Cognitive Development (COGNITIVE DEV)

Publisher: Jean Piaget Society, Elsevier

Journal description

Cognitive Development contains the very best empirical and theoretical work on the development of perception, memory, language, concepts, thinking, problem solving, metacognition, and social cognition. Criteria for acceptance of articles will be: significance of the work to issues of current interest, substance of the argument, and clarity of expression. For purposes of publication in Cognitive Development, moral and social development will be considered part of cognitive development when they are related to the development of knowledge or thought processes. The Publisher and new Editor are resolute in their determination to maintain and enhance the reputation of Cognitive Development as a leading journal in the field, publishing papers of high quality in an expeditious manner (and in due course embracing the new electronic technologies). They remain committed to serving the best interest of the community of researchers, readers, and subscribers who have helped make the journal the success it is, and to increasing the value of Cognitive Development to those who work in the field in the future.

Current impact factor: 1.73

Impact Factor Rankings

2015 Impact Factor Available summer 2015
2009 Impact Factor 1.686

Additional details

5-year impact 2.25
Cited half-life 0.00
Immediacy index 0.14
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 1.03
Website Cognitive Development website
Other titles Cognitive development
ISSN 0885-2014
OCLC 12603626
Material type Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details

Elsevier

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Pre-print allowed on any website or open access repository
    • Voluntary deposit by author of authors post-print allowed on authors' personal website, arXiv.org or institutions open scholarly website including Institutional Repository, without embargo, where there is not a policy or mandate
    • Deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate only allowed where separate agreement between repository and the publisher exists.
    • Permitted deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate, may be required to comply with embargo periods of 12 months to 48 months .
    • Set statement to accompany deposit
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to journal home page or articles' DOI
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Articles in some journals can be made Open Access on payment of additional charge
    • NIH Authors articles will be submitted to PubMed Central after 12 months
    • Publisher last contacted on 18/10/2013
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Three experiments were conducted to investigate young children's use of the “ignorance = getting it wrong” rule. Four- to six-year-old children and adults (comparison group) were told a story, in which the protagonist did not know which of the two options was correct and had an incentive to select one. Although the adults predicted that the protagonist would select the two options equally, the children were biased toward the incorrect option and most mentioned “not knowing” in their explanations of the protagonist's incorrect behavior, indicating that the children used the “ignorance = getting it wrong” rule. Moreover, most of the six-year-olds recognized that the protagonist was also likely to select the other option, whereas most of the four-year-olds thought this selection was unlikely. The results suggest that young children use the “perceptual access” approach in their theory of mind.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 35. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.11.004
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    ABSTRACT: An object's location can be informative about whether it is owned—typically, a seashell on a beach is not owned, but one in someone's home is. However, in four experiments, we provide evidence that children have difficulty using location to recognize when natural kinds are owned. Children aged three to seven years (N = 262) and adults (N = 50) were shown pictures of objects located inside and outside, and were asked whether each object is owned. While adults viewed natural kinds located inside as owned by someone, children did not. Though children's judgments were sometimes influenced by where objects were located, they never viewed natural kinds as owned at rates exceeding chance. This finding was robust across a variety of testing methods. For example, it occurred when children were asked either of two test questions, when the location of the objects was explicitly highlighted, and when children were shown commonly encountered natural objects and less familiar natural objects. In contrast with children's difficulty recognizing the ownership of natural objects, they overwhelmingly claimed that human-made objects are owned. These findings extend knowledge about children's differing expectations about artifacts and natural kinds, and are informative about how children recognize ownership.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 35. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.03.002
