Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology Impact Factor & Information

Publisher: American Psychological Association

Current impact factor: 0.00

Impact Factor Rankings

Additional details

5-year impact 0.00
Cited half-life 0.00
Immediacy index 0.00
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 0.00
ISSN 1068-8471
OCLC 313232002
Material type Periodical
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

American Psychological Association

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  • Classification

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The 4 articles in this special issue (Stam, Sugarman, Teo, Walsh) each provide an illustration of particular ethical failings of psychology, and argue for a reconceptualization of ethics in psychology. Teo and Walsh focus their analysis in part explicitly on the codes of ethics of the Canadian and the American Psychological Association. All 4 papers focus on the ethical implications of the distinctive character and development of psychological knowledge and practice in broader societal contexts. Taken together, they constitute a formidable critique of the ethical foundation of (North American) psychology. In this commentary I reflect on some of the key themes across the articles. I focus, in particular, on the need for broadening conceptualizations of ethical decisionmaking in psychology to incorporate a sense of social responsibility, and on ethical failings resulting from psychology being based on epistemology modeled on the natural sciences.
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 05/2015; 35(2):135-139.
  • T. Teo ·
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    ABSTRACT: The question is raised whether the American and Canadian codes of ethics for psychologists (codes) are able to address some of the most important moral issues that have plagued the discipline of psychology in recent history. Applying Habermas's distinction between pragmatic, ethical, and moral reasoning, the codes are challenged on moral grounds and calls for reflexivity are articulated. Using examples from academia and psychological practice, lacunae of the codes are disclosed. First it is argued that the ethics codes are not equipped to deal with epistemological violence that is expressed in some research articles. Second it is suggested that the codes, despite their apparently clear articulation, are not immune to ideological changes that have been observed on the background of the "War on Terror." Finally, it is argued that the codes ignore and provide no ethical guidelines when dealing with work that is based on financial conflicts of interest that afflict recent versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). Reflections on the possibility for postconventional codes are included.
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 05/2015; 35(2):78-89.

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000025

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000024

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000026

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000021

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000023

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; 35(3):196-200. DOI:10.1037/teo0000019

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; 35(4):260-261. DOI:10.1037/a0039566

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000027
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Much of the literature concerned about Psychology's conceptual disarray and disunity remains unaware of, or disinclined to consider, the essential role that metaphysics hasin addressing these matters. Properly understood, metaphysics involves what it is to be and to become, that is, what must be involved for anything to occur. Accordingly, metaphysics belongs to the phenomena that psychologists study. If we take the constituents of reality to be complex networks of situations that change over time through the dynamic interplay of parties, it is possible to derive a set of metaphysical categories that constitute the ontological conditions necessary for anything to occur, including bio-psycho-social processes. These conditions of existence are the placeholders for knowledge generally and they entail excluders for conceptual errors, that is, there is a logic to the metaphysical categories which any theory, model, or method in Psychology should observe. This logic bears heavily on relationality, and it is evident that beneath Psychology's surface of "progress-being-made," many conceptualize a range of topics in ways that are at odds with the logic of relations. These topics include types of dependence and the concept of constitution, representational cognition, reification, meaning, the "measurement imperative," qualitative research, and causation. In short, if Psychology were to take metaphysics seriously, it would begin not with method (as has historically been the case) but with the conditions of existence. They provide the ontological justification for hermeneutic inquiry and qualitative research in Psychology; they are the fundamental counterpoint to conceptual disarray and disciplinary fragmentation-they unify.
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 08/2014; 34(3):161-186. DOI:10.1037/a0036242
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    ABSTRACT: From an anticapitalist perspective we examine the personal and political economy of the desires for social justice expressed by psychologists associated with either the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) or Behaviorists for Social Responsibility (BSR). First, we consider terms and concepts related to social justice and acknowledge our conceptual debts to critical theory, poststructuralism, feminist epistemology, and liberation psychology. To provide context, we briefly review North American psychologists’ historical relationship to the state. Then, after discussing the implications of different accounts of SPSSI’s past expressions of interest in social justice, we assess three collections of articles in the last decade of SPSSI’s house organ, the Journal of Social Issues. Next, we examine the interests in social justice shown by B. F. Skinner and subsequent generations of operant behaviorists, known as behavior analysts. Overall, our review of these two bodies of literature indicates that authors tended to use the language of social justice loosely and to present liberal political visions, abstracted from direct political involvement and aimed at reforming social conditions. Furthermore, we infer that the privileged socioeconomic status of academic psychologists compromises aspirations to contribute to social action that challenges the status quo. Accordingly, we propose abandoning attempts as psychologists to practice social justice. Instead, we advocate joining emancipatory struggles in solidarity with other citizens, while striving to overcome socioeconomic and intellectual hierarchies in academic psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 02/2014; 34(1):41. DOI:10.1037/a0033081
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Although there has been considerable empirical scholarship on the psychological dimensions of social justice, there has been less interest in interrogating and clarifying the philosophical and theoretical issues that lie at the intersection of psychology and social justice. The purpose of this special issue is to bring together a range of established scholars with diverse social and political commitments to reflect on some of the philosophical and theoretical issues that emerge when psychologists address social justice in their research and practice. The major themes taken up in this issue include the relationship between the individual and the community, the role that psychology plays both in promoting and in preventing the development of more equitable social and political institutions, and the way that different forms of universalism (e.g., moral, scientific, psychological) inform the struggle for social justice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 02/2014; 34(1):1. DOI:10.1037/a0033578
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    ABSTRACT: This article makes the case for “social justice” in relation to the conceptions of “madness” that currently operate in mental health practice. The argument proceeds in eight steps which challenge dominant views of “madness” in the discipline of psychology. Each of these eight steps is linked to the question of social justice. The first step concerns the irresolvable differences between “models” of madness, with a focus here on four mainstream models: the psychiatric medical model, psychoanalytic conceptions of “psychosis,” systemic interventions into family systems, and cognitive–behavioral therapy approaches. The second step concerns the differences internal to each of these models. In the third step I identify a fifth “model” which is usually occluded in psychological debate, the model madness elaborates of itself. The article then turns to the social conditions that structure different models of madness. Step four of the argument is to emphasize the way that models of madness are embedded in structures of power and point five steps back to the historical separation of reason from unreason as condition of possibility for “madness” as such to be configured as object of psychology. Step six is concerned with the “madness” of contemporary social reality, and step seven with the way that this socially structured madness informs clinical practice. The eighth step is to draw attention to already-existing alternative social practices; social justice in action organized by and for the mental health system user and survivor movements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 02/2014; 34(1):28. DOI:10.1037/a0032841

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2014; 34(4):275-278. DOI:10.1037/a0032006