance is problematic.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2012; 31(1):41-55. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.647534
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    ABSTRACT: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is considered the model for how to address the complex problem of proliferation. This article analyzes the NPT's impact on the decision to peacefully give up nuclear weapons programs in four states—South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and Libya. It concludes that while the nuclear decision-making calculus is complicated, because of the centrality of security concerns in nuclear decision-making, the NPT as currently structured appears not to have had a meaningful impact. This article accordingly suggests that nonproliferation efforts should focus on working directly with problem states to alter their calculations about the utility of nuclear weapons.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2012; 31(1):84-102. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.647508