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    ABSTRACT: Although a great deal of research has focused on ontological judgments in preschoolers, very little has examined ontological judgments in older children. The present study asked 10-year-olds and adults (N = 94) to judge the reality status of known real, known imagined, and novel entities presented in simple and elaborate contexts and to explain their judgments. Although judgments were generally apt, participants were more likely to endorse imagined and novel entities when the entities were presented in elaborate contexts. When asked to explain their reasoning, participants at both ages cited firsthand experience for real entities and general knowledge for imagined entities. For novel entities, participants referred most to indirect experiences when entities were presented in simple contexts and to general knowledge when those entities were presented in elaborate contexts. These results suggest that rich contextual information continues to be an important influence on ontological judgments past the preschool years.
    Cognitive Development 04/2015; 34. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.010
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    ABSTRACT: Do children use the Gricean maxim of informativeness (“Make your contribution as informative as is required”) to guide judgments about the reality status of novel entities? In three studies, 9-year-olds watched video clips of two adults discussing novel entities. In Studies 1 and 2, children were less likely to believe in entities introduced with only explicit belief statements (e.g., “I believe in cusk”) than those introduced with other information (e.g., “We saw some cusk in the trees”) or both explicit belief statements and other information. In Study 3, children were more likely to believe in entities about which speakers made an explicit belief statement and appeared to be providing additional information (even though that information was unintelligible) than those about which they only made an explicit belief statement. Consistent with the maxim of informativeness, 9-year-olds expect speakers to introduce novel entities by providing more information about them than a mere statement of belief.
    Cognitive Development 03/2015; 33. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.08.004
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    ABSTRACT: In summarizing the nine articles comprising the Special Issue, Cognizing the Unreal, the editors make two major points. The first is that several articles show that children come to learn about what is real through their perceptions (particularly apparent in the articles by Markova & Legerstee, Goldstein & Bloom, Aguiar & Taylor, Gjersoe, Hall, & Hood, and Woolley & McInnis). Second, children's beliefs about what is real appear to be helped by their accessing underlying abstract structures and comparing these across domains, an idea supported by Shultman & Yoo, Corriveau & Harris, and Van Reet, Pinkham, & Lillard's articles, and given credence by Magid, Sheskin, & Shulz. This latter article proposes that the reason children pretend might be because it is a venue in which children learn to engage in cross-domain abstraction. The authors end with reflection on the cultural proclivity to give very young children fantasy. This proclivity might not serve children well, since (the articles suggest) it is through reality (both perceptions of and abstractions about reality) that children come to understand fantasy.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.007
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    ABSTRACT: One of the most striking examples of appearance–reality discrepancy is invisibility—when something has no appearance yet still exists. The issue of invisibility sits at the juncture of two foundational ontological distinctions, that between appearance and reality and that between reality and non-reality. We probed the invisibility concepts of 47 3–7-year-olds using two sets of tasks: (1) an entity task, in which children were queried about the visibility and reality status of a variety of both visible and invisible entities, and (2) two standard appearance–reality tasks. Results showed that children's concepts of visibility and reality status are intertwined, and that an understanding that some entities are impossible to see develops between the ages of 3 and 7.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; 34. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.009
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    ABSTRACT: Anthropomorphism of toys has been portrayed in popular culture with notable examples such as children's fairy stories, and, more recently, in movies like Toy Story. However, studies of children's attitudes toward inanimate objects suggest that they do not attribute mental states to toys. In two studies using a mental state induction technique, we demonstrate that children do exhibit this tendency with toys that are also their attachment objects. Attribution of mental states to objects was not simply due to familiarity, category membership, or perceptual similarity to sentient beings, but rather to emotional attachment combined with personifying features such as a face.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.002
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    ABSTRACT: Given that children are told stories about real as well as pretend protagonists, how do they differentiate between them? Previous research indicates that children's understanding of historical versus fictional stories develops between ages 3 and 5 (Corriveau et al., 2009. Cognition, 112, 225; Woolley and Cox, 2007. Developmental Science, 10, 681). Across two experiments (N = 134), we asked if children's developing understanding of representation is related to their ability to differentiate between historical and fictional stories. Controlling for age and verbal ability, children's ability to correctly differentiate such stories is related to their developing understanding of false beliefs and false signs but not false photographs.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.005
  • Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.003
  • Cognitive Development 01/2015; 35:92-110.