Description

Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal is the only journal publishing original, primary, scientific research devoted to the issues of consciousness, voluntary control, and self. The journal features two types of articles: empirical research (in the form of regular articles and short reports) and theoretical articles. Book reviews, integrative theoretical and critical literature reviews, and tutorial reviews are also published. The journal aims to be both scientifically rigorous and open to novel contributions.

Publisher details

Elsevier

Publications in this journal

• The involuntary nature of music-evoked autobiographical memories in Alzheimer’s disease

  Authors: mohamad el haj, luciano fasotti, philippe allain

  Consciousness and Cognition.

  The main objective of this paper was to examine the involuntary nature of music-evoked autobiographical memories. For this purpose, young adults, older adults, and patients with a clinical diagnosisThe main objective of this paper was to examine the involuntary nature of music-evoked autobiographical memories. For this purpose, young adults, older adults, and patients with a clinical diagnosis of probable Alzheimer’s disease (AD) were asked to remember autobiographical events in two conditions: after being exposed to their own chosen music, and in silence. Compared to memories evoked in silence, memories evoked in the ‘‘Music’’ condition were found to be more specific, accompanied by more emotional content and impact on mood, and retrieved faster. In addition, these memories engaged less executive processes. Thus, with all these characteristics and the fact that they are activated by a perceptual cue (i.e., music), music-evoked autobiographic memories have all the features to be considered as involuntary memories. Our paper reveals several characteristics of music-evoked autobiographical memories in AD patients and offers a theoretical background for this phenomenon

• Effects of a nine days Shamatha meditation retreat on attention, mindfulness and self-compassion in participants with different levels of meditation expertise

  Authors: Elisa H Kozasa, Shirley Silva Lacerda, Carolina B. Menezes, João Radvany, Alan Wallace, Luiz Eugênio Mello, João R. Sato

  Consciousness and Cognition.

• Self-reflection and the temporal focus of the wandering mind.

  Authors: J. Smallwood, J. Schooler, D. J. Turk, S. Cunningham, P. Burns, C. N. Macrae

  Consciousness and Cognition.

• Influence of suggestion in the DRM paradigm: What state of consciousness is associated with false memory?

  Authors: Gaën Plancher, Serge Nicolas, Pascale Piolino

  Consciousness and Cognition.

• Self-memory biases in explicit and incidental encoding of trait adjectives

  Authors: DJ. Turk, SJ. Cunningham, CN. Macrae

  Consciousness and Cognition.

• Yours or mine? Ownership and self-memory.

  Authors: S. J. Cunningham, D. J. Turk, L. M. Macdonald, Macrae, C. N. (2008)

  Consciousness and Cognition.

• Proximity and distance between current neuroscientific research and phenomenological investigation on space perception.

  Authors: Bernard Pachoud

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):684-6.

• Close to me: multisensory space representations for action and pre-reflexive consciousness of oneself-in-the-world.

  Authors: Dorothée Legrand, Claudio Brozzoli, Yves Rossetti, Alessandro Farnè

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):687-99.

  Philosophical considerations as well as several recent studies from neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and psychophysics converged in showing that the peripersonal space (i.e. closely surrounding thePhilosophical considerations as well as several recent studies from neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and psychophysics converged in showing that the peripersonal space (i.e. closely surrounding the body-parts) is structured in a body-centred manner and represented through integrated sensory inputs. Multisensory representations may deserve the function of coding peripersonal space for avoiding or interacting with objects. Neuropsychological evidence is reviewed for dynamic interactions between space representations and action execution, as revealed by the behavioural effects that the use of a tool, as a physical extension of the reachable space, produces on visual-tactile extinction. In particular, tool-use transiently modifies action space representation in a functionally effective way. The possibility is discussed that the investigation of multisensory space representations for action provides an empirical way to consider in its specificity pre-reflexive self-consciousness by considering the intertwining of self-relatedness and object-directness of spatial experience shaped by multisensory and sensorimotor integrations.

• The spatiality of situation: comment on Legrand et al.

