Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (J ECON BEHAV ORGAN )

Publisher: Elsevier

Description

The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy's structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome. The journal is eclectic as to research method; systematic observation and careful description, simulation modeling and mathematical analysis are all within its purview. Empirical work, including controlled laboratory experimentation, that probes close to the core of the issues in theoretical dispute is encouraged.

  • Impact factor
    1.01
  • 5-year impact
    1.44
  • Cited half-life
    9.10
  • Immediacy index
    0.19
  • Eigenfactor
    0.02
  • Article influence
    1.16
  • Website
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization website
  • Other titles
    Journal of economic behavior & organization, Journal of economic behavior and organization
  • ISSN
    0167-2681
  • OCLC
    6974696
  • Material type
    Periodical, Internet resource
  • Document type
    Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details

Elsevier

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Voluntary deposit by author of pre-print allowed on Institutions open scholarly website and pre-print servers
    • Voluntary deposit by author of authors post-print allowed on institutions open scholarly website including Institutional Repository
    • Deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental mandate only allowed where separate agreement between repository and publisher exists
    • Set statement to accompany deposit
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to journal home page or articles' DOI
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Articles in some journals can be made Open Access on payment of additional charge
    • NIH Authors articles will be submitted to PMC after 12 months
    • Authors who are required to deposit in subject repositories may also use Sponsorship Option
    • Pre-print can not be deposited for The Lancet
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This study provides experimental evidence, using a large sample of 2,894 individuals recruited via business media websites, about the impact of demographic attributes within entrepreneurial teams on funding decisions by external capital providers. In previous work the role of diversity with regard to personal characteristics within entrepreneurial teams, such as education, gender and nationality was not clear. Specifically, we focus on task-oriented (e.g., education, experience) and relations-oriented (e.g., age, nationality) dimensions of diversity. The participants of our experiment had to decide on providing early-stage funding to a team of start-up managers whereas the diversity of these teams varied across treatment groups. We find that task-oriented diversity is positively and significantly related to the willingness of respondents to provide capital. Interestingly, the same applies for relations-oriented diversity. This suggests social capital of an entrepreneurial team matters to a greater extent to funding decisions of external investors than the behavioral integration of the team's human capital. Entrepreneurial teams must therefore carefully balance the social costs of non-task-related diversity and the access to financial resources.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2015;
  • Source
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    ABSTRACT: We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, whereas selfish principals are not. Principals are privately informed about their types. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract o er to the agent. If this equilibrium is played, explicit and implicit contracts are substitutes. Since the agent learns the principal's type, a selfish principal has to rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce implicit incentives and hence does not need to use explicit incentives. Interestingly, if a selfish principal can rely on more effective explicit incentives, a fair principal becomes more likely to be able to separate from the selfish type and, hence, to make better use of implicit incentives. In this sense, there is a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives. --
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 09/2014; 86.
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    ABSTRACT: This is the first study to provide a comprehensive analysis of banks’ willingness to lend to small businesses (SBs) by differentiating between conventional and Islamic banks’ behaviour in Indonesia. In our initial analysis we examine the determinants of banks’ willingness to lend to SBs and in the second part we investigate the Granger-causes of diversification towards SB lending and banks’ efficiency and ex-post risk. Our results reveal that large banks are less interested in SB lending compared to small banks. Profitability is an important determinant for Indonesian banks to lend to SBs. Islamic banks however, benefit more from lending to SBs given the substantial improvement in their net interest margin and lower capital compared to conventional banks. Our findings signal overpricing behaviour by Islamic banks, represented by a relatively high unadjusted rate of return given the risk exposure of their products. It is also evident that Islamic banks’ managers seem to hold less capital, counting on the benefits of portfolio diversification towards SBs lending. As expected the moral hazard hypothesis is only evident for Islamic banks in terms of loan and income portfolio diversification.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 03/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: Although a number of theoretical studies explain empirical puzzles in finance with ambiguity aversion, it is not a given that individual ambiguity attitudes survive in markets. In fact, despite ample evidence of ambiguity aversion in individual decision making, most studies find no or only limited ambiguity aversion in experimental financial markets, even when they exclude arbitrage. We argue that ambiguity effects in markets depend on market feedback and on a sufficiently strong bias toward ambiguity among the participants. Accordingly, we find significant ambiguity effects in low-feedback call markets for assets that provoke high ambiguity aversion, but no ambiguity effects in high-feedback double auctions.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 03/2014; In Press, Accepted Manuscript.
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    ABSTRACT: Taxpayers with large amounts of non-third-party-reported income usually self-report at least a portion of it, an act inconsistent with common theories of compliance. I explain this behavior by generalizing the classical evasion theory to realistically account for the endogeneity of audit and payment rates. These taxpayers refrain from more evasion not due to deterrence, but to tilt the odds and payoffs of the evasion gamble. The introduction of this incentive helps explain many empirical findings that seemingly contradict a more restrictive and unrealistic version of the “deterrence paradigm.” I also estimate feasible structural calibrations, the first based on observed compliance behavior, of taxpayers’ perceptions of the relationship between evasion, audit probabilities, and payment rates.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: As the mortgage foreclosure crisis accelerated in the U.S. in the late 2000s, state-level policymakers implemented measures designed to protect consumers and stem the tide of foreclosures. One form of policy was simply to require lenders to report on foreclosure prevention activities. Such policies represented a shift from the status quo for mortgage loan servicing firms operating under incomplete information—doing nothing with non-paying loans while waiting for more information to be revealed—to either foreclosing on the borrower or offering the borrower a modification of loan terms. Using a difference-in-difference-in-differences empirical strategy, we exploit one policy implemented in Maryland for a subset of mortgage servicers and find evidence that firms perform more loan modifications, as well as file more foreclosures. Increasing foreclosure filings was contrary to the intent of the policy, suggesting that policymakers should be aware of how firms exhibit systematic biases, much like individuals.