Husserl Studies

Publisher: Springer Verlag

Description

Husserl Studies is an international journal which underlines the relevance of Husserl's phenomenology both for contemporary philosophy and for the wider academic field. The journal serves as a forum for Husserlian studies both systematic and historical. The publication of important texts from Husserl's Nachlaß makes such a forum even more necessary. Intercultural and interdisciplinary contributions are particularly welcomed by the journal. Occasionally material by Husserl himself or connected with the historical background of his thought is published. Husserl Studies also publishes critical reviews of current Husserl literature as well as reviews or other philosophical works which have a direct bearing on Husserl research. There is also a section -Chronicle- devoted to recent developments in Husserl research. This section also serves as a bulletin board for both conferences and papers as well as books articles and dissertations devoted to Husserl and ñ to a lesser extent ñ phenomenology in general.

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  • Website
    Husserl Studies website
  • Other titles
    Husserl studies (Online)
  • ISSN
    0167-9848
  • OCLC
    41568635
  • Material type
    Document, Periodical, Internet resource
  • Document type
    Internet Resource, Computer File, Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Springer Verlag

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Author's pre-print on pre-print servers such as arXiv.org
    • Author's post-print on author's personal website immediately
    • Author's post-print on any open access repository after 12 months after publication
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to publisher version
    • Set phrase to accompany link to published version (see policy)
    • Articles in some journals can be made Open Access on payment of additional charge
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: While classical phenomenology, as represented by Edmund Husserl’s work, resists certain forms of representationalism about perception, I argue that in its theory of horizons, it posits representations in the sense of content-bearing vehicles. As part of a phenomenological theory, this means that on the Husserlian view such representations are part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I believe that, although the intuitions supporting this idea are correct, it is a mistake to maintain that there are such representations defining the phenomenal character of low-level perception. What these representations are called on to explain, i.e., the phenomenal character of perceiving objects in their full presence, can be more parsimoniously explained by appealing to certain affective states or affect schemas that shape the intentional directedness of low-level perceptual experience and define its phenomenal character in a non-representational way. This revision of the Husserlian view, it is shown, also helps us understand the normative character of perception.
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This volume is the first of its kind to provide such a comprehensive survey of contemporary research in phenomenology. The editor has assembled an impressive cast of authoritative contributors to produce what will undoubtedly become a much-used, stimulating, and invaluable reference book in the field of philosophical phenomenology. The contributions themselves are on the whole of a uniformly high standard and (with some understandable exceptions, notably regarding applied phenomenology) cover the whole sprectrum of phenomenological research. The book is divided into seven parts. The five chapters in Part I, “Subjectivity and Nature,” present some competing visions of what phenomenology is and what it is not, with special focus on its relationship to naturalism. The second and largest part of the book, “Intentionality, Perception, and Embodiment,” includes phenomenological contributions to the philosophy of mind and the theory of perception—concentrating on the intentionality of percept
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: In seinem neuen Buch vertieft Steven Crowell seine Auffassung der Phänomenologie als Transzendentalphilosophie, die es mit dem normativen Raum des Sinnes (space of meaning) zu tun habe (vgl. Crowell 2001). Sowohl Husserl als auch Heidegger führen aus seiner Sicht innerhalb der Phänomenologie die kantische Tradition der Transzendentalphilosophie weiter, indem sie der Frage nach den „transzendentalen Bedingungen der Konstitution oder Enthüllung des Sinnes“ (S. 1) nachgehen.Vgl. auch den von Steven Crowell mit herausgegebenen Band Transcendental Heidegger (2007). Da der Sinn aber Crowell zufolge Normativität impliziert, hat die von ihm vertretene phänomenologische Transzendentalphilosophie einen neukantianischen Zug (vgl. S. 10). Von den vier Teilen des Buches befassen sich die ersten beiden im Wesentlichen mit Husserl, während der dritte und vierte Teil auf Heidegger eingehen. Dieser Aufbau begründet sich dadurch, dass Crowell anstatt des Bruches vielmehr die Kontinuität zwischen Husserl
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of material Apriori while exhibiting the anti-Kantian inspiration and factual grounding thereof. The attempt is made to show that a non-formal Apriori obtains because the sensuous has a normative character; further, that the difference between material and formal eidetic laws is rooted in the difference between sensuous contents, given in experience, and intellectual contents, originating in activities of judgement. The material Apriori is not independent of all experience, since it is grounded on sensuous eidetic contents and thus depends on the latter’s givenness and characteristics. It is thanks precisely to this ,contingency‘ that it has an ontological significance.
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3).
