Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology Impact Factor & Information

Publisher: American Psychological Association

Journal description

Current impact factor: 0.00

Impact Factor Rankings

Additional details

5-year impact 0.00
Cited half-life 0.00
Immediacy index 0.00
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 0.00
ISSN 1068-8471
OCLC 313232002
Material type Periodical
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

American Psychological Association

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  • Classification
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Publications in this journal

  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000024
  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000021
  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; 35(3):196-200. DOI:10.1037/teo0000019
  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2015; DOI:10.1037/teo0000023
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Much of the literature concerned about Psychology's conceptual disarray and disunity remains unaware of, or disinclined to consider, the essential role that metaphysics hasin addressing these matters. Properly understood, metaphysics involves what it is to be and to become, that is, what must be involved for anything to occur. Accordingly, metaphysics belongs to the phenomena that psychologists study. If we take the constituents of reality to be complex networks of situations that change over time through the dynamic interplay of parties, it is possible to derive a set of metaphysical categories that constitute the ontological conditions necessary for anything to occur, including bio-psycho-social processes. These conditions of existence are the placeholders for knowledge generally and they entail excluders for conceptual errors, that is, there is a logic to the metaphysical categories which any theory, model, or method in Psychology should observe. This logic bears heavily on relationality, and it is evident that beneath Psychology's surface of "progress-being-made," many conceptualize a range of topics in ways that are at odds with the logic of relations. These topics include types of dependence and the concept of constitution, representational cognition, reification, meaning, the "measurement imperative," qualitative research, and causation. In short, if Psychology were to take metaphysics seriously, it would begin not with method (as has historically been the case) but with the conditions of existence. They provide the ontological justification for hermeneutic inquiry and qualitative research in Psychology; they are the fundamental counterpoint to conceptual disarray and disciplinary fragmentation-they unify.
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 08/2014; 34(3):161-186. DOI:10.1037/a0036242
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    ABSTRACT: From an anticapitalist perspective we examine the personal and political economy of the desires for social justice expressed by psychologists associated with either the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) or Behaviorists for Social Responsibility (BSR). First, we consider terms and concepts related to social justice and acknowledge our conceptual debts to critical theory, poststructuralism, feminist epistemology, and liberation psychology. To provide context, we briefly review North American psychologists’ historical relationship to the state. Then, after discussing the implications of different accounts of SPSSI’s past expressions of interest in social justice, we assess three collections of articles in the last decade of SPSSI’s house organ, the Journal of Social Issues. Next, we examine the interests in social justice shown by B. F. Skinner and subsequent generations of operant behaviorists, known as behavior analysts. Overall, our review of these two bodies of literature indicates that authors tended to use the language of social justice loosely and to present liberal political visions, abstracted from direct political involvement and aimed at reforming social conditions. Furthermore, we infer that the privileged socioeconomic status of academic psychologists compromises aspirations to contribute to social action that challenges the status quo. Accordingly, we propose abandoning attempts as psychologists to practice social justice. Instead, we advocate joining emancipatory struggles in solidarity with other citizens, while striving to overcome socioeconomic and intellectual hierarchies in academic psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 02/2014; 34(1):41. DOI:10.1037/a0033081
  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2014; 34(4):275-278. DOI:10.1037/a0032006
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    ABSTRACT: Although there has been considerable empirical scholarship on the psychological dimensions of social justice, there has been less interest in interrogating and clarifying the philosophical and theoretical issues that lie at the intersection of psychology and social justice. The purpose of this special issue is to bring together a range of established scholars with diverse social and political commitments to reflect on some of the philosophical and theoretical issues that emerge when psychologists address social justice in their research and practice. The major themes taken up in this issue include the relationship between the individual and the community, the role that psychology plays both in promoting and in preventing the development of more equitable social and political institutions, and the way that different forms of universalism (e.g., moral, scientific, psychological) inform the struggle for social justice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2014; 34(1):1. DOI:10.1037/a0033578
  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2014; 34(4):229-242. DOI:10.1037/a0034517
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    ABSTRACT: Heidegger's analysis of human existence has long been criticized for ignoring the full possibilities of human encounter. This article finds a basis for the criticism in recent infancy research. It presents evidence for a second-person structure in our earliest encounters: An infant first becomes present to herself as the focal center of a caregiver's gazing, smiling, or vocalization. The exchange in which the self thus appears is termed a You-I event. Such an event, it is held, cannot be assimilated into Heidegger's Dasein analysis. The article locates the origins of temporality in the early playful exchanges that make up You-I events. The dread of losing the You is seen as the original form of what Heidegger calls dread in the face of death. The apparently self-sufficient self of the cogito first emerges, it is held, when the child becomes capable of playing the role of a You toward herself. This happens especially through talking "with oneself," as in "inner" speech. The postinfancy self is here interpreted as a derivative of the You-I event. It is argued that because inner speech frees the child from a felt dependence on others for self-awareness, they are no longer experienced in their full significance. The loss of fullness extends to all beings, including the self, with the result that beings are, as Heidegger puts it, depleted of being.
