Review of Financial Studies (Rev Financ Stud )

Publisher: Society for Financial Studies, Oxford University Press

Description

The Review of Financial Studies is a major forum for the promotion and wide dissemination of significant new research in financial economics. As reflected by its broadly based editorial board the Review balances theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary criteria for publishing a paper are its quality and importance to the field of finance without undue regard to its technical difficulty. Finance is interpreted broadly to include the interface between finance and economics. The Review is sponsored by The Society for Financial Studies. The editors of the Review and officers of the Society are elected for limited terms.

  • Impact factor
    4.75
  • 5-year impact
    5.18
  • Cited half-life
    7.40
  • Immediacy index
    0.75
  • Eigenfactor
    0.05
  • Article influence
    6.44
  • Website
    Review of Financial Studies website
  • Other titles
    Review of financial studies (Online)
  • ISSN
    1465-7368
  • OCLC
    40777420
  • Material type
    Document, Periodical, Internet resource
  • Document type
    Internet Resource, Computer File, Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Oxford University Press

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author cannot archive a post-print version
  • Restrictions
    • 12 months embargo on science, technology, medicine articles
    • 2 years embargo on arts and humanities articles
    • Some titles may have different embargoes
  • Conditions
    • Pre-print can only be posted prior to acceptance
    • Pre-print must be accompanied by set statement (see link)
    • Pre-print must not be replaced with post-print, instead a link to published version with amended set statement should be made
    • Pre-print on author's personal website, employer website, free public server or pre-prints in subject area
    • Post-print in Institutional repositories or Central repositories
    • Publisher version cannot be used except for Nucleic Acids Research articles
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to publisher version
    • Set phrase to accompany archived copy (see policy)
    • Articles in some journals can be made Open Access on payment of additional charge
    • Eligible UK authors may deposit in OpenDepot
    • Publisher will deposit on behalf of NIH funded authors to PubMed Central, Nucleic Acids Research authors must pay their fee first
    • Some titles may use different policies
  • Classification
    ​ yellow

Publications in this journal

  • Review of Financial Studies 02/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: Using a novel dataset on correlation swaps, we study the relation between correlation risk, hedge fund characteristics and their risk-return profile. We find that hedge funds' ability to create market neutral returns is often associated with a significant exposure to correlation risk, which helps to explain the large abnormal returns found in previous models. We also estimate a significant negative market price of correlation risk, which accounts for the cross-section of hedge fund excess returns. Finally, we detect a pronounced nonlinear relation between correlation risk exposure and the tail risk of hedge fund returns.
    Review of Financial Studies 01/2014; 27(2):581-616.
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    ABSTRACT: We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist (VC)–entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager's compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger.
    Review of Financial Studies 10/2013; 26(10):2620-2647.
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    ABSTRACT: We show that stock prices are more accurate when short sellers are more active. First, in a large panel of NYSE-listed stocks, intraday informational efficiency of prices improves with greater shorting flow. Second, at monthly and annual horizons, more shorting flow accelerates the incorporation of public information into prices. Third, greater shorting flow reduces post-earnings announcement drift for negative earnings surprises. Fourth, short sellers change their trading around extreme return events in a way that aids price discovery and reduces divergence from fundamental values. These results are robust to various econometric specifications and their magnitude is economically meaningful.
    Review of Financial Studies 01/2013;
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    ABSTRACT: Market liberalization may not result in full market integration if implicit barriers are important. We test this proposition for investable and non-investable segments of 22 emerging markets (EMs). We also measure the degree of integration for six major developed markets (DMs) as a meaningful benchmark. We find that while the DMs are close to fully integrated, both EM segments are not effectively integrated with the global economy. We quantify the importance of implicit barriers and show that better institutions, stronger corporate governance and more transparent markets in EMs would jointly contribute to a higher degree of integration by about 20-30 percent.
    Review of Financial Studies 01/2013; Vol. 26, No. 7:1694-1739.
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    ABSTRACT: We examine the performance of liquidity proxies in commodities. The Amihud measure has the largest correlation with liquidity benchmarks. Amivest and Effective Tick measures also perform well. These proxies are useful for studies of commodity liquidity over a long time period and those that lack access to high-frequency data. We use various aspects of transaction costs, such as spread, depth, immediacy, and resiliency, to give insight into the costs of different execution approaches. Transaction costs increase with volatility and exhibit mean reversion. Splitting trades over one hour can reduce trading costs by two-thirds compared to an immediate execution. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
    Review of Financial Studies 01/2012; 25(2):599-638.
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    ABSTRACT: We solve for a firm's optimal cash holding policy within a continuous time, contingent claims framework using dividends, short-term borrowing, and equity issues as controls assuming mean reversion of earnings. Optimal cash is non-monotone in business conditions and increasing in the level of long-term debt. The model matches closely a wide range of empirical benchmarks and predicts cash and leverage dynamics in line with the empirical literature. Firm value is quite insensitive to changes in the level of long-term debt. The model has interesting implications for asset substitution, hedging, and pecking order. Growth opportunities do not greatly affect cash holding policy. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
    Review of Financial Studies 01/2012; 25(3):797-837.
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    ABSTRACT: We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world. Many features of governance and compensation that have caused consternation among commentators arise naturally in this dynamic setting, even though boards are rational and managers are powerless. Compensation changes depend on changes in the evolution of a latent state variable outside the manager's control. Board passivity is positively correlated with both the value of management compensation and the firm's good fortune. Managerial opportunism tends to follow sudden reversals of good fortune. Moreover, managerial private benefits, by increasing managers' stake in the long-run viability of the firm, may actually ameliorate agency conflicts. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
    Review of Financial Studies 01/2012; 25(2):480-521.