Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (J ECON BEHAV ORGAN )

Publisher: Elsevier

Description

The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy's structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome. The journal is eclectic as to research method; systematic observation and careful description, simulation modeling and mathematical analysis are all within its purview. Empirical work, including controlled laboratory experimentation, that probes close to the core of the issues in theoretical dispute is encouraged.

  • Impact factor
    1.01
  • 5-year impact
    1.44
  • Cited half-life
    9.10
  • Immediacy index
    0.19
  • Eigenfactor
    0.02
  • Article influence
    1.16
  • Website
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization website
  • Other titles
    Journal of economic behavior & organization, Journal of economic behavior and organization
  • ISSN
    0167-2681
  • OCLC
    6974696
  • Material type
    Periodical, Internet resource
  • Document type
    Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details

Elsevier

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Voluntary deposit by author of pre-print allowed on Institutions open scholarly website and pre-print servers
    • Voluntary deposit by author of authors post-print allowed on institutions open scholarly website including Institutional Repository
    • Deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental mandate only allowed where separate agreement between repository and publisher exists
    • Set statement to accompany deposit
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to journal home page or articles' DOI
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Articles in some journals can be made Open Access on payment of additional charge
    • NIH Authors articles will be submitted to PMC after 12 months
    • Authors who are required to deposit in subject repositories may also use Sponsorship Option
    • Pre-print can not be deposited for The Lancet
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This study provides experimental evidence, using a large sample of 2,894 individuals recruited via business media websites, about the impact of demographic attributes within entrepreneurial teams on funding decisions by external capital providers. In previous work the role of diversity with regard to personal characteristics within entrepreneurial teams, such as education, gender and nationality was not clear. Specifically, we focus on task-oriented (e.g., education, experience) and relations-oriented (e.g., age, nationality) dimensions of diversity. The participants of our experiment had to decide on providing early-stage funding to a team of start-up managers whereas the diversity of these teams varied across treatment groups. We find that task-oriented diversity is positively and significantly related to the willingness of respondents to provide capital. Interestingly, the same applies for relations-oriented diversity. This suggests social capital of an entrepreneurial team matters to a greater extent to funding decisions of external investors than the behavioral integration of the team's human capital. Entrepreneurial teams must therefore carefully balance the social costs of non-task-related diversity and the access to financial resources.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2015;
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 03/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Although a number of theoretical studies explain empirical puzzles in finance with ambiguity aversion, it is not a given that individual ambiguity attitudes survive in markets. In fact, despite ample evidence of ambiguity aversion in individual decision making, most studies find no or only limited ambiguity aversion in experimental financial markets, even when they exclude arbitrage. We argue that ambiguity effects in markets depend on market feedback and on a sufficiently strong bias toward ambiguity among the participants. Accordingly, we find significant ambiguity effects in low-feedback call markets for assets that provoke high ambiguity aversion, but no ambiguity effects in high-feedback double auctions.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 03/2014; In Press, Accepted Manuscript.
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: In a large number of decisions, the option that does not require a specific action such as filling in a form is chosen frequently. It is a stylized fact that opt-in or opt-out designs for otherwise identical choices lead to vastly different outcomes. Choice options are chosen more frequently simply because they are the no-action alternative or default option. However, direct empirical evidence on the reasons for the popularity of defaults is scarce. We devised a special survey module for the Dutch DNB Household Survey to study potential explanations for default choices. We find that the popularity of the default option is related to different personal traits in economic and non-economic decisions. Financially literate individuals are more likely to take action and opt out the default option in economic decision-making. In non-economic decisions, procrastination increases the popularity of the default while individuals who care much about the opinion of others are more inclined to deviate from the default.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The disposition effect refers to the empirical fact that investors have a higher propensity to sell risky assets with capital gains compared to risky assets with capital losses, and it has been associated with low trading performance. We use a stock trading laboratory experiment to investigate if it is possible to reduce subjects’ tendency to exhibit a disposition effect by making information about a stock's purchase price, and thus about capital gains and losses, less salient. We compare two experimental conditions: a high-saliency condition in which the purchase price of a stock is prominently displayed by the trading software, and a low-saliency condition in which it is not displayed at all. We find that individuals exhibit a disposition effect in the high-saliency condition, and that the effect is 25% smaller in the low-saliency condition. This suggests that it is possible to debias the disposition effect by reducing the saliency with which information about a stock's purchase price is displayed on financial statements and online trading platforms.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We probe the boundaries of myopic loss aversion (MLA) theory through market treatments designed to reduce the MLA effect. Our market settings separate investment commitment from information frequency, display a running average asset value and explore the influence of participant experience. The market-based results suggest MLA persists with inexperienced participants despite efforts to mitigate MLA. Prices in markets with returning participants do not display an MLA effect. However, the same experienced participants individually succumb to MLA in an allocation setting immediately following the market. Overall, our results suggest that, while market experience mitigates the MLA effect, participants do not transfer these results to other settings.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014; 97:113–125.
