Comparative Strategy Journal Impact Factor & Information

Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

Journal description

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new, potentially hostile regional powers have totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind Western foreign and defense policy. Drawing on historical perspectives and insights from leading international analysts, Comparative Strategy provides a contextual framework for considering the critical security issues of today and tomorrow. Regular features of the journal include: timely commentary by leading U.S. and foreign policymakers comprehensive coverage of Russian and German perspectives on international security issues special issues on key topics such as "Ballistic Missile Defense: New Requirements for a New Century," "Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," The Future of Russia," and "Intelligence Reform" texts of the latest U.S. government, foreign, and NATO documentation on major defense issues, particularly with regard to proliferation and counter-proliferation policies.

Current impact factor: 0.00

Impact Factor Rankings

Additional details

5-year impact 0.00
Cited half-life 0.00
Immediacy index 0.00
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 0.00
Website Comparative Strategy website
Other titles Comparative strategy (Online), Comparative strategy
ISSN 0149-5933
OCLC 47297400
Material type Document, Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Internet Resource, Computer File, Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Some individual journals may have policies prohibiting pre-print archiving
    • On author's personal website or departmental website immediately
    • On institutional repository or subject-based repository after a 18 months embargo
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • On a non-profit server
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to publisher version
    • Set statements to accompany deposits (see policy)
    • The publisher will deposit in on behalf of authors to a designated institutional repository including PubMed Central, where a deposit agreement exists with the repository
    • SSH: Social Science and Humanities
    • Publisher last contacted on 25/03/2014
    • This policy is an exception to the default policies of 'Taylor & Francis (Routledge)'
  • Classification
    ​ green

Publications in this journal

  • Comparative Strategy 07/2015; DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069511
  • Comparative Strategy 07/2015; DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069520
  • Comparative Strategy 07/2015; DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069517
  • Comparative Strategy 07/2015; DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069510
  • Comparative Strategy 07/2015; DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069538
  • Comparative Strategy 07/2015; DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069519
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    ABSTRACT: This monograph, Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence, is the second in a series examining the U.S. goals of deterrence, extended deterrence and the assurance of allies, and how to think about the corresponding U.S. standards of adequacy for measuring “how much is enough?” It begins by examining the manifest character of the contemporary threat environment in which the United States must pursue its strategic goals of deterring foes and assuring allies. Fortunately, there is considerable available evidence regarding the character of the contemporary threat environment and its general directions. Noted historians have compared this threat environment not to the bipolar Cold War, but to the highly dynamic threat environments leading to World War I and World War II. The uncertainties involved are daunting given the great diversity of hostile and potentially hostile states and non-state actors, leaderships, goals, perceptions, and forces that could be involved.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2015; 34(3). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1050292
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    ABSTRACT: Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been relying heavily on drone strikes for counterterrorism. This policy remains controversial. I argue that assertive statecraft is needed to prevent drone strikes from undermining U.S. foreign and security policy over the long term. The article argues legally, comparatively, and historically, using President's Eisenhower restrictions on U.S. aerial espionage programs during the earlier Cold War, as a benchmark for President Obama's policy on missions by armed drones. A more limited drone program offers a better balance between what is necessary for security and what is politically sustainable.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017385
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    ABSTRACT: This article reviews national security decision-making in the Iranian context by focusing on institutions, formal process and individuals. It specifically examines the Supreme National Security Council, which formalizes and embodies the decision-making process, as well as the Revolutionary Guards, which epitomize both the influence of institutions as well as the centrality of the agent-individual. Despite the plurality of formal institutions and the existence of process, decision-making remains heavily centered on a small group of largely unelected individuals driven as much by ‘regime expediency’ as by mutual give-and-take along informal, microfactional lines. While he may have the last word, even Iran's current Supreme Leader is constrained by these ideological, negotiational and structural factors. These key figures are closely affiliated either with the politico-clerical founding kernel of the 1979 Revolution, or the powerful Revolutionary Guards—mainly the hardliners in any case—and are instrumental in determining the discursive boundaries of national security, the scope of which this article confines to defense and foreign policy. Finally, how all this coheres in the realm of strategy has as much to do with regime survival as with the art of reconciling ends and means.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017347
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    ABSTRACT: The question of how to measure a state's rationality and compatibility with deterrence must be confronted in order to address the broader theoretical discussion concerning the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence. This article broadens Janice Stein's three-condition model of potential constraints of deterrence as a theory and a strategy. It then applies this revised model as a means of identifying potential obstacles to a future nonconventional deterrence regime with Iran, concluding with an assessment as to whether this analysis can support the argument that such a future deterrence regime would be stable.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017349
  • Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017390
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    ABSTRACT: Geography helps to explain why violent extremist organizations are difficult to counter; vast ungoverned spaces combined with weak states make it nearly impossible to decisively defeat them. However, partial success has been achieved by the United States in the Horn of Africa with a strategy of training, equipping, and supporting African intervention forces and attacking extremist leaders. In contrast, a strategy of containment in the Sahara, focusing on counterterrorism training for regional security forces and countering extremist ideology, did not succeed in preventing militant groups from taking over northern Mali and expanding their activities to other parts of the region.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017381
  • Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017391
  • Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2):117-132. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017341
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    ABSTRACT: The use of cyber operations, as well as the interaction of other elements of power that have an effect on cyber operations, represents another method by which nations and non-state actors may attempt to achieve political ends. The Syrian civil war has encompassed many elements of warfare, including cyber operations. A study of the observed cyber operations by both direct and indirect participants in the Syrian civil war can lead to valuable lessons regarding who operates in the cyber domain, what these operators can accomplish, and how a nation-state can respond. These lessons may be applied to future conflicts.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017342
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    ABSTRACT: Strategic debates have long characterized the discourse on military affairs. Three lively disputes concern: 1) Whether set “principles of war” can be codified and mastered; 2) The relative strengths and limitations of maritime and continental power; and 3) The potential for waging successful “short wars.” Carl von Clausewitz provided the sharpest critique of the principles of war, arguing that “friction” can overwhelm even highly refined military art. A.T. Mahan's concept of sea power was challenged by Halford Mackinder's theory of “heartland power.” Short-war notions animated by Moltke the Elder's victories in the 19th Century German wars of unification, and expanded upon by his successors, were rebutted by Ivan Bloch. Each debate remains relevant: technological advances prompt reappraisal of principles of war; the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia as great continental powers challenge American naval mastery; and insurgents and terrorists continue to prove the value of “long wars.”
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017370
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    ABSTRACT: The traditional view of ballistic missile defense is that defensive weapons are destabilizing. This article explains why the more broadly and traditionally accepted classical approach to deterrence is flawed and demonstrates the greater explanatory power and implications of conditional deterrence based on power parity theory. Given the implications that can be drawn from conditional deterrence, this article demonstrates that limited efforts at developing and deploying missile defenses enhance deterrence and reduce the ballistic missile threat in the short term and may also discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
    Comparative Strategy 02/2015; 34(1). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2014.962976
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    ABSTRACT: More than any other modern nation, Israel has combatted, prevented, countered, and deterred terrorist attacks. While the conflict that spawns terrorism did not begin with the founding of modern Israel, its establishment by United Nations resolution in 1948 has certainly become the contemporary trigger point for this ancient antipathy. Israel has attempted different tactical and strategic approaches to halt attacks, including deterrence, but, in contrast to what U.S. strategists might initially suppose from their Cold War experience, Israeli deterrence of terrorism does not fall into either the Kahn or Schelling schools of thought. It has more affinity to risk management, and kinship with deterrence of crime in a civil legal system. Like criminal law enforcement