Comparative Strategy (Comp Strat )

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Description

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new, potentially hostile regional powers have totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind Western foreign and defense policy. Drawing on historical perspectives and insights from leading international analysts, Comparative Strategy provides a contextual framework for considering the critical security issues of today and tomorrow. Regular features of the journal include: timely commentary by leading U.S. and foreign policymakers comprehensive coverage of Russian and German perspectives on international security issues special issues on key topics such as "Ballistic Missile Defense: New Requirements for a New Century," "Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," The Future of Russia," and "Intelligence Reform" texts of the latest U.S. government, foreign, and NATO documentation on major defense issues, particularly with regard to proliferation and counter-proliferation policies.

  • Impact factor
    0.00
  • 5-year impact
    0.00
  • Cited half-life
    0.00
  • Immediacy index
    0.00
  • Eigenfactor
    0.00
  • Article influence
    0.00
  • Website
    Comparative Strategy website
  • Other titles
    Comparative strategy (Online), Comparative strategy
  • ISSN
    0149-5933
  • OCLC
    47297400
  • Material type
    Document, Periodical, Internet resource
  • Document type
    Internet Resource, Computer File, Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Taylor & Francis

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Some individual journals may have policies prohibiting pre-print archiving
    • On author's personal website or departmental website immediately
    • On institutional repository or subject-based repository after either 12 months embargo for STM, Behavioural Science and Public Health Journals or 18 months embargo for SSH journals
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • On a non-profit server
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to publisher version
    • Set statements to accompany deposits (see policy)
    • The publisher will deposit in on behalf of authors to a designated institutional repository including PubMed Central, where a deposit agreement exists with the repository
    • STM: Science, Technology and Medicine
    • SSH: Social Science and Humanities
    • Publisher last contacted on 25/03/2014
    • 'Taylor & Francis (Psychology Press)' is an imprint of 'Taylor & Francis'
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This article examines the relationship between two concepts in strategic studies, grand strategy and operational art, to consider their aggregate effect on the fundamental concept of strategy. Grand strategy as a higher level of strategy fails to account for the entire ends-ways-means logic of strategy, thus requiring the introduction of another concept to compensate. Parallels are drawn between this conceptual dichotomy and the current practice in modern civil-military relations. Its conceptual division into two other distinct ideas is counterproductive to the fundamental task of strategy, although its practice is necessarily divided.
    Comparative Strategy 08/2014; 33(4).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Sun Tzu's The Art of War deals with the economic aspects of military operations as well as some more general economic principles. This article studies several of its economic ideas in turn: on war and the state, the effect of war on economic affairs, and the role of incentives in promoting desired behavior within military organizations. It also discusses how the text treats ideal military strategy as a matter of opportunity discovery, analogous to entrepreneurship in the work of Israel Kirzner.
    Comparative Strategy 08/2014; 33(4).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Western states—the U.S. and many European states—have since the early 1990s conducted military operations at a pace that overshadows the number of military operations during the threat-penetrated Cold War era. During the last twenty years, Western states have switched their military outlook from containment and deterrence toward active engagement and expeditionary warfare. It is argued that even though in many cases the objectives of military activism are good and noble, the unintended—and in many cases the unrecognized—consequences of such action will in the long run be negative at best—and potentially even dangerous.
    Comparative Strategy 08/2014; 33(4).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The inter-organizational lesson in the fight against terrorism has been clearly identified after 9/11, but not completely learned and applied. Horizontal cooperation and coordination structures have been established, yet due to many challenges they do not function optimally. This article reaches beyond the prevailing mantra concerning the need for inter-organizational cooperation in the fight against terrorism by providing a framework for understanding the complexity of network counterterrorism and the relevant challenges. It introduces four levels of complexity that must be comprehended in order to ensure an optimal and comprehensive strategic approach in this fight. Based on this, it argues that a successful counterterrorism strategy needs to provide capacities for multi-organizational, inter-organizational and network-horizontal cooperation, and the capacity to manage many related inter-organizational challenges. The conclusions also suggest that our societies are still not conceptually and practically ready to embrace a truly comprehensive network approach to a networked threat. The inter-organizational approach in the fight against terrorism is ultimately what organizations make of it.
