The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A (Q J Exp Psychol)

Publisher: Experimental Psychology Society, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Journal description

Section A of The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology publishes original articles on any topic within the field of human experimental psychology. The majority of papers published are substantial experimental reports, but brief reports which allow some definite and important conclusion to be reached are included, and review articles and theoretical treatments are welcome. A distinctive feature of the journal is its book reviews. As well as normal book reviews, from time to time particularly important books are accorded a fuller Critical Notice which may be as long as a normal article. The journal is read internationally, and its contributors are similarly international, with articles from the UK, continental Europe, North America and elsewhere in the world.

Current impact factor: 0.00

Impact Factor Rankings

Additional details

5-year impact 0.00
Cited half-life >10.0
Immediacy index 0.00
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 0.00
Website Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A website
Other titles The Quarterly journal of experimental psychology. A, Human experimental psychology, Human experimental psychology, Quarterly journal of experimental psychology., QJEP(A)
ISSN 0272-4987
OCLC 6855549
Material type Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Pre-print to be accompanied by notice when submitted for publication and when published
    • Publisher copyright and source must be acknowledged
    • Readers of post-print must be advised to contact publisher for further reprinting or re-use
  • Classification

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The problem of deciding whether two things are the same or different in magnitude can be solved by judging one magnitude relative to the other, or by making absolute judgements about the magnitude of each. The shape of the resulting receiver operating characteristic depends on which solution is adopted. In order to obtain empirical receiver operating characteristics, we therefore had subjects rate their confidence that two tone amplitudes were the same or different. Four subjects each made 500 ratings of three differences in amplitude. The asymmetry in the obtained characteristics indicated that subjects made relative rather than absolute judgements of the amplitudes, despite the fact that making absolute judgements would lead to better performance on the task.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 12/2012; 47:1035-1045. DOI:10.1080/14640749408401106
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    ABSTRACT: When individuals offer choices, they intend them to be mandatory (requiring action) or permissive (not requiring action), and they intend them to be open (allowing the choice of both options) or closed (not allowing the choice of both options). In two studies subjects were presented with sets of syntactically equivalent disjunctive sentences with varying content designed to represent four patterns of permitted choice. The research indicates that individuals distinguish four distinct uses of “or” in deontic contexts, and that individuals more often judge choices as mandatory than permissive. The research also compared responses to questions about choice giver intent and receiver choice. The data indicate that when judging intent, individuals are inclined to understand some choices to be permissive. However, when judging what action they might take as choice receiver, subjects tend to regard action to be mandatory. It appears that although people have some facility in assessing a permission giver's intent, they often apply a more restrictive rule to themselves than is required by the choice giver.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 02/2011; 41(4):829-848. DOI:10.1080/14640748908402395
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    ABSTRACT: In written Japanese, there are two types of scripts: logographic kanji and syllabic kana. Three experiments investigated effects of concurrent articulation on decisions about words that are normally written in kanji either presented in kanji or transcribed in kana. Concurrent articulation disrupted rhyme decisions and homophone decisions for the kanji condition more than for the kana-transcribed condition (Experiments 1 and 2) and did not disrupt lexical decisions in either the kanji condition or the kana-transcribed condition (Experiment 3). The results were interpreted as indicating that concurrent articulation does not disrupt the generation of assembled phonology in Japanese, consistent with findings using English materials.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 02/2011; 1992(3-44A):455-474. DOI:10.1080/14640749208401294
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    ABSTRACT: Successful performance of a delayed intention relies, in part, on recognition that a cue provides a signal for the retrieval and realization of that intention. The relative ease with which cues are recognized should influence the likelihood of successfully acting upon a delayed intention (cf. Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). We report three studies in which we manipulated ease of recognition by providing, at encoding, either the particular cues (category exemplars) that subsequently appeared during the test phase or the name of the category from which these cues were drawn—specific or general encoding instructions, respectively. Recognition of cues at test, and thus delayed intention performance, should be enhanced by the provision of specific rather than general instructions at encoding—the “specificity effect” identified by Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn, and Cunfer (1995). This contrast, however, is likely to be influenced by both category-exemplar and exemplar-exemplar relations. The experiments reported here explored the influence of these relations on delayed intention performance. The results indicate the importance of the semantic relations (a) among cues and (b) between cues and the category from which they are drawn in determining the superiority of specific over general cue instructions.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 11/2010; November 1(4-1996):862-887. DOI:10.1080/713755662
