Consciousness and Cognition (Conscious Cognit)

Publications in this journal

• Article: Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge.

  Andy D Mealor, Zoltan Dienes
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.
  Consciousness and Cognition 06/2013; 22(3):822-832.
• Article: Adapting to an initial self-regulatory task cancels the ego depletion effect.

  Junhua Dang, Siegfried Dewitte, Lihua Mao, Shanshan Xiao, Yucai Shi
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: The resource-based model of self-regulation provides a pessimistic view of self-regulation that people are destined to lose their self-control after having engaged in any act of self-regulation because these acts deplete the limited resource that people need for successful self-regulation. The cognitive control theory, however, offers an alternative explanation and suggests that the depletion effect reflects switch costs between different cognitive control processes recruited to deal with demanding tasks. This account implies that the depletion effect will not occur once people have had the opportunity to adapt to the self-regulatory task initially engaged in. Consistent with this idea, the present study showed that engaging in a demanding task led to performance deficits on a subsequent self-regulatory task (i.e. the depletion effect) only when the initial demanding task was relatively short but not when it was long enough for participants to adapt. Our results were unrelated to self-efficacy, mood, and motivation.
  Consciousness and Cognition 06/2013; 22(3):816-821.
• Article: Introspection: The tipping point.

  Anthony Ian Jack
  Consciousness and Cognition 06/2013; 22(2):670-671.
• Article: A gap in Nisbett and Wilson's findings? A first-person access to our cognitive processes.

  Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour, Shirley Carter-Thomas
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects' intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this protocol, while introducing for some choices an expert guidance to the description of this choice. The subjects who were assisted detected the manipulation in 80% of cases. Our experiment confirms Nisbett and Wilson's findings that we are usually unaware of our decision processes, but goes further by showingthat we can access them through specific mental acts.
  Consciousness and Cognition 06/2013; 22(2):654-669.
• Article: Interactively guided introspection is getting science closer to an effective consciousness meter.

  Tom Froese
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: The ever-increasing precision of brain measurement brings with it a demand for more reliable and fine-grained measures of conscious experience. However, introspection has long been assumed to be too limited and fallible. This skepticism is primarily based on a series of classic psychological experiments, which suggested that more is seen than can be retrospectively reported (Sperling, 1960), and that we can be easily fooled into retrospectively describing intentional choices that we have never made (Johansson, Hall, Silkström, & Olsson, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, the work by Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour, and Carter-Thomas (2013) could resolve this dilemma. They showed that subjects can be interactively guided to become better aware of their past experience, thereby overturning the "choice blindness" results of Johansson et al. (2005). Although some more fine-tuning of the experimental protocol is needed, interactively guided introspection may well become the most reliable and exhaustive measure of consciousness.
  Consciousness and Cognition 06/2013; 22(2):672-676.
• Article: Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency.

  Mikkel C Vinding, Michael N Pedersen, Morten Overgaard
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one's own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate (proximal) intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing (distal) intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):810-815.
• Article: Subjective states associated with retrieval failures in Parkinson's disease.

  Celine Souchay, Sarah Jane Smith
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Instances in which we cannot retrieve information immediately but know that the information might be retrieved later are subjective states that accompany retrieval failure. These are expressed in feeling-of-knowing (FOK) and Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) experiences. In Experiment 1, participants with Parkinson's disease (PD) and older adult controls were given general questions and asked to report when they experienced a TOT state and to give related information about the missing word. The PD group experienced similar levels of TOTs but provided less correct peripheral information related to the target when in a TOT state. In Experiment 2, participants were given a Semantic (general knowledge questions) and an Episodic (word pairs) FOK task. PD patients failed to accurately predict their future memory performance (FOK) in response to both episodic and semantic cues. Results are interpreted in the context of recent frameworks of memory and metacognition.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):795-805.
• Article: The pull of the group: Conscious conflict and the involuntary tendency towards conformity.

  Randy Stein
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Is the reason that majorities exert an undue influence on the actions of individuals revealed through changes in subjective experience? Using an adaptation of the response interference paradigm (Morsella, Wilson, et al., 2009) in which participants are trained to introspect on their own experience of conscious conflict, two studies reported here show that the mere act of recalling counter-majority stances or opinions is associated with stronger subjective effects than recalling stances or opinions that coincide with majorities. Thus, an intention to conform to a majority (even when the majority is known to be wrong, as shown in the second study) seems to interfere with people's recall of their own stance or opinion. These results provide novel evidence for recent yet under-supported suggestions that majorities can influence individuals even when it is improper or illogical because human social cognition is primarily and involuntarily cooperative at the implicit level.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):788-794.
• Article: Processing of invisible social cues.