  Authors: Shaun Gallagher

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):700-2.

• Cognitive neuroscience of ownership and agency.

  Authors: Lars Schwabe, Olaf Blanke

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):661-6.

• Neurophenomenology and the study of self-consciousness.

  Authors: Antoine Lutz

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):765-7.

• Self-consciousness in non-communicative patients.

  Authors: Steven Laureys, Fabien Perrin, Serge Brédart

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):722-41; discussion 742-5.

  The clinical and para-clinical examination of residual self-consciousness in non-communicative severely brain damaged patients (i.e., coma, vegetative state and minimally conscious state) remainsThe clinical and para-clinical examination of residual self-consciousness in non-communicative severely brain damaged patients (i.e., coma, vegetative state and minimally conscious state) remains exceptionally challenging. Passive presentation of the patient's own name and own face are known to be effective attention-grabbing stimuli when clinically assessing consciousness at the patient's bedside. Event-related potential and functional neuroimaging studies using such self-referential stimuli are currently being used to disentangle the cognitive hierarchy of self-processing. We here review neuropsychological, neuropathological, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies using the own name and own face paradigm obtained in conscious waking, sleep, pharmacological coma, pathological coma and related disorders of consciousness. Based on these results we discuss what we currently do and do not know about the functional significance of the neural network involved in "automatic" and "conscious" self-referential processing.

• On agency and body-ownership: phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections.

  Authors: Manos Tsakiris, Simone Schütz-Bosbach, Shaun Gallagher

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):645-60.

  The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals andThe recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals and peripheral afferent signals to these two varieties of body experience remain unknown. In the present review, we consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and we then present a series of experiments that study the interplay between motor and sensory information. In particular, we focus on how multisensory signals interact with body representations to generate the sense of body-ownership, and how the sense of agency modulates the sense of body-ownership. Finally, we consider the respective roles of efferent and afferent signals for the experience of one's own body and actions, in relation to self-recognition and the recognition of other people's actions. We suggest that the coherent experience of the body depends on the integration of efferent information with afferent information in action contexts. Overall, whereas afferent signals provide the distinctive content of one's own body experience, efferent signals seem to structure the experience of one's own body in an integrative and coherent way.

• The deep bodily origins of the subjective perspective: models and their problems.

  Authors: Helena De Preester

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):604-18; discussion 619-22.

  The naturalization of consciousness and the way a subjective perspective arises are hotly debated both in the cognitive sciences and in more strictly philosophical contexts. A number of theseThe naturalization of consciousness and the way a subjective perspective arises are hotly debated both in the cognitive sciences and in more strictly philosophical contexts. A number of these debates, mainly inspired by neuroscientific findings, focus on the 'visceral' dimension of the body in order to formulate a hypothesis for the coming about of consciousness. This focus on what might be called the 'in-depth body' (which is usually not governed by the intentions of the subject) shows that consciousness or the subjective perspective is intimately linked with vital and visceral regulatory processes. I join the debate by arguing that representationalist accounts of the origin of consciousness in the in-depth body exhibit a number of flaws hitherto mainly unnoticed. Furthermore, some aspects of neuroscientific theories are explored as possible validations of a nonrepresentationalist model of consciousness and the subjective perspective. Inspired by phenomenological (more specifically Husserlian) philosophy, I present a hypothesis in which the subjective perspective constitutes itself (in a process of auto-constitution) and in which the 'in-depth' body is not the object of representations in the brain. Rather, the 'in-depth body' is in a non-objectified way built-in in the subjective perspective itself. In this account, therefore, the subjective perspective looses its transparency and gains 'interoceptive thickness'.

• First-personal self-reference and the self-as-subject.

  Authors: Dan Zahavi

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):600-3.

• Mountains and valleys: binocular rivalry and the flow of experience.

  Authors: Diego Cosmelli, Evan Thompson

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):623-41; discussion 642-4.