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    ABSTRACT: By the time of the Prolegomena (1900), Husserl took phenomenology to be a philosophical method that stands in opposition to naturalism, of which psychologism was supposed to be a particularly pernicious instance. Husserl was not the only philosopher at the turn of the century to oppose psychologism. Among his fellow campaigners one finds Frege, who played a decisive role in the development of so-called analytic philosophy, and Dilthey, who stands at the roots of contemporary hermeneutics. When it comes to issues concerning the origins of phenomenology, as opposed to other traditions, anti-psychologism in particular, and anti-naturalism in general, cannot be used as discriminative criteria. One would need to determine what is specific to the phenomenological brand of anti-naturalism.Consider some of the claims shared by most anti-naturalists in Husserl’s time. Judgments have a specific kind of content, called “proposition,” “state of affairs” or “thought.” Contents of that kind are orig
    Husserl Studies 10/2014; 30(3).
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    ABSTRACT: Why is nature amenable to mathematical description? This question has received attention in the philosophy of science but rarely from a phenomenological perspective. Nevertheless Husserl’s late essay “The Origin of Geometry,” which has received some critical scholarly attention in recent years, contains the beginning of a striking answer. This answer proceeds from Husserl’s main claim in that essay, which he also makes in the Crisis of the European Sciences, that the original meaning of science has been covered over or “sedimented” by concepts that obscure the true intentional core of scientific meaning. In the first three sections of this paper I develop Husserl’s central insights about mathematics in light of two contemporary critiques of his project of “reactivation” of the original, sedimented meaning of science. In the latter two sections, I argue that accepting Husserl’s account of the original meaning and development of science offers a promising explanation of why nature is amenable to mathematics. This explanation hinges on a conception of the objects and methods of mathematics and the mathematized physical sciences as accomplishments, that is, as constituted contents of consciousness.
    Husserl Studies 07/2014; 30(2).
  • Husserl Studies 07/2014; 30(2).
  • Husserl Studies 07/2014; 30(2).
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    ABSTRACT: In the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time, Edmund Husserl has frequent recourse to sound and melody as illustrations of the processes that give rise to immanent temporal objects. In Husserl’s analysis, there is a philosophically pregnant tension between the geometrical diagrams representing multiple dimensions of immanent time and his intuition that time-points might be no more than fictions leading to absurdities. In this paper, I will address this tension in order to motivate a complementarity approach to temporal objects such as sound and melody that might illuminate the phenomenology of sound-consciousness.
    Husserl Studies 07/2014; 30(2).
  • Husserl Studies 07/2014; 30(2).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: With his “discovery” of the phenomenological reduction, Husserl confronted the problem of intersubjectivity: How is the Other constituted? Gustav Shpet, a Russian student of Husserl’s in Göttingen, unlike many others accepted the reduction on some level but, unlike Husserl, did not dwell on the problem. In this essay, we look first at the Russian treatment of intersubjectivity in the immediately preceding years and see that the concern was over the possibility of proving our natural conviction in the Other. We then turn to Husserl’s position circa 1912 with its embryonic conception of empathy as its vehicle into the sphere of the Other’s “ownness.” Finally, we turn to Shpet, who cautiously suggests that Husserl’s division of intuition into two sorts, experiencing and ideal, is insufficient. Affirming Husserl’s claim that each species of being has a correlative cognitive method, Shpet asserts that social being should also have its own method. Shpet recognizes that Husserl does not ascribe originary givenness to what empathy provides, but might Husserl have been wrong about this? Could it be that empathy, properly understood as a third form of intuition, “comprehension,” provides social being originarily and therefore functions in the constitution of the Other analogously to the way experiencing intuition functions in the constitution of physical things? However, comprehension is employed on what the Other presents, namely signs, be they in the form of bodily movements, speech or even writing. In this way, Shpet transforms Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology into a hermeneutic phenomenology.
    Husserl Studies 04/2014; 30(1).
  • Husserl Studies 01/2014; 30(1).
  • Husserl Studies 01/2014; 30(1).
  • Husserl Studies 01/2014; 30(1).
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    ABSTRACT: A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present an object as extended in time and that objects can be perceived as persisting through time. An object that is seen as persisting through time is often seen as constant and unchanging, even though the presentation of it is changing. In this paper it is argued that in order to account for these cases of perceptual constancy, we must distinguish between the awareness of having perceived that an object has a property at a certain point in time, and perceptually intending that it has that property at that point in time. Consequently, we must in at least some instances be aware of something more than the object of the experience. But precisely this distinction is rejected by the transparency theory.
    Husserl Studies 01/2014;
  • Husserl Studies 01/2014; 30(1).
  • Husserl Studies 01/2014; 30(1).
  • Husserl Studies 10/2013;
  • Husserl Studies 10/2012;