  M Ida Gobbini, Jason D Gors, Yaroslav O Halchenko, Howard C Hughes, Carlo Cipolli
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Successful interactions between people are dependent on rapid recognition of social cues. We investigated whether head direction - a powerful social signal - is processed in the absence of conscious awareness. We used continuous flash interocular suppression to render stimuli invisible and compared the reaction time for face detection when faces were turned towards the viewer and turned slightly away. We found that faces turned towards the viewer break through suppression faster than faces that are turned away, regardless of eye direction. Our results suggest that detection of a face with attention directed at the viewer occurs even in the absence of awareness of that face. While previous work has demonstrated that stimuli that signal threat are processed without awareness, our data suggest that the social relevance of a face, defined more broadly, is evaluated in the absence of awareness.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):765-770.
• Article: Conscious and unconscious face recognition is improved by high-frequency rTMS on pre-motor cortex.

  Michela Balconi, Adriana Bortolotti
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Simulation process and mirroring mechanism appear to be necessary to the recognition of emotional facial expressions. Prefrontal areas were found to support this simulation mechanism. The present research analyzed the role of premotor area in processing emotional faces with different valence (positive vs. negative faces), considering both conscious and unconscious pathways. High-frequency rTMS (10Hz) stimulation was applied to prefrontal area to induce an activation response when overt (conscious) and covert (unconscious) processing was implicated. Twenty-two subjects were asked to detect emotion/no emotion (anger, fear, happiness, neutral). Error rates (ERs) and response times (RTs) were considered in response to the experimental conditions. ERs and RTs decreased in case of premotor brain activation, specifically in response to fear, for both conscious and unconscious condition. The present results highlight the role of the premotor system for facial expression processing, supporting the existence of two analogous mechanisms for conscious and unconscious condition.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):771-778.
• Article: Putting yourself in the skin of a black avatar reduces implicit racial bias.

  Tabitha C Peck, Sofia Seinfeld, Salvatore M Aglioti, Mel Slater
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Although it has been shown that immersive virtual reality (IVR) can be used to induce illusions of ownership over a virtual body (VB), information on whether this changes implicit interpersonal attitudes is meager. Here we demonstrate that embodiment of light-skinned participants in a dark-skinned VB significantly reduced implicit racial bias against dark-skinned people, in contrast to embodiment in light-skinned, purple-skinned or with no VB. 60 females participated in this between-groups experiment, with a VB substituting their own, with full-body visuomotor synchrony, reflected also in a virtual mirror. A racial Implicit Association Test (IAT) was administered at least three days prior to the experiment, and immediately after the IVR exposure. The change from pre- to post-experience IAT scores suggests that the dark-skinned embodied condition decreased implicit racial bias more than the other conditions. Thus, embodiment may change negative interpersonal attitudes and thus represent a powerful tool for exploring such fundamental psychological and societal phenomena.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):779-787.
• Article: Performance predictions affect attentional processes of event-based prospective memory.

  Jan Rummel, Beatrice G Kuhlmann, Dayna R Touron
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: To investigate whether making performance predictions affects prospective memory (PM) processing, we asked one group of participants to predict their performance in a PM task embedded in an ongoing task and compared their performance with a control group that made no predictions. A third group gave not only PM predictions but also ongoing-task predictions. Exclusive PM predictions resulted in slower ongoing-task responding both in a nonfocal (Experiment 1) and in a focal (Experiment 2) PM task. Only in the nonfocal task was the additional slowing accompanied by improved PM performance. Even in the nonfocal task, however, was the correlation between ongoing-task speed and PM performance reduced after predictions, suggesting that the slowing was not completely functional for PM. Prediction-induced changes could be avoided by asking participants to additionally predict their performance in the ongoing task. In sum, the present findings substantiate a role of metamemory for attention-allocation strategies of PM.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):729-741.
• Article: Are delusional contents replayed during dreams?