    Comparative Strategy 08/2014; 33(4).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: By a number of accounts, NATO's membership expansion has been viewed favorably, with many analysts pointing to the positive impact NATO's enlargement has on the democratic development of civil-military relations across Central and Eastern Europe. Within this context, Mosès Naím's recent essay in Foreign Affairs was especially striking due to his piercing criticism of Bulgaria due to its significant problems with internal domestic corruption. We examine the potential impact of a Bulgarian mafia-oriented society on NATO from three perspectives, which include assessments of Bulgaria's military, its military capabilities—including its recent weapons purchases—as well as its willingness and ability to participate in NATO's major operations. In our view, these measures provide at least a partial assessment of Bulgaria's role within the alliance in an era that parallels claims of widespread corruption. The findings suggest that Bulgaria's corruption does have some impact on its ability to contribute to NATO's major alliance objectives, which apart from the deleterious impact on Bulgaria, also has broader implications for NATO's ongoing interest in membership expansion.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2014; 33(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: As the only country in history to have created, then voluntarily renounced, a nuclear arsenal, South Africa is often referenced as a potential model for nuclear disarmament. However, this article argues that there are sharp limitations on the extent to which the South African case can be applied as a model for other countries to follow. Because South Africa unilaterally dismantled its program and only brought in inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and key member states after the dismantlement was complete, information vital to the verification process was lost to the international community. As a model of a cooperative verification, South Africa thus highlights both the difficulties that monitoring and verification regimes will encounter, as well as the opportunities that they afford.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2014; 33(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has attained mixed results using the traditional instruments of power in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. In the future these instruments may prove even less effective because of domestic problems and changes in the geopolitical environment. Advanced military capabilities enabled by emerging technology may provide policymakers with broader options and greater utility when coercion is required in international relations. The application of non-lethal force is not a substitute for war but an effective lever to consider in future conflict. This article proposes several concepts: digital blockade, conflict termination, wide-area denial, and offshore control, which could be used during future state-level conflict. While these emerging capabilities offer great promise, they are not a panacea. Policymakers and military leaders must fully understand the conditions in which these capabilities provide maximum effectiveness, as well as overcoming legal barriers and contending with the problem of escalation.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2014; 33(3).
  • Comparative Strategy 05/2014; 33(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Minimum Deterrence advocates, such as the Global ZERO report chaired by retired General James Cartwright, often urge the elimination of the U.S. triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers and minimum modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. These recommendations ignore fundamental realities. Both Russia and China have announced that they intend to increase their nuclear forces and both are modernizing their forces. Russia and China regard the U.S. as their main enemy and are arming against us. The Minimum Deterrence assumption that there is no risk of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia or China is a dangerous one. Both Russia and China have significant territorial claims against their neighbors. Russian claims to the Arctic Ocean and Chinese claims over the South China Sea are particularly troubling. China continues to threaten war over Taiwan. China has increasingly used military might to support its territorial claims in the South China Sea, creating incidents that have the potential to escalate into war. The most fundamental problem with Minimum Deterrence is that it intentionally degrades our deterrence of nuclear or other WMD attack, as well as our ability to deter nuclear escalation in a situation where the U.S. provides allies a credible nuclear umbrella. U.S. failure to provide a credible nuclear umbrella could result in Japan and, possibly other nations, deciding to go nuclear in order to protect themselves.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2014; 33(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Russia's policy toward Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. This article aims to explain the evolution of Moscow's policy since 2001, and to assess its future options. The findings of this article are twofold. Moscow attempted to balance two overarching objectives: stabilize Afghanistan and maintain Russia's hegemony in Central Asia. Russian fluctuations toward Afghanistan since 2001 stemmed from changes in its perceived interests and its prioritization of these two objectives. Furthermore, Moscow is becoming increasingly concerned about Afghanistan. However, it has relatively few realistic policy options to address challenges that may develop once international military forces cease major combat operations.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2014; 33(3).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and precision strike systems. Second, cyber-attacks may be used against opposed nuclear command-control systems and weapons platforms as well as against infrastructure for the purpose of mass disruption during a crisis or war. Third, cyber capabilities support escalation dominance or escalation control, depending on the objectives of states and on the transparency of identification for cyber friends and foes.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2014; 33(3).
  • Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(1).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The United States' military-strategic pivot toward Asia is motived by concerns about a rising China, about the increased significance of Asia on the world economic and political stages, and about the growing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear first use in that region. Nuclear Asia already numbers five acknowledged or de facto nuclear weapons states among its members: Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Failure to reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons status or political distrust among other powers may increase the number of Asian nuclear weapons states (including states with prospective nuclear-missile reach into Asia) to eight, creating an Asian-Middle Eastern nuclear arms race that defies containment. On the other hand, an alternative presents itself, in the form of a multilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement that would create three tiers of accepted nuclear weapons states and bar the door to new admits.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: A recent unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment stated: “DIA assesses with moderate confidence the North [Korea] currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles.” This conclusion is highly credible and not really new. North Korea was assessed to have nuclear weapons long before the actual (or at least detected) first test of these weapons in 2006. Building a nuclear weapon small enough to be carried by the relatively large payloads of North Korea's ballistic missiles is not a very difficult task today. In light of what is now known about the proliferation of a nuclear missile warhead from China to Pakistan and from Pakistan to North Korea, the North Korea defector reports about nuclear weapons development and the North Korean nuclear tests, the DIA conclusion may be an understatement. The North Korean nuclear stockpile may be significantly greater than what is usually assessed. This is of concern because the North Korean regime is the most brutal Stalinist dictatorship in the world. Moreover, while North Korea has long made occasional nuclear attack threats against the U.S. in the past, the scope, magnitude, and frequency of these threats vastly increased in 2013. Current U.S. policy, which downgrades the importance of nuclear deterrence and cuts missile defense, is not well suited to handle this threat.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The principles espoused in Sun Tzu's Art of War and Sextus Iulius Frontinus's Stratagematon that have linkages with the practice of special operations warfare are examined in this article. The academic study of special operations within the field of strategy has been hindered by the lack of resources in strategic theories that explain how special operations work and succeed. This article presents the discovery of principles of special operations which has been vividly described in both of these classical texts but often overlooked, and these principles can be matched with the contemporary practice of special operations.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).
  • Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The five states that surround the Arctic Ocean— Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Norway—have in recent years taken various measures to protect their economic and security interests in the north. The measures include not only the adoption of Arctic strategies, but also the development of new military capabilities. As in other parts of the world, one state's military efforts to enhance its security may have the unfortunate effect of making others feel less secure, and therefore more likely to undertake similar efforts. Thus, despite being a low-tension region, the Arctic is by no means immune to the logic of the security dilemma.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This article examines the merits of extending the U.S. nuclear deterrent to the Middle East. It begins by looking at past practices of such an extension before delving into the overall issues presented by providing such a security guarantee. This article then looks at a brief survey of some of the regional issues facing a nuclear extension before considering the P-5 states and their concerns.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Although intuitively social science has much to contribute to strategy, this article examines the difficulty for strategists doing so. To illustrate the difficulty, the article draws on two social science theories that provided conceptual frameworks for U.S. strategy in the 1960s: deterrence/coercion theory and modernization theory. The article also draws on the cases of Project Camelot in the 1960s and the recent use of human terrain teams to illustrate the difficulty encountered by the military when it tries to use social scientists operationally.
    Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).
  • Comparative Strategy 01/2014; 33(2).