Cognitive Development Journal Impact Factor & Information

Publisher: Jean Piaget Society, Elsevier

Journal description

Cognitive Development contains the very best empirical and theoretical work on the development of perception, memory, language, concepts, thinking, problem solving, metacognition, and social cognition. Criteria for acceptance of articles will be: significance of the work to issues of current interest, substance of the argument, and clarity of expression. For purposes of publication in Cognitive Development, moral and social development will be considered part of cognitive development when they are related to the development of knowledge or thought processes. The Publisher and new Editor are resolute in their determination to maintain and enhance the reputation of Cognitive Development as a leading journal in the field, publishing papers of high quality in an expeditious manner (and in due course embracing the new electronic technologies). They remain committed to serving the best interest of the community of researchers, readers, and subscribers who have helped make the journal the success it is, and to increasing the value of Cognitive Development to those who work in the field in the future.

Current impact factor: 1.73

Impact Factor Rankings

2015 Impact Factor Available summer 2016
2009 Impact Factor 1.686

Additional details

5-year impact 2.25
Cited half-life >10.0
Immediacy index 0.14
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 1.03
Website Cognitive Development website
Other titles Cognitive development
ISSN 0885-2014
OCLC 12603626
Material type Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details


  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Authors pre-print on any website, including arXiv and RePEC
    • Author's post-print on author's personal website immediately
    • Author's post-print on open access repository after an embargo period of between 12 months and 48 months
    • Permitted deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate, may be required to comply with embargo periods of 12 months to 48 months
    • Author's post-print may be used to update arXiv and RepEC
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Must link to publisher version with DOI
    • Author's post-print must be released with a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License
    • Publisher last reviewed on 03/06/2015
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • Cognitive Development 10/2015; 36:68-82. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.09.001
  • Cognitive Development 10/2015; 36:83-92. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.09.011
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    ABSTRACT: Children's judgments of gender norm violations in the U.S. (N = 71) and Korea (N = 73) were examined at ages 5, 7 and 9 years. Children made judgments of hypothetical children violating gender norms when the violation was performed for a helping goal and when no helping goal was presented. When there was no helping goal, American children were more accepting of violations than Korean children, and older children were more accepting than younger children. However, when the norm was violated in order to help someone, there were no differences between the countries and age differences were diminished, with the majorities of children at each age judging the violation as acceptable.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 35. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.04.002
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    ABSTRACT: An object's location can be informative about whether it is owned—typically, a seashell on a beach is not owned, but one in someone's home is. However, in four experiments, we provide evidence that children have difficulty using location to recognize when natural kinds are owned. Children aged three to seven years (N = 262) and adults (N = 50) were shown pictures of objects located inside and outside, and were asked whether each object is owned. While adults viewed natural kinds located inside as owned by someone, children did not. Though children's judgments were sometimes influenced by where objects were located, they never viewed natural kinds as owned at rates exceeding chance. This finding was robust across a variety of testing methods. For example, it occurred when children were asked either of two test questions, when the location of the objects was explicitly highlighted, and when children were shown commonly encountered natural objects and less familiar natural objects. In contrast with children's difficulty recognizing the ownership of natural objects, they overwhelmingly claimed that human-made objects are owned. These findings extend knowledge about children's differing expectations about artifacts and natural kinds, and are informative about how children recognize ownership.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 35. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.03.002
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    ABSTRACT: Adults’ haptic exploratory abilities are efficient and systematic. Associations exist between specific patterns of movement and a person's desired perceptual information (i.e., perceptual goals). These specific movements are called Exploratory Procedures. The development of Exploratory Procedures remains unclear. Young children execute Exploratory Procedures following explicitly given goals, but not implicitly given goals. The present study furthers our knowledge of how implicitly given goals in the context of tool use affect children's exploratory behavior. During haptic only exploration, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds and adults verbally indicated if spoons with varied bowl sizes could transport a piece of candy, and sticks of varied rigidity could mix a substance. Five-year-olds and adults varied their exploration patterns as a function of task (transporting or mixing), but younger children did not. Specifically, the older participants executed the anticipated Exploratory Procedures in each task, suggesting that implicit tool knowledge organized exploration.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 35. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.04.001