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: When the assignment of incentives is uncertain, we study how the regularity and frequency of rewards and risk attitudes influence participation and effort. We contrast three incentive schemes in a real-effort experiment in which individuals decide when to quit: a continuous incentive scheme and two intermittent ones, fixed and random. In all treatments, we introduce a regime shift by withdrawing monetary rewards after the same unknown number of periods. In such an ambiguous environment, we show that less able and more risk averse players are less persistent in effort. Intermittent incentives lead to a greater persistence of effort, while continuous incentives entail exit as soon as payment stops. Randomness increases both earlier and later exiting. This selection effect in terms of ability and risk attitudes combined with the impact of intermittent rewards on persistence lead to an increase in mean performance after the regime shift when incentives are intermittent.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Previous research provides compelling evidence that defaults affect individual behaviour in several domains. However, evidence of their influence in strategic interaction is scant. We experimentally investigate the effect of defaults on contributions to a public good and attempt to shed light on potential channels through which they operate. Our main experimental findings show that defaults influence contribution behaviour: preference for a suggested contribution significantly increases when it is presented as the default. However, this effect seems not to operate primarily through information conveyance or expectations about others’ behaviour. Default contributions, thus, appear to have an attractive power that goes beyond recommendation signals and expectation influences.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Taxpayers with large amounts of non-third-party-reported income usually self-report at least a portion of it, an act inconsistent with common theories of compliance. I explain this behavior by generalizing the classical evasion theory to realistically account for the endogeneity of audit and payment rates. These taxpayers refrain from more evasion not due to deterrence, but to tilt the odds and payoffs of the evasion gamble. The introduction of this incentive helps explain many empirical findings that seemingly contradict a more restrictive and unrealistic version of the “deterrence paradigm.” I also estimate feasible structural calibrations, the first based on observed compliance behavior, of taxpayers’ perceptions of the relationship between evasion, audit probabilities, and payment rates.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent's output, we find that males and females do not differ in their performance in the real effort task but in their choice of sabotage. Males select significantly more sabotage, leading to an, on average, higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the opponent is revealed before the tournament, males increase their performance in the real-effort task especially if the opponent is female. The gender gap in sabotage is persistent. We discuss possible explanations for our findings and their implications.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We investigate the effect of positional goods (goods for which one's consumption relative to others’ matters) on saving, based on results from a life–cycle consumption/saving experiment. In a Group treatment, we allow inter–personal comparisons by assigning subjects to groups and displaying rankings based partly on consumption. A baseline Individual treatment is similar, but without the additional information. We find more under–saving (saving less than the optimal amount), and lower money earnings for subjects, in the Group treatment. Both effects are economically relevant, with magnitudes of roughly 6–7% of expected income and 7–8% of average earnings respectively. Additional analysis shows that the result is driven by those subjects who are not ranked in the top three in their group (“keeping up with the Joneses”), and males in particular.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are implemented, and the positive or negative payments due to the members as well as outsiders. The mechanism allows only for one community with more or less outsiders but not forming multiple communities. We justify procedural fairness but acknowledge that the outsider problem questions some of its desirable properties. Furthermore, we compare procedurally fair with optimal, e.g., welfaristic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979).
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This paper studies how dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine (2006)) decision-makers can use commitment technologies to combat temptation and implement long-run optimal actions. I consider three types of commitment technologies: carrot contracts (rewards for ‘good’ behavior financed by borrowing from future consumption), stick contracts (self imposed fines for ‘bad’ behavior) and binding commitment. I compare the welfare implications of these contracts and show that dual-self decision-makers strictly prefer to use carrots instead of either sticks or binding commitments. This is for several reasons: sticks are highly vulnerable to trembles (while carrots are not), sticks and binding commitments create a temptation to cancel them (while carrots do not), and finally carrots allow easy tradeoffs between commitment and flexibility (while sticks and binding commitments do not).
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We examine a choice setting in which residential electricity consumers may respond to non-financial incentives in addition to prices. Using data from a natural field experiment that exposed some households to a change in their electricity rates, we find that households reduced electricity usage in response to a contemporaneous decrease in electricity prices. This provides clear evidence that other factors – potentially encompassing non-monetary and dynamic considerations – can influence consumer choice, and even dominate the static price response in some cases. A comprehensive understanding of household behavior in energy markets is essential for the effective implementation of market-based energy and environmental policies. The documentation of our result and others like it is a necessary step in achieving such an understanding.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The Catholic sex abuse scandals reduced both membership and religiosity in the Catholic Church. Because government spending on welfare may substitute for the religious provision of social services, we consider whether this plausibly exogenous decline in religiosity affected several measures of the public taste towards government and spending on welfare between 1990 and 2008. In places where there were more scandals, individuals state a preference for less government provision of social services. In contrast, a higher level of abuse is also associated with an increase in voting for Democratic candidates for President, state legislatures, and the US House of Representatives, and an increase in per capita government welfare spending, although this increase is insufficient to replace the decrease in Catholic-provided charity.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on bank runs. We model depositors’ decision-making in a sequential framework, with three depositors located at the nodes of a network. Depositors observe the other depositors’ actions only if connected by the network. Theoretically, a sufficient condition to prevent bank runs is that the second depositor to act is able to observe the first one's action (no matter what is observed). Experimentally, we find that observability of actions affects the likelihood of bank runs, but depositors’ choice is highly influenced by the particular action that is being observed. Depositors who are observed by others at the beginning of the line are more likely to keep their money deposited, leading to less bank runs. When withdrawals are observed, bank runs are more likely even when the mere observation of actions should prevent them.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We present a lab experiment on an endogenous trust game in which one player (the principal) may decide to leave the investment choice to the agent or to take the investment decision himself/herself. In the latter case we refer to this as “voluntary leadership”. We show that voluntary leadership increases investment and increases backtransfer of the second mover compared to the alternative sequencing in which the agent is investor. We also show that investment and backtransfer is higher under voluntary leadership than in the control treatment with exogenously determined sequencing. Furthermore, we show that risk preference and inequality aversion as modelled formally by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) influence behavior in the endogenous trust game.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;

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