  Binocular rivalry provides a useful situation for studying the relation between the temporal flow of conscious experience and the temporal dynamics of neural activity. After proposing aBinocular rivalry provides a useful situation for studying the relation between the temporal flow of conscious experience and the temporal dynamics of neural activity. After proposing a phenomenological framework for understanding temporal aspects of consciousness, we review experimental research on multistable perception and binocular rivalry, singling out various methodological, theoretical, and empirical aspects of this research relevant to studying the flow of experience. We then review an experimental study from our group explicitly concerned with relating the temporal dynamics of rivalrous experience to the temporal dynamics of cortical activity. Drawing attention to the importance of dealing with ongoing activity and its inherent changing nature at both phenomenological and neurodynamical levels, we argue that the notions of recurrence and variability are pertinent to understanding rivalry in particular and the flow of experience in general.

• Is minimal self preserved in schizophrenia? A subcomponents view.

  Authors: Aaron L Mishara

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):715-21.

• Anticipating seizure: pre-reflective experience at the center of neuro-phenomenology.

  Authors: Claire Petitmengin, Vincent Navarro, Michel Le Van Quyen

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):746-64.

  The purpose of this paper is to show through the concrete example of epileptic seizure anticipation how neuro-dynamic analysis (using new mathematical tools to detect the dynamic structure of theThe purpose of this paper is to show through the concrete example of epileptic seizure anticipation how neuro-dynamic analysis (using new mathematical tools to detect the dynamic structure of the neuro-electric activity of the brain) and "pheno-dynamic" analysis (using new interview techniques to detect the pre-reflective dynamic micro-structure of the corresponding subjective experience) may guide and determine each other. We will show that this dynamic approach to epileptic seizure makes it possible to consolidate the foundations of a cognitive non pharmacological therapy of epilepsy. We will also show through this example how the neuro-phenomenological co-determination could shed new light on the difficult problem of the "gap" which separates subjective experience from neurophysiological activity.

• Subjectivity and the body: introducing basic forms of self-consciousness.

  Authors: Dorothée Legrand

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):577-82.

• The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum.

  Authors: Michel Cermolacce, Jean Naudin, Josef Parnas

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):703-14.

  The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experientialThe notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self.

• Embodiment, spatial categorisation and action.

  Authors: Yann Coello, Yvonne Delevoye-Turrell

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):667-83.

  Despite the subjective experience of a continuous and coherent external world, we will argue that the perception and categorisation of visual space is constrained by the spatial resolution of theDespite the subjective experience of a continuous and coherent external world, we will argue that the perception and categorisation of visual space is constrained by the spatial resolution of the sensory systems but also and above all, by the pre-reflective representations of the body in action. Recent empirical data in cognitive neurosciences will be presented that suggest that multidimensional categorisation of perceptual space depends on body representations at both an experiential and a functional level. Results will also be resumed that show that representations of the body in action are pre-reflective in nature as only some aspects of the pre-reflective states can be consciously experienced. Finally, a neuro-cognitive model based on the integration of afferent and efferent information will be described, which suggests that action simulation and associated predicted sensory consequences may represent the underlying principle that enables pre-reflective representations of the body for space categorisation and selection for action.

• Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives.

  Authors: Dorothée Legrand

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(3):583-99.

  In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, andIn the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness can be of relevance for empirical research. In particular, I propose to interpret processes of sensorimotor integration in light of the phenomenological approach that allows the definition of pre-reflective self-consciousness.

• The rubber hand illusion: sensitivity and reference frame for body ownership.

  Authors: Marcello Costantini, Patrick Haggard

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(2):229-40.

