Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (J ECON BEHAV ORGAN)

Publisher: Elsevier

Journal description

The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy's structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome. The journal is eclectic as to research method; systematic observation and careful description, simulation modeling and mathematical analysis are all within its purview. Empirical work, including controlled laboratory experimentation, that probes close to the core of the issues in theoretical dispute is encouraged.

Current impact factor: 1.01

Impact Factor Rankings

2015 Impact Factor Available summer 2015
2009 Impact Factor 1.081

Additional details

5-year impact 1.44
Cited half-life 9.10
Immediacy index 0.19
Eigenfactor 0.02
Article influence 1.16
Website Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization website
Other titles Journal of economic behavior & organization, Journal of economic behavior and organization
ISSN 0167-2681
OCLC 6974696
Material type Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details


  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Pre-print allowed on any website or open access repository
    • Voluntary deposit by author of authors post-print allowed on authors' personal website, or institutions open scholarly website including Institutional Repository, without embargo, where there is not a policy or mandate
    • Deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate only allowed where separate agreement between repository and the publisher exists.
    • Permitted deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate, may be required to comply with embargo periods of 12 months to 48 months .
    • Set statement to accompany deposit
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to journal home page or articles' DOI
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Articles in some journals can be made Open Access on payment of additional charge
    • NIH Authors articles will be submitted to PubMed Central after 12 months
    • Publisher last contacted on 18/10/2013
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 09/2015; 117:259-280. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.012
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 09/2015; 117:175-195. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.015
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    ABSTRACT: Using a discrete choice experiment with real economic incentives, this paper studies how food fiscal policies and external influences (such as pestering and information) can affect parental choice of food for their child. Using pairs of a parent and child, the experimental design varies the food prices of healthier and unhealthier alternatives of food products for children as part of specific food fiscal policies. We then examine the interplay of children’s pester power as well as information about the fiscal policies. The results from our lab experiment suggest that (a) implementing a fat tax and a subsidy simultaneously can shift parental behavior to healthier food products to a greater degree than a fat tax or a subsidy alone, (b) providing information regarding the food fiscal policies can further increase the impact of the intervention, and (c) child pestering is one of the causes of the moderate effectiveness of the policies as it strongly affects parents in making unhealthier choices
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 09/2015; 117:196-208. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.011
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 09/2015; 117:223-232. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.014
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    ABSTRACT: We introduce the taxicab game, related to the ultimatum game and Gehrig et al. (2007) yes/no game. The proposer makes an offer, and simultaneously sends a cheap talk message indicating (possibly falsely) the amount of the offer. The responder observes the message with certainty and the offer with probability p before accepting or rejecting the offer. We investigate versions with p = 0 and p = 0.5 along with the ultimatum game as a baseline. Intuition and a model comprising both standard economic agents and others who dislike inequity, lies and lying provide clear predictions that our experimental results support. As the likelihood increases of offers being seen, the offers themselves increase, messages over-state them less, and responders are more likely to accept (even when the offer is unseen). Also, responders are more likely to accept after truthful messages than after lies or when no message is sent.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 08/2015; 116:346-360. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.009
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    ABSTRACT: There is significant heterogeneity over high school students in the wage and employment rate returns to education. I evaluate this heterogeneity using subjective returns derived from a data set of high school juniors and seniors in Washington State. Variation over observables in projected returns estimated using observed data is uncorrelated with variation in subjective returns elicited by directly asking students about their beliefs. These results mean that returns estimated using observed data are likely a very weak proxy for student beliefs.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 06/2015; 117:10-25. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.005
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    ABSTRACT: Smoke from inefficient biomass cookstoves contributes to global climate change and kills approximately four million people per year. Cooking technologies, such as manufactured fuel-efficient cookstoves, that mitigate the negative effects of traditional cookstoves exist, but adoption rates are low. The international development community debates whether this low adoption of fuel-efficient cookstoves is due to a lack of adequate product information or due to household financial constraints. We ran Vickery second-price auctions in rural Uganda to elicit willingness to pay for fuel-efficient cookstoves, comparing the effect of informational marketing messages and time payments on willingness to pay. A randomized trial tested the following marketing messages: “This stove can improve health,” “This stove can save time and money,” and both messages combined. None of the messages consistently increased willingness to pay. In a second experiment we compared willingness to pay for two different contracts, one with payment due within a week and one with equal installment payments over 4 weeks. Consistent with household financial constraints, time payments raised willingness to pay by 40%.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 06/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.025
