Cognitive Development (COGNITIVE DEV)

Publisher: Jean Piaget Society, Elsevier

Journal description

Cognitive Development contains the very best empirical and theoretical work on the development of perception, memory, language, concepts, thinking, problem solving, metacognition, and social cognition. Criteria for acceptance of articles will be: significance of the work to issues of current interest, substance of the argument, and clarity of expression. For purposes of publication in Cognitive Development, moral and social development will be considered part of cognitive development when they are related to the development of knowledge or thought processes. The Publisher and new Editor are resolute in their determination to maintain and enhance the reputation of Cognitive Development as a leading journal in the field, publishing papers of high quality in an expeditious manner (and in due course embracing the new electronic technologies). They remain committed to serving the best interest of the community of researchers, readers, and subscribers who have helped make the journal the success it is, and to increasing the value of Cognitive Development to those who work in the field in the future.

Current impact factor: 1.73

Impact Factor Rankings

2015 Impact Factor Available summer 2015
2009 Impact Factor 1.686

Additional details

5-year impact 2.25
Cited half-life 0.00
Immediacy index 0.14
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 1.03
Website Cognitive Development website
Other titles Cognitive development
ISSN 0885-2014
OCLC 12603626
Material type Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details


  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Pre-print allowed on any website or open access repository
    • Voluntary deposit by author of authors post-print allowed on authors' personal website, or institutions open scholarly website including Institutional Repository, without embargo, where there is not a policy or mandate
    • Deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate only allowed where separate agreement between repository and the publisher exists.
    • Permitted deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate, may be required to comply with embargo periods of 12 months to 48 months .
    • Set statement to accompany deposit
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to journal home page or articles' DOI
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Articles in some journals can be made Open Access on payment of additional charge
    • NIH Authors articles will be submitted to PubMed Central after 12 months
    • Publisher last contacted on 18/10/2013
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The present study examined predictors of student's knowledge of fraction concepts and procedures in sixth grade (N = 334). Predictors included both math-specific and more general competencies, which were assessed in fifth grade. Multiple regression analyses showed that whole number line estimation, non-symbolic proportional reasoning, long division, working memory, and attentive behavior contributed uniquely to a general measure of students’ fraction concepts; on a measure of fraction procedures, whole number line estimation, multiplication fact fluency, division, and attention made unique contributions. The combined predictability of the measures was lower for fraction procedures than for fraction concepts. Although the unique predictors and the amount of explained variance differed according to the fraction outcome, the ability to locate whole numbers on the number line was a major contributor to prediction in each model. Non-symbolic proportional reasoning was particularly predictive of children's conceptual understanding of fractions.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 35. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.02.001
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    ABSTRACT: Do children use the Gricean maxim of informativeness (“Make your contribution as informative as is required”) to guide judgments about the reality status of novel entities? In three studies, 9-year-olds watched video clips of two adults discussing novel entities. In Studies 1 and 2, children were less likely to believe in entities introduced with only explicit belief statements (e.g., “I believe in cusk”) than those introduced with other information (e.g., “We saw some cusk in the trees”) or both explicit belief statements and other information. In Study 3, children were more likely to believe in entities about which speakers made an explicit belief statement and appeared to be providing additional information (even though that information was unintelligible) than those about which they only made an explicit belief statement. Consistent with the maxim of informativeness, 9-year-olds expect speakers to introduce novel entities by providing more information about them than a mere statement of belief.
    Cognitive Development 03/2015; 33. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.08.004