  When subjects view stimulation of a rubber hand while feeling congruent stimulation of their own hand, they may come to feel that the rubber hand is part of their own body. This illusion of bodyWhen subjects view stimulation of a rubber hand while feeling congruent stimulation of their own hand, they may come to feel that the rubber hand is part of their own body. This illusion of body ownership is termed 'Rubber Hand Illusion' (RHI). We investigated sensitivity of RHI to spatial mismatches between visual and somatic experience. We compared the effects of spatial mismatch between the stimulation of the two hands, and equivalent mismatches between the postures of the two hands. We created the mismatch either by adjusting stimulation or posture of the subject's hand, or, in a separate group of subjects, by adjusting stimulation or posture of the rubber hand. The matching processes underlying body ownership were asymmetrical. The illusion survived small changes in the subject's hand posture, but disappeared when the same posture transformations were applied to the rubber hand. Mismatch between the stimulation delivered to the subject's hand and the rubber hand abolished the illusion. The combination of these two situations is of particular interest. When the subject's hand posture was slightly different from the rubber hand posture, the RHI remained as long as stimulation of the two hands was congruent in a hand-centred spatial reference frame, even though the altered posture of the subject's hand meant that stimulation was incongruent in external space. Conversely, the RHI was reduced when the stimulation was incongruent in hand-centred space but congruent in external space. We conclude that the visual-tactile correlation that causes the RHI is computed within a hand-centred frame of reference, which is updated with changes in body posture. Current sensory evidence about what is 'me' is interpreted with respect to a prior mental body representation.

• Implicit learning of sequential bias in a guessing task: failure to demonstrate effects of dopamine administration and paranormal belief.

  Authors: John Palmer, Christine Mohr, Peter Krummenacher, Peter Brugger

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(2):498-506.

  Previous research suggests that implicit sequence learning (ISL) is superior for believers in the paranormal and individuals with increased cerebral dopamine. Thirty-five healthy participantsPrevious research suggests that implicit sequence learning (ISL) is superior for believers in the paranormal and individuals with increased cerebral dopamine. Thirty-five healthy participants performed feedback-guided anticipations of four arrow directions. A 100-trial random sequence preceded two 100-trial biased sequences in which visual targets (arrows) on trial t tended to be displaced 90 degrees clockwise (CW) or counter-clockwise (CCW) from those on t - 1. ISL was defined as a positive change during the course of the biased run in the difference between pro-bias and counter-bias responses. It was hypothesized that this difference would be greater for believers in the paranormal than for skeptics, for those who received dopamine than for those who received placebo, and for believers who received dopamine than for the other groups. None of the hypotheses were supported by the data. It is suggested that a simple binary guessing task with a focus on prediction accuracy during early trials should be considered for future explorations.

• Sequential resolution of fragmented visual percepts: experimental investigation of a subject's perceptual experience after a right medial temporal stroke.

  Authors: Rodger A Weddell

  Consciousness and cognition. 16(2):551-76.

  This report concerns the fragmented visual percepts in a woman, TR, following a right entorhinal-perirhinal infarct. In a previous report, Weddell [Weddell, R. A. (2005). A visual disorder producingThis report concerns the fragmented visual percepts in a woman, TR, following a right entorhinal-perirhinal infarct. In a previous report, Weddell [Weddell, R. A. (2005). A visual disorder producing highly selective deletion of recurring letters. Cortex, 41, 471-485] linked TR's highly selective tendency to delete recurrent letters with her fragmented percepts. The conflation of same-identity form elements was attributed to anterior extrastriate damage, which reduced the amount of information sustainable in fully resolved visual percepts, and the present experimental investigation of her subjective account of segment formation and resolution completes the story. She said that complex objects and long words first appeared as blurred regions, which sometimes included form elements. It is argued that figure-centred attentional mechanisms subdivided this blurred region into up to 3-4 parts. String length, lexical status (word vs. nonword), and background colour and/or luminance determined fragment length. Two rules described the fragment resolution sequence: largest segments usually resolved first, left-to-right resolution accounting for a few sequences. This resolution sequence occurred when stimuli were exposed too briefly for saccadic exploration, implicating endogenous attentional shifts. Experiment 4 confirmed TR's assertion that spatial, orthographic, and phonological information were stored during the fragment resolution process. Moreover, TR exerted considerable voluntarily control over the fragment resolution sequence and some influence over fragment length. Finally, these findings were interpreted in terms of an extended version of a neural network model of vision largely derived from nonhuman primate studies.

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