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    ABSTRACT: Items rarely belong to a single category, but rather can be cross-classified into many categories, each serving a very different basis for induction. Presently, little is known about how children determine which category to use for induction in cross-classification situations. This research examined the role of category coherence in children's and adults’ (N = 329) inductive reasoning about cross-classified entities. In Study 1 and 2, participants were presented with a person who could be cross-classified into two categories, one coherent and the other incoherent. Category coherence is the extent to which members of a category and/or the properties of a category make sense together, given one's background knowledge. The results showed that by age 5 years, children are systematic in their use of coherence, tending to select the coherent category to inform their inference about the person. There is weaker evidence for 4-year-olds. Study 3 and 4 revealed that 4-year-olds have an appreciation for coherence in tasks of categorization. The results of Study 5 demonstrated 5-year-olds’ and adults’ tendency to use coherence when reasoning about cross-classified entities across different induction tasks. Overall, these results contribute to our emerging understanding of how and why children select some categories versus others during induction with cross-classified items.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 35. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.05.001
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    ABSTRACT: Adolescence is often viewed as a time of irrational, risky decision-making - despite adolescents' competence in other cognitive domains. In this study, we examined the strategies used by adolescents (N=30) and young adults (N=47) to resolve complex, multi-outcome economic gambles. Compared to adults, adolescents were more likely to make conservative, loss-minimizing choices consistent with economic models. Eye-tracking data showed that prior to decisions, adolescents acquired more information in a more thorough manner; that is, they engaged in a more analytic processing strategy indicative of trade-offs between decision variables. In contrast, young adults' decisions were more consistent with heuristics that simplified the decision problem, at the expense of analytic precision. Collectively, these results demonstrate a counter-intuitive developmental transition in economic decision making: adolescents' decisions are more consistent with rational-choice models, while young adults more readily engage task-appropriate heuristics.
    Cognitive Development 09/2015; 36:20-30. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.08.001
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    ABSTRACT: This study was conducted to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the normative development of response monitoring. We examined response monitoring under both relatively simple and more cognitively demanding conditions by measuring behavioral modifications that occurred in the presence of error and conflict. Eighty-nine participants between 4 and 24 years of age were administered two tasks (i.e., Simon and go/no-go). Data were analyzed using t-tests and hierarchical regression. We found that children (4–10 years of age), adolescents (11–17 years of age), and young adults (18–24 years of age) demonstrated significant reaction time slowing in the presence of either error or conflict, and that the magnitude of the slowing in these relatively simple conditions decreased with age. Under more cognitively demanding task conditions, adolescents and young adults demonstrated additional slowing beyond what they exhibited when task conditions were relatively simple. In contrast, children did not show any additional slowing in response to more cognitively demanding task conditions. The findings suggest that older individuals more efficiently modify their behavior in response to subtle changes in task demands.
    Cognitive Development 07/2015; 35:151-162. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.05.002
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    ABSTRACT: Preschoolers seek out and endorse new labels from informants who have previously provided accurate labels over those who have previously provided inaccurate labels (e.g., Koenig et al., 2004). In Study 1, we show that 4-year-olds also prefer a previously accurate pointer over a previously inaccurate one as a source of information about newly hidden objects. In Study 2, we show that they do not expect that a previously accurate pointer will necessarily be a good labeler, though they do expect a previously accurate labeler will be a good pointer. This asymmetry suggests that the scope of inferences children draw about the knowledge of informants can be influenced by the modality in which they communicate. By sharing semantic information (e.g., object names), labelers demonstrate generalizable knowledge; by sharing episodic information (e.g., an object's location), pointers demonstrate more limited knowledge.
    Cognitive Development 07/2015; 35:178-185. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.06.003
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    ABSTRACT: When asked to find the referent of a novel label, young children usually select a novel object rather than an object that has a known label. However, children did not show this so-called disambiguation effect in a situation that required cross-modal generalization of the known label (Scofield et al., 2009). In three experiments, children learned a label for an object that they could see, but not touch, then examined two objects that they could touch, but not see. One of these tactile objects was novel, whereas the other was an exemplar of the just-trained label. On the critical trials, children were asked to decide which object was the referent of a novel label. Neither 3- nor 4-year-olds favored the novel object unless they were first asked to choose the one that was the referent of the just-trained label (both age groups) or choose the one that was the same as the visual training object (4-year-olds only). Children’s tendency to disambiguate across the senses was associated with how accurately they judged their own knowledge of object labels. These findings are consistent with the claim that the cross-modal disambiguation effect can be undermined by children’s reactions to discovering the cross-modal match and by their failure to retrieve the known label for this matching object when considering whether a novel label applies to it.
    Cognitive Development 07/2015; 35:163-177. DOI:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.06.001