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    ABSTRACT: In summarizing the nine articles comprising the Special Issue, Cognizing the Unreal, the editors make two major points. The first is that several articles show that children come to learn about what is real through their perceptions (particularly apparent in the articles by Markova & Legerstee, Goldstein & Bloom, Aguiar & Taylor, Gjersoe, Hall, & Hood, and Woolley & McInnis). Second, children's beliefs about what is real appear to be helped by their accessing underlying abstract structures and comparing these across domains, an idea supported by Shultman & Yoo, Corriveau & Harris, and Van Reet, Pinkham, & Lillard's articles, and given credence by Magid, Sheskin, & Shulz. This latter article proposes that the reason children pretend might be because it is a venue in which children learn to engage in cross-domain abstraction. The authors end with reflection on the cultural proclivity to give very young children fantasy. This proclivity might not serve children well, since (the articles suggest) it is through reality (both perceptions of and abstractions about reality) that children come to understand fantasy.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.007
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    ABSTRACT: One of the most striking examples of appearance–reality discrepancy is invisibility—when something has no appearance yet still exists. The issue of invisibility sits at the juncture of two foundational ontological distinctions, that between appearance and reality and that between reality and non-reality. We probed the invisibility concepts of 47 3–7-year-olds using two sets of tasks: (1) an entity task, in which children were queried about the visibility and reality status of a variety of both visible and invisible entities, and (2) two standard appearance–reality tasks. Results showed that children's concepts of visibility and reality status are intertwined, and that an understanding that some entities are impossible to see develops between the ages of 3 and 7.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.009
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    ABSTRACT: Anthropomorphism of toys has been portrayed in popular culture with notable examples such as children's fairy stories, and, more recently, in movies like Toy Story. However, studies of children's attitudes toward inanimate objects suggest that they do not attribute mental states to toys. In two studies using a mental state induction technique, we demonstrate that children do exhibit this tendency with toys that are also their attachment objects. Attribution of mental states to objects was not simply due to familiarity, category membership, or perceptual similarity to sentient beings, but rather to emotional attachment combined with personifying features such as a face.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.002
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    ABSTRACT: Given that children are told stories about real as well as pretend protagonists, how do they differentiate between them? Previous research indicates that children's understanding of historical versus fictional stories develops between ages 3 and 5 (Corriveau et al., 2009. Cognition, 112, 225; Woolley and Cox, 2007. Developmental Science, 10, 681). Across two experiments (N = 134), we asked if children's developing understanding of representation is related to their ability to differentiate between historical and fictional stories. Controlling for age and verbal ability, children's ability to correctly differentiate such stories is related to their developing understanding of false beliefs and false signs but not false photographs.
    Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.005
  • Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.003
  • Cognitive Development 01/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.010
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    ABSTRACT: Children and adults are presented with a special case of the unreal on a daily basis: realistic acting. Although the realistic portrayal of characters is a widespread activity, psychologists know little about how children understand acting, especially the differences between actors and the characters they play. In two studies we tested whether children believe that actors actually possess the physical and emotional states they enact. We found that 3- and 4-year-old children (but not 5-year-old children) fail to appreciate that what happens to a character on screen does not also happen to the actor in real life. We also found that, unlike adults, children tend to favor a nonrealistic portrayal over a realistic one when asked which better depicts a characteristic. These studies can provide a new lens on children's knowledge about portrayals of mental and emotional states in pretend worlds, as well as on their ability to quarantine the world of the unreal.
    Cognitive Development 12/2014; DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.001
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    ABSTRACT: This experiment was designed to clarify the referential status of infants’ newly learned words. We introduced 15- and 17-month-olds to a novel noun, presented in conjunction with pictures of two whisks that differed in color (one purple, one orange). We asked whether infants would extend this newly learned noun to other members of the same kind (other whisks), one differing only in color (a picture of a silver whisk) and another differing in both color and representational medium (a real three-dimensional silver whisk). Fifteen- and 17-month-olds’ interpretation of the novel noun was not tethered tightly to the perceptual features with which the word had previously been paired. Instead, their interpretation was sufficiently abstract to include a new member of the same object category, although it differed in color and representational medium (a real silver whisk). Thus, by 15 months, infants appreciate the referential status of words and extend their meaning flexibly from pictures to objects.
    Cognitive Development 10/2014; 32:1–11. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.04.003