Husserl Studies

Publisher: Springer Verlag

Journal description

Husserl Studies is an international journal which underlines the relevance of Husserl's phenomenology both for contemporary philosophy and for the wider academic field. The journal serves as a forum for Husserlian studies both systematic and historical. The publication of important texts from Husserl's Nachlaß makes such a forum even more necessary. Intercultural and interdisciplinary contributions are particularly welcomed by the journal. Occasionally material by Husserl himself or connected with the historical background of his thought is published. Husserl Studies also publishes critical reviews of current Husserl literature as well as reviews or other philosophical works which have a direct bearing on Husserl research. There is also a section -Chronicle- devoted to recent developments in Husserl research. This section also serves as a bulletin board for both conferences and papers as well as books articles and dissertations devoted to Husserl and ñ to a lesser extent ñ phenomenology in general.

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Website Husserl Studies website
Other titles Husserl studies (Online)
ISSN 0167-9848
OCLC 41568635
Material type Document, Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Internet Resource, Computer File, Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Springer Verlag

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Publications in this journal

  • Husserl Studies 08/2015; 31(3). DOI:10.1007/s10743-015-9175-3
  • Husserl Studies 07/2015; 31(2). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9162-0
  • Husserl Studies 07/2015; 31(2):151-158. DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9161-1
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    ABSTRACT: Phenomenology and Embodiment. Husserl and the Constitution of Subjectivity is a surprising study, given that much has been written during the last decades on phenomenology and embodiment. Although its author, Joona Taipale, does not offer revolutionarily new insights into Husserl’s phenomenology (how could he?), the book is an outstanding contribution to phenomenology in general, and to Husserlian phenomenology in particular. For although it covers a broad range of topics within the area of a phenomenology of embodiment, its author expertly brings together a diverse range of aspects of his topic and weaves together many thematic threads in a lucidly written and coherent text. The study is superbly organized, as well as clearly laid out in its introduction and conclusion. And though partial aspects of Taipale’s topics have been addressed before, this is the first study, as far as I can see, that brings them all together within 240 pages. After a discussion of “small scale” issues, such ...
    Husserl Studies 07/2015; 31(2). DOI:10.1007/s10743-015-9166-4
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    ABSTRACT: The debate about scientific realism (henceforth: SR) has occupied center stage in philosophy of science since its very inception. The main question is whether or not scientific theories are (at least approximately) true descriptions of the world. Or, to give the question a slightly different spin: What grounds (if any) do we have for believing in the reality of the unobservable entities postulated by contemporary science (photons, fields, J/ψ-mesons, etc.)? Although the main arena of this debate is analytic philosophy, it is clear that these questions are no less important for philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Should phenomenologists advocate SR or should they opt for scientific anti-realism (henceforth: SAR)? And, on a more historical note, which of these options is most appropriate from the viewpoint of Husserl’s work?Such are the questions that Lee Hardy tries to answer in his book. Hardy’s main thesis is “that Husserl was indeed an instrumentalist, but that his instrumen ...
    Husserl Studies 07/2015; 31(2). DOI:10.1007/s10743-015-9167-3
  • Husserl Studies 07/2015; 31(2):169-173. DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9160-2
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    ABSTRACT: In this paper I criticize Claude Romano’s recent characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology as a form of Cartesianism. Contra Romano, Husserl is not committed to the view that since individual things in the world are dubitable, then the world as a whole is dubitable. On the contrary, for Husserl doubt is a merely transitional phenomenon which can only characterize a temporary span of experience. Similarly, illusion is not a mode of experience in its own right but a retrospective way of characterizing a span of experience. Therefore, Husserl cannot be plausibly characterized as either a disjunctivist or a conjunctivist. The common premise of both theories – namely, that perception and illusion are two classes of conscious acts standing on equal footing – is phenomenologically unsound. I propose to call Husserl’s theory a hermeneutical theory of perception, i.e., one that interprets perception as a temporal and self-correcting process. In the last part of the paper I argue that Husserl’s positive appraisal of Cartesian doubt is only pedagogical in nature. Husserl does not take Cartesian doubt to be practicable, but the attempt to doubt universally has the positive effect of revealing transcendental subjectivity as the subject matter of phenomenology.
    Husserl Studies 07/2015; 31(2). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9164-y
  • Husserl Studies 06/2015; 31(3). DOI:10.1007/s10743-015-9170-8
  • Husserl Studies 05/2015; DOI:10.1007/s10743-015-9169-1
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    ABSTRACT: I argue that Husserlian phenomenology is metaphysically neutral, in the sense of being compatible with multiple metaphysical frameworks (including frameworks Husserl argued against). For example, though Husserl dismisses the concept of an unknowable thing in itself as “material nonsense”, I argue that the concept is coherent and that the existence of such things is compatible with Husserl’s phenomenology. I defend this metaphysical neutrality approach against a number of objections and consider some of its implications for Husserl interpretation.
    Husserl Studies 04/2015; 31(1). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9163-z
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    ABSTRACT: Zum Inhalt des BuchesDurch seine Theorie des thematischen Feldes war A. Gurwitsch überzeugt, „ein wesentliches Fundament für die Lehre von der Ichhaftigkeit des Attentionalen erschüttert“ zu haben (Gurwitsch 1929, 366). Nun kreist M. Wehrles Untersuchung subjektiver Horizonte gerade um die Ichhaftigkeit des Attentionalen und geht somit in die entgegengesetzte Richtung als das Vorhaben Gurwitschs: Die Autorin versucht nachzuweisen, dass es ohne subjektive Tätigkeit keine Aufmerksamkeit gibt. Motor der Aufmerksamkeit ist das Interesse, und Interesse wird in Anlehnung an Husserls Erfahrung und Urteil als „erfahrende Ichtendenz“ aufgefasst (S. 102). Das Interesse als erfahrende Ichtendenz ist das Prinzip, das nicht nur bei der aktiv vollzogenen aufmerksamen Zuwendung im Spiel ist, sondern schon auf der Ebene der Affektion als „Gegenmodus aller Aufmerksamkeit in der Passivität“ (vgl. Hua XXXI, S. 4) sein Werk leistet (S. 108; 181). Insofern Affektionen und Assoziationen die Tätigkeit eines ...