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2014; 34(4):257-274. DOI:10.1037/a0038004
  • Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2014; 34(4):279-282. DOI:10.1037/a0038057
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This article makes the case for “social justice” in relation to the conceptions of “madness” that currently operate in mental health practice. The argument proceeds in eight steps which challenge dominant views of “madness” in the discipline of psychology. Each of these eight steps is linked to the question of social justice. The first step concerns the irresolvable differences between “models” of madness, with a focus here on four mainstream models: the psychiatric medical model, psychoanalytic conceptions of “psychosis,” systemic interventions into family systems, and cognitive–behavioral therapy approaches. The second step concerns the differences internal to each of these models. In the third step I identify a fifth “model” which is usually occluded in psychological debate, the model madness elaborates of itself. The article then turns to the social conditions that structure different models of madness. Step four of the argument is to emphasize the way that models of madness are embedded in structures of power and point five steps back to the historical separation of reason from unreason as condition of possibility for “madness” as such to be configured as object of psychology. Step six is concerned with the “madness” of contemporary social reality, and step seven with the way that this socially structured madness informs clinical practice. The eighth step is to draw attention to already-existing alternative social practices; social justice in action organized by and for the mental health system user and survivor movements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2014; 34(1):28. DOI:10.1037/a0032841
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    ABSTRACT: Campbell (1960) proposed the theory that creativity required blind variation and selective retention (BVSR). More than a half century has transpired without any resolution of the controversy over the theory’s validity. This inability to reach consensus may reflect a fundamental failure on both sides to define the critical terms of the debate, namely, creativity and blindness. Hence, to help resolve the issue, the ideas making up a variant set are first described via three parameters: (a) the idea’s initial probability of generation, (b) its final utility, and (c) any prior knowledge of its utility value. These three subjective parameters are then used to derive a creativity index applicable to each idea in the set. The same parameters are also deployed to produce a sightedness metric that describes the sightedness of the variant set as well as each idea in that set. It is then logically demonstrated, first, that an idea’s creativity is inversely related to its sightedness, and, second, that an idea’s creativity is inversely related to the sightedness of the variant set that contains that idea. Furthermore, the same general conclusions hold when the third parameter is omitted from the two definitions or when the two definitions are not functions of identical parameters (e.g., novelty in one but originality in the other). Because blindness is just the inverse of sightedness, it automatically follows that creativity has an essential positive connection with blind variation. The article closes with a discussion of BVSR implications regarding the joint distribution of creativity and sightedness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 11/2013; 33(4):253. DOI:10.1037/a0030705
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    ABSTRACT: Recent experimental research on concepts has identified a number of important aspects of concepts which appear to be generally incompatible with each other (e.g., research supporting concepts as prototypes vs. psychological essences, or supporting concepts as statistical accumulations vs. generics). We propose that the Aristotelian–Thomistic (A-T) view of concepts provides a theoretical framework within which such disparate results can be accommodated. We show that the classical view of concepts ruled out in the 1970s was not the A-T view of concepts, and that the evidence that rules out the classical view does not rule out the A-T view. We then show that many modern research results are prefigured by aspects of the A-T view. Our review indicates that the A-T view of concepts remains a viable approach and warrants reconsideration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 05/2013; 33(2):71. DOI:10.1037/a0029990
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    ABSTRACT: This article takes a dialogical and interactive approach to the development of perception, looking at the role that internal conversation (or microdialogue), feeling, and emotion plays in our perception of self and others. Using the work of Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty, I argue against cognitive and neurological understandings of perception, affect, and cognition, in which “the mind” is conceived as mental “representations.” Instead, I argue for an embodied understanding of perception and action in which the “field of perception” and our internal microdialogue is informed by the emotional−evaluative stances and intonations of others. Thus, perception can never be emotionally neutral because it is informed by the often conflicted and divided voices that evaluate us, and the action stemming from this is motivated by highly personal emotional stances taken toward things, toward others, and toward one’s own self that centers on the “field of perception.” The idea of the “field of perception” is taken from Bakhtin’s notion of the “field of vision” given to the characters in Dostoevsky’s novels, denoting a person’s own particular point of view on the world and on them self, centered on their microdialogue, from which position they interpret and evaluate their surrounding reality and act upon it. I therefore attempt to show how microdialogue, emotion, and feeling are connected to our own individually oriented involvement in lived interactions with others. These elements are central to our individual field of perception and to how we interpret reality and act within it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 01/2013; 33(4):267. DOI:10.1037/a0030255