  Armando D'Agostino, Giacomo Aletti, Martina Carboni, Simone Cavallotti, Ivan Limosani, Marialaura Manzone, Silvio Scarone
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: The relationship between dream content and waking life experiences remains difficult to decipher. However, some neurobiological findings suggest that dreaming can, at least in part, be considered epiphenomenal to ongoing memory consolidation processes in sleep. Both abnormalities in sleep architecture and impairment in memory consolidation mechanisms are thought to be involved in the development of psychosis. The objective of this study was to assess the continuity between delusional contents and dreams in acutely psychotic patients. Ten patients with a single fixed and recurring delusional content were asked to report their dreams during an acute psychotic break. Sixteen judges with four different levels of acquaintance to the specific content of the patients' delusions were asked to group the dreams, expecting that fragments of the delusional thought would guide the task. A mathematical index (f,t) was developed in order to compare correct groupings between the four groups of judges. Most judges grouped the dreams slightly above chance level and no relevant differences could be found between the four groups [F(3,12)=1.297; p=n.s.]. Scoring of dreams for specific delusional themes suggested a continuity in terms of dream and waking mentation for two contents (Grandiosity and Religion). These findings seem to suggest that at least some delusional contents recur within patients' dreams. Future studies will need to determine whether such continuity reflects ongoing consolidation processes that are relevant to current theories of delusion formation and stabilization.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):708-715.
• Article: Unconscious and out of control: Subliminal priming is insensitive to observer expectations.

  Erin K Cressman, Melanie Y Lam, Ian M Franks, James T Enns, Romeo Chua
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: We asked whether the influence of an invisible prime on movement is dependent on conscious movement expectations. Participants reached to a central target, which triggered a directional prime-mask arrow sequence. Participants were instructed that the visible arrows (masks) would most often signal a movement modification in a specific (biased) direction. Kinematic analyses revealed that responses to the visible mask were influenced by participants' intentional bias, as movements were fastest when the more probable mask was displayed. In addition, responses were influenced by the invisible prime without regard to its relationship to the more probable mask. Analysis of the time of initial trajectory modifications revealed that both primes influenced responses in a similar manner after accounting for participants' bias. These results imply that invisible stimuli automatically activate their associated responses and that unconscious priming of the motor system is insensitive to the conscious expectations of the participant making the pointing movements.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):716-728.
• Article: The time travelling self: Comparing self and other in narratives of past and future events.

  Azriel Grysman, Janani Prabhakar, Stephanie M Anglin, Judith A Hudson
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Mental time travel research emphasizes the connection between past and future thinking, whereas autobiographical memory research emphasizes the interrelationship of self and memory. This study explored the relationship between self and memory when thinking about both past and future events. Participants reported events from the near and distant past and future, for themselves, a close friend, or an acquaintance. Past events were rated higher in phenomenological quality than future events, and near self events were rated higher in quality than those about friends. Although future events were more positive than past events, only valence ratings for self and close friend showed a linear increase in positivity from distant past to future. Content analysis showed that this increase in positivity could not be ascribed to choosing events from the cultural life script. These findings provide evidence for the role of personal goals in imagining the future.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):742-755.
• Article: Mirroring mirror neurons in an interdisciplinary debate.

  Alessandro Antonietti, Antonella Corradini
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013;
• Article: Theory of Mind experience sampling in typical adults.

  Lauren Bryant, Anna Coffey, Daniel J Povinelli, John R Pruett
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: We explored the frequency with which typical adults make Theory of Mind (ToM) attributions, and under what circumstances these attributions occur. We used an experience sampling method to query 30 typical adults about their everyday thoughts. Participants carried a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) that prompted them to categorize their thoughts as Action, Mental State, or Miscellaneous at approximately 30 pseudo-random times during a continuous 10-h period. Additionally, participants noted the direction of their thought (self versus other) and degree of socializing (with people versus alone) at the time of inquiry. We were interested in the relative frequency of ToM (mental state attributions) and how prominent they were in immediate social exchanges. Analyses of multiple choice answers suggest that typical adults: (1) spend more time thinking about actions than mental states and miscellaneous things, (2) exhibit a higher degree of own- versus other-directed thought when alone, and (3) make mental state attributions more frequently when not interacting (offline) than while interacting with others (online). A significant 3-way interaction between thought type, direction of thought, and socializing emerged because action but not mental state thoughts about others occurred more frequently when participants were interacting with people versus when alone; whereas there was an increase in the frequency of both action and mental state attributions about the self when participants were alone as opposed to socializing. A secondary analysis of coded free text responses supports findings 1-3. The results of this study help to create a more naturalistic picture of ToM use in everyday life and the method shows promise for future study of typical and atypical thought processes.
  Consciousness and Cognition 05/2013; 22(3):697-707.