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    ABSTRACT: Irrelevant background speech disrupts serial recall of visually presented lists of verbal material. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that the degree of disruption is dependent on the number of words heard (i.e. word dose) whilst the task was undertaken. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that more disruption is produced if the word dose is increased, thereby providing evidence to support the experimental hypothesis. It was concluded from the first two experiments that the word-dose effect might be the result of increasing the amount of changing-state information in the speech. The results of Experiment 3 supported this conclusion by showing an interaction between word dose and changing-state information. It was noted however that the results might be explained within the working memory account of the disruptive action of irrelevant speech. A further two experiments cast doubt on this possibility by failing to replicate the finding that the phonological similarity between heard and seen material affects the degree of interference (Salamé & Baddeley, 1982). The findings are discussed in relation to the changing state hypothesis of the irrelevant speech effect (e.g. Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992).
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 11/2010; November 1(4-1996):919-939. DOI:10.1080/713755663
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    ABSTRACT: Three experiments examined the short-term retention of order in a modified Brown-Peterson task. Our intent was to examine the loss of order memory, unconfounded by item memory, under conditions in which interference from prior trials is kept low. In previous work on the short-term forgetting of order, experimenters have tended to repeat the same items across trials or to draw from a restricted set; in our experiments, we changed the to-be-recalled items from trial to trial and used reconstruction as the retention measure. In all three experiments, very little forgetting was obtained across retention intervals that have traditionally produced dramatic and systematic loss. Our results are reminiscent of those obtained in the BrownPeterson task when performance is assessed after only the first experimental trial.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; 52(1):241-251. DOI:10.1080/713755806
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    ABSTRACT: Four experiments examined the sensitivity of visual short-term memory to visual pattern similarity. Experiment 1 showed that immediate serial memory for novel visual patterns was sensitive to similarity. Using an item reocgnition task, Experiment 2 showed that subjects learned the descriptions of sets of similar and dissimilar patterns at the same rate. But repeated presentations of patterns in a serial memory task again showed a marked and persistent similarity effect (Experiment 3). The final experiment showed the visual similarity effect in serial memory for patterns that had been previously learned. The results show that (a) serial memory for patterns is sensitive to visual similarity, (b) the visual similarity effect is not due to perceptual confusions but originates in memory, (c) there is a clear dissociation between item and order errors, and (d) the visual similarity effect survives articulatory suppression. Visual serial order memory and verbal serial recall appear to share several of these properties, suggesting that the same constraints govern serial memory in each modality. Implications for the understanding of short-term memory are discussed.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; 52(1):217-240. DOI:10.1080/713755809
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    ABSTRACT: There has been considerable debate about whether or not we need to distinguish between the acquisition of implicit—and, independently thereof, the acquisition of explicit—knowledge in sequence learning tasks. Proponents of the view that a unitary knowledge base is formed assume (a) that the knowledge acquired is explicitly available, and (b) that information about sequence fragments forms the core of this explicit knowledge. Both of these issues are addressed empirically in the present article. In two experiments, an adapted process dissociation procedure and a suitable measurement model were used to separate recollective (explicit) and fluency-based (implicit) memory processes in a sequence learning task. Experiment 1 demonstrated that fluency-based processes came into play much later than recollective processes. Such recollective processes have been conceptualized as being based on simple knowledge about sequence fragments or chunks. Indeed, Experiment 2 showed that recollective processes are more likely to contribute to sequence judgements if chunks are readily available at test than if they are not. Together, these results are in line with the view that the learning of an event systematicity can be conceived of as the memorization of chunks of events that support both the speedingup of reaction times to systematic events and explicit, recollective memory processes even after relatively little training.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; 51(2):251-281. DOI:10.1080/713755757
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    ABSTRACT: The purpose of this experiment was to investigate how the control of aiming movements performed as fast and as accurately as possible changes with practice. We examined: (1) the influence of visual feedback on the initial impulse and error correction phases of aiming movements during acquisition; and (2) the effect of removing visual feedback at different levels of practice. Results from the acquisition trials indicated that vision had a major impact on the organization of the initial impulse and error correction phases. Also, consistent with findings from research involving temporally constrained movements, the cost of removing vision was greater after extensive levels than after moderate levels of practice. Collectively, these results denote the importance of visual feedback to the learning of this particular class of aiming movements. Learning appears to be a dual process of improved programming of the initial impulse and increased efficiency of feedback processing. Practice not only acts on programming and feedback processes directly, but also indirectly through a reciprocal interplay between these two processes.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; 51(2):425-443. DOI:10.1080/713755756
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    ABSTRACT: When producing a sentence, the speaker needs to place words in linear order. We hypothesized the existence of a linearization process, which imposes order on a constituent structure. This structure is assumed to be specified with respect to hierarchial relations between constituents but not with respect to word order. We tested this hypothesis in a primed picture description experiment. Speakers of Dutch repeated prime sentences and described target pictures. Word order of prime sentences was manipulated (e.g. “On the table is a ball” vs. “A ball is on the table”). Both alternatives could be used in the description of unrelated target pictures. In support of our hypothesis, word order was “persistent”: Speakers were more likely to use a given word order, when the prime sentence had that same word order. We argue that our results support the notion of a linearization process and reject the alternative explanation that the results should be attributed to persistent selection of a fully specified syntactic frame.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; 52(1):129-147. DOI:10.1080/713755798
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    ABSTRACT: Where information concerning an ongoing event is acquired piecemeal over time, it may become necessary to correct a particular item of information after it is first encountered. Previous work (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988) has shown that if the content targeted for correction is thematically salient, neither a delayed nor an immediate correction may be sufficient to suppress its influence when subjects are subsequently tested for their comprehension of the message sequence as a whole. The present experiments are aimed at clarifying the conditions under which corrections fail to achieve their intended effects. In Experiment 1, message sequences were prepared in which the correction occurred midway in the text. It was found that the pre- or post-correction status of a message had no bearing on how it was interpreted on a later test of comprehension; both types of statements were equally likely to be associated with inferences based on the discredited message. In Experiment 2 the message targeted for correction could be directly linked to only one other message in the overall sequence. Despite this reduction in the scope of the correction, illegitimate inferences based on the discredited source continued to be made during comprehension testing. These results suggest that the critical inferences were made at the time of comprehension testing and are interpreted as providing support for the minimalist stance on the incidence of on-line inferencing during normal reading.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; 52(1):165-183. DOI:10.1080/713755808
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    ABSTRACT: Faces represent a “special” class of physically similar stimuli but it remains uncertain whether they are processed by cognitive systems that are functionally separate from those used for objects. This paper reports two experiments, which examine whether there exist qualitative differences in the semantic and associative priming of faces, “structurally similar” objects (living things), and “structurally distinct” objects (artefacts). Recognition was examined in Experiment 1 using the familiarity judgement task for faces and the object decision task for objects, and naming was examined in Experiment 2. Both experiments compared, within subjects, priming by associates (e.g. Eric Morecambe → Ernie Wise, lion → tiger and lock key) and priming by non-associates from the same semantic category (e.g. Keith Richards → Paul McCartney, bee → spider and nail-file → comb) against both “neutral” and unrelated prime conditions. Both experiments produced a remarkably similar pattern of results. For faces, there was a substantial priming effect from associates but no reliable priming from non-associates of the same semantic category. In contrast, both structurally similar and distinct objects were primed reliably by both associates and semantically (i.e. categorically) related non-associates. The results are interpreted within a model that proposes that the semantic representations of objects are inter-connected by abstracted superordinate categories, but that the representations of people (the elements of which, we propose, are specific biographical descriptive information units) are inter-connected by networks of inter-personal relatedness rather than by “categories” of celebrity.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; 51(4):853-882. DOI:10.1080/713755783
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    ABSTRACT: Three experiments examined repetition priming of the recognition of printed proper names of familiar people by the prior exposure of those names in their correct form or with their letters re-arranged as anagrams. Experiment 1 found that, compared with response times to previously unseen names, name familiarity decisions were made more rapidly if the subject had seen and identified the famous name in the pre-training stage, irrespective of whether they saw the intact name or an anagram. Priming was not demonstrated if the name was not recognized in the pre-training stage. The results of Experiment 2 suggested that if anagrams were not solved spontaneously in the pre-training stage, being prompted to their identity by the experimenter would not yield reliable priming at test, a result that reflected previous work using face stimuli (Brunas-Wagstaff, Young, & Ellis, 1992; Johnston, Barry, & Williams, 1996). In Experiment 3, prompts were given for all names and anagrams presented at pretraining. Subsequent priming was demonstrated only for names identified spontaneously, which showed that, as with face recognition, it was the situation in which the prime was given that was critical in determining whether priming of name recognition occurred. The findings are used to develop proposed extensions of the Bruce and Young (1986) model such as that offered by Burton, Bruce, and Johnston (1990).
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; February 1(1-1999):47-65. DOI:10.1080/713755796
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    ABSTRACT: A new paradigm, the “teaching-by-examples” paradigm, was used to shed new light on the process of category acquisition. In four experiments (n = 90, 90, 115, 117), manipulating the variables of category structure, status of non-target category, learning mode, and teaching mode, participants first learned a category and then taught it to someone else. High agreement between participants on the teaching sequences was found across conditions, and a typical sequence was identified for each category structure. The typical participant-produced sequences startedwith several ideal positive cases, followed by anideal negative case and then borderline cases. The efficiency of such sequences for teaching was tested in another experiment (n = 60), in which they were compared with sequences emphasizing category borders and sequences emphasizing each dimension separately. The typical participant-produced sequences induced the most efficient learning. It is proposed that the pattern of performance may provide a rich source of data for testing and fine-tuning models of category acquisition.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; August 1(3-1997):586-606. DOI:10.1080/713755719
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    ABSTRACT: The central executive component of working memory is a poorly specified and very powerful system that could be criticized as little more than a homunculus. A research strategy is outlined that attempts to specify and analyse its component functions and is illustrated with four lines of research. The first concerns the study of the capacity to coordinate performance on two separate tasks. A second involves the capacity to switch retrieval strategies as reflected in random generation. The capacity to attend selectively to one stimulus and inhibit the disrupting effect of others comprises the third line of research, and the fourth involves the capacity to hold and manipulate information in long-term memory, as reflected in measures of working memory span. It is suggested that this multifaceted approach is a fruitful one that leaves open the question of whether it will ultimately prove more appropriate to regard the executive as a unified system with multiple functions, or simply as an agglomeration of independent though interacting control processes. In the meantime, it seems useful to continue to use the concept of a central executive as a reminder of the crucially important control functions of working memory.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; February 1(1-1996):5-28. DOI:10.1080/713755608
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    ABSTRACT: Two principal types of account of repetition priming postulate either facilitation of activation of perceptual representations used in stimulus recognition, or retrieval of specific processing episodes as possible mechanisms by which the effect occurs; these make different predictions concerning the priming of two stimuli presented simultaneously. In Experiments 1–3, subjects made same/different decisions about picture-word stimulus pairs. Recombining the pairings of a subset of items between training and test encounters did not significantly reduce the benefit in response time from repetition, as compared to pairs repeated intact. Subjects were able to remember the pairings (Experiment 4), but this did not influence repetition priming. Instead, the memory representations underlying the priming of each item in a pair were independent. No priming was found between pictures seen at training and words at test, and vice versa (Experiment 5), indicating that representations underlying the repetition effect were domain-specific. In Experiment 6, stimuli were all from within the domain of object pictures. Again, recombining the pairings of items between training and test did not significantly reduce the benefit in response time from repetition, as compared to pairs repeated intact. These results reveal an item-specific locus for repetition priming, consistent with priming occurring within pre-semantic perceptual representation systems involved in item recognition. The findings pose problems for theories that argue that repetition effects result only from retrieval of entire processing episodes.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; May 1(2-1996):269-294. DOI:10.1080/713755631
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    ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the issue of how negative components affect people's ability to draw conditional inferences. The study was motivated by an attempt to resolve a difficulty for the mental models theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne, whose account of matching bias in the selection task is apparently inconsistent with Johnson-Laird's explanation of the double negation effects in conditional inference reported by Evans, Clibbens, and Rood (1995). Two experiments are reported, which investigate frequencies of conditional inferences with task presentation similar to that of the selection task in two respects: the presence of a picture of four cards and the use of implicit negations in the premises. The latter variable was shown to be critical and demonstrated a new phenomenon: Conditional inferences of all kinds are substantially suppressed when based on implicitly negative premises. This phenomenon was shown to operate independently of and in addition to the double negation effect. A third experiment showed that the implicit negation effect could be extended to the paradigm in which people are asked to produce their own conclusions. It is argued that these two effects can be explained within either the mental models theory or the inference rule theory, of propositional reasoning, but that each will require some revision in order to offer a convincing account.
    The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 10/2010; August 1(3-1999):739-769. DOI:10.1080/713755834