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    ABSTRACT: We propose an experimental method whose purpose is to remove social concerns in games. The core idea is to adapt the binary-lottery incentive scheme, so that an individual payoff is a probability to see one's preferred social allocation implemented. For a large class of social preference models, the method induces payoffs in the game that are in line with subjects’ (social) preferences. We test the method in several popular experimental games, contrasting behaviors with and without our methodology. Our results suggest that a substantial part of the difference between predictions based on selfishness and observed behaviors seems driven by such preferences, since our method does induce more “selfish” behaviors. But they also indicate that a considerable share is left unexplained, perhaps giving weight to alternative explanations or other types of social concerns.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 06/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.021
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    ABSTRACT: This paper tests whether choosing to stay ignorant about the negative consequences of one's own actions affects performance in a real-effort experiment. In the experiment, participants’ effort increased only their own payoff or also the donation to a negatively perceived charity. We introduced ignorance by letting agents decide whether to learn if the effort benefits the charity. As expected, agents exerted significantly higher efforts if they knew the negatively perceived charity would receive no benefits. Yet, when given the choice, almost a third of the agents chose to stay ignorant and exert significantly more effort than agents who knew their effort would benefit the charity. Importantly, if the uncertainty about the donation to the charity was introduced exogenously, agents exerted lower effort than ignorant agents, which suggests that not having information about the consequences of one's own actions alone does not lead to self-interested behavior, but rather, the sorting of social agents of a low type into ignorance drives self-interested behavior of ignorant agents.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 06/2015; 116. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.020
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 06/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.013
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    ABSTRACT: One of the hallmark findings from behavioral economics is that choices are sensitive to the context they are presented in. However, the strength of such ‘framing effects’ varies between studies, and some studies fail to find any effect at all. A long line of research has argued that the presence and size of framing effects depend to a large extent on whether people use higher or lower-level mental decision making processes (or heuristics). A similarly important line of research in social psychology and economics suggests that higher-level mental processes such as self-control draw upon a limited pool of mental resources that can be exhausted. This study links these two lines of research and investigates whether depleting people's mental resources (or ‘willpower’) affects the degree to which they are susceptible to framing effects. In three separate experiments we depleted participants’ willpower using the commonly used Stroop task method and subsequently made them take part in a series of tasks, including a framed prisoner's dilemma, an attraction effect task and an anchoring effect task. However, though we find strong evidence of a framing effect in all three tasks, the strength of these effects is not affected by induced changes in the level of willpower depletion.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 06/2015; 117. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.002
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    ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes whether marginal taxation of labor and capital income are useful second best instruments for internalizing the externalities caused by conspicuous housing consumption, when the government is unable to implement a first best corrective tax on housing wealth. The rationale for studying income taxation in this particular context is that first best taxes on housing wealth may be infeasible (at least in a shorter time perspective), while income taxes indirectly affect both the level and composition of accumulated wealth. We show that a suboptimally low tax on housing wealth provides an incentive for the government to subsidize financial saving and tax labor income at the margin.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 05/2015; 56. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.011
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    ABSTRACT: We design a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which the often-observed “beauty premium”–a positive relationship between attractiveness and wages–is context-specific. Using three realistic worker tasks, we find that the existence of the “beauty premium” indeed depends on the task: while relatively more attractive workers receive higher wage bids in a bargaining task, there is no such premium in either an analytical task or a data entry task. Our analysis shows that the premium in bargaining is driven by statistical discrimination based on biased beliefs about worker performance. We also find that there is substantial learning after worker-specific performance information is revealed, highlighting the importance of accounting for longer-run interactions in studies of discrimination.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 05/2015; 116. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.007
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    ABSTRACT: We used a natural experiment in Taiwan to test whether mating competition is a major motive for entrepreneurship. After being defeated in Mainland China, more than half million solders retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The soldiers were not allowed to get married until the military marriage ban was lifted in 1959. The policy change created a severe marriage squeeze for local men, triggering their animal spirits to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Empirical results show that local men exposed to high sex ratios as a result of the removal of the marriage ban were more likely to become entrepreneurs later on.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 05/2015; 116. DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.004