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: This paper studies how dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine (2006)) decision-makers can use commitment technologies to combat temptation and implement long-run optimal actions. I consider three types of commitment technologies: carrot contracts (rewards for ‘good’ behavior financed by borrowing from future consumption), stick contracts (self imposed fines for ‘bad’ behavior) and binding commitment. I compare the welfare implications of these contracts and show that dual-self decision-makers strictly prefer to use carrots instead of either sticks or binding commitments. This is for several reasons: sticks are highly vulnerable to trembles (while carrots are not), sticks and binding commitments create a temptation to cancel them (while carrots do not), and finally carrots allow easy tradeoffs between commitment and flexibility (while sticks and binding commitments do not).
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: We study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent's output, we find that males and females do not differ in their performance in the real effort task but in their choice of sabotage. Males select significantly more sabotage, leading to an, on average, higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the opponent is revealed before the tournament, males increase their performance in the real-effort task especially if the opponent is female. The gender gap in sabotage is persistent. We discuss possible explanations for our findings and their implications.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are implemented, and the positive or negative payments due to the members as well as outsiders. The mechanism allows only for one community with more or less outsiders but not forming multiple communities. We justify procedural fairness but acknowledge that the outsider problem questions some of its desirable properties. Furthermore, we compare procedurally fair with optimal, e.g., welfaristic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979).
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: This paper develops a theoretical model of consumer demand for an energy conservation program that involves non-binding, self-set goals. We present evidence from a Northern Illinois goal-setting program, aimed at reducing residential electricity consumption, that is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and is broadly consistent with a model of presentbiased consumers with reference-dependent preferences. We find that the need for commitment is correlated with program adoption, higher pre-adoption consumption, and lower responsiveness to goals. Consumers choosing realistic goals persistently save substantially more, achieving savings of nearly 11%, than those choosing very low or unrealistically high goals.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: This research provides empirical evidence that social interaction is more prevalent among active rather than passive investors. While previous empirical work, spearheaded by Hong et al. (2004), shows that proxies for sociability are related to participation in asset markets, the literature is unable to distinguish between the types of participants because of data limitations. I address this shortcoming by using data from the Consumer Expenditure Quarterly Interview Survey, which contains information on individual holdings and the buying and selling of financial assets, as well as expenditure variables that imply variation in the level of social activity. This finding supports a new explanation for the active-investing puzzle in which informal communication tends to promote active rather than passive strategies (Han and Hirshleifer, 2012).
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: Since the 1970s California's residential electricity consumption per capita has stopped increasing while other states’ electricity use continued to grow steadily. What accounts for California's apparent savings? Some credit the strict energy efficiency standards for buildings and appliances enacted by California in the mid-1970s. They argue that the growing gap between California and other states demonstrates that other states and countries could replicate California's gains by adopting California-style regulations, and that California should build on its own success by tightening its standards further. Skeptics might point to three long-run trends that differentiate California's electricity demand from other states: (1) shifting of the U.S. population towards warmer climates of the South and West; (2) relatively small income elasticity of energy demand in California's temperate climate; and (3) evolving differences between the demographics of households in California and other states. Today, differences in climate and demographics account for almost 90 percent of the difference between California's and other states’ residential electricity use. That difference thus provides no lessons for other states or countries considering adopting or tightening their own energy efficiency standards.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: We investigate the effect of positional goods (goods for which one's consumption relative to others’ matters) on saving, based on results from a life–cycle consumption/saving experiment. In a Group treatment, we allow inter–personal comparisons by assigning subjects to groups and displaying rankings based partly on consumption. A baseline Individual treatment is similar, but without the additional information. We find more under–saving (saving less than the optimal amount), and lower money earnings for subjects, in the Group treatment. Both effects are economically relevant, with magnitudes of roughly 6–7% of expected income and 7–8% of average earnings respectively. Additional analysis shows that the result is driven by those subjects who are not ranked in the top three in their group (“keeping up with the Joneses”), and males in particular.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: We examine a choice setting in which residential electricity consumers may respond to non-financial incentives in addition to prices. Using data from a natural field experiment that exposed some households to a change in their electricity rates, we find that households reduced electricity usage in response to a contemporaneous decrease in electricity prices. This provides clear evidence that other factors – potentially encompassing non-monetary and dynamic considerations – can influence consumer choice, and even dominate the static price response in some cases. A comprehensive understanding of household behavior in energy markets is essential for the effective implementation of market-based energy and environmental policies. The documentation of our result and others like it is a necessary step in achieving such an understanding.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: Previous research provides compelling evidence that defaults affect individual behaviour in several domains. However, evidence of their influence in strategic interaction is scant. We experimentally investigate the effect of defaults on contributions to a public good and attempt to shed light on potential channels through which they operate. Our main experimental findings show that defaults influence contribution behaviour: preference for a suggested contribution significantly increases when it is presented as the default. However, this effect seems not to operate primarily through information conveyance or expectations about others’ behaviour. Default contributions, thus, appear to have an attractive power that goes beyond recommendation signals and expectation influences.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 01/2014;

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