    Husserl Studies 03/2015; DOI:10.1007/s10743-015-9168-2
  • Husserl Studies 02/2015; DOI:10.1007/s10743-015-9165-5
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    ABSTRACT: This article highlights a neglected, if not wholly overlooked, topic in phenomenology, a topic central to Husserl’s writings on animate organism, namely, animation. Though Husserl did not explore animation to the fullest in his descriptions of animate organism, his texts are integral to the task of fathoming animation. The article’s introduction focuses on seminal aspects of animate organisms found within several such texts and elaborates their significance for a phenomenological understanding of animation. The article furthermore highlights Husserl’s pointed recognition of “the problem of movement,” movement being an essential dimension of animation if not definitive of animation itself. Succeeding sections testify to “the problem of movement” and the need to address it. They do so by answering the following basic questions: What indeed is livingly present in the experience of movement, whether our own movement and the movement of other animate beings, or the movement of leaves, clouds, and so on? What distinguishes kinesthetic from kinetic experiences of movement? How are movement and time related? Just what is the problem of movement and how do we address it? In what way is movement pertinent to receptivity and responsivity? Throughout these sections the article encompasses phenomenological analyses, elaborations, and implications of animation.
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3):247-268. DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9156-y
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    ABSTRACT: This volume is the first of its kind to provide such a comprehensive survey of contemporary research in phenomenology. The editor has assembled an impressive cast of authoritative contributors to produce what will undoubtedly become a much-used, stimulating, and invaluable reference book in the field of philosophical phenomenology. The contributions themselves are on the whole of a uniformly high standard and (with some understandable exceptions, notably regarding applied phenomenology) cover the whole sprectrum of phenomenological research. The book is divided into seven parts. The five chapters in Part I, “Subjectivity and Nature,” present some competing visions of what phenomenology is and what it is not, with special focus on its relationship to naturalism. The second and largest part of the book, “Intentionality, Perception, and Embodiment,” includes phenomenological contributions to the philosophy of mind and the theory of perception—concentrating on the intentionality of percept
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9157-x
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    ABSTRACT: While classical phenomenology, as represented by Edmund Husserl’s work, resists certain forms of representationalism about perception, I argue that in its theory of horizons, it posits representations in the sense of content-bearing vehicles. As part of a phenomenological theory, this means that on the Husserlian view such representations are part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I believe that, although the intuitions supporting this idea are correct, it is a mistake to maintain that there are such representations defining the phenomenal character of low-level perception. What these representations are called on to explain, i.e., the phenomenal character of perceiving objects in their full presence, can be more parsimoniously explained by appealing to certain affective states or affect schemas that shape the intentional directedness of low-level perceptual experience and define its phenomenal character in a non-representational way. This revision of the Husserlian view, it is shown, also helps us understand the normative character of perception.
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9152-2
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    ABSTRACT: The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of material Apriori while exhibiting the anti-Kantian inspiration and factual grounding thereof. The attempt is made to show that a non-formal Apriori obtains because the sensuous has a normative character; further, that the difference between material and formal eidetic laws is rooted in the difference between sensuous contents, given in experience, and intellectual contents, originating in activities of judgement. The material Apriori is not independent of all experience, since it is grounded on sensuous eidetic contents and thus depends on the latter’s givenness and characteristics. It is thanks precisely to this ,contingency‘ that it has an ontological significance.
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9149-x
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    ABSTRACT: By the time of the Prolegomena (1900), Husserl took phenomenology to be a philosophical method that stands in opposition to naturalism, of which psychologism was supposed to be a particularly pernicious instance. Husserl was not the only philosopher at the turn of the century to oppose psychologism. Among his fellow campaigners one finds Frege, who played a decisive role in the development of so-called analytic philosophy, and Dilthey, who stands at the roots of contemporary hermeneutics. When it comes to issues concerning the origins of phenomenology, as opposed to other traditions, anti-psychologism in particular, and anti-naturalism in general, cannot be used as discriminative criteria. One would need to determine what is specific to the phenomenological brand of anti-naturalism.Consider some of the claims shared by most anti-naturalists in Husserl’s time. Judgments have a specific kind of content, called “proposition,” “state of affairs” or “thought.” Contents of that kind are orig
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9146-0
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    ABSTRACT: Why is nature amenable to mathematical description? This question has received attention in the philosophy of science but rarely from a phenomenological perspective. Nevertheless Husserl’s late essay “The Origin of Geometry,” which has received some critical scholarly attention in recent years, contains the beginning of a striking answer. This answer proceeds from Husserl’s main claim in that essay, which he also makes in the Crisis of the European Sciences, that the original meaning of science has been covered over or “sedimented” by concepts that obscure the true intentional core of scientific meaning. In the first three sections of this paper I develop Husserl’s central insights about mathematics in light of two contemporary critiques of his project of “reactivation” of the original, sedimented meaning of science. In the latter two sections, I argue that accepting Husserl’s account of the original meaning and development of science offers a promising explanation of why nature is amenable to mathematics. This explanation hinges on a conception of the objects and methods of mathematics and the mathematized physical sciences as accomplishments, that is, as constituted contents of consciousness.
    Husserl Studies 07/2014; 30(2). DOI:10.1007/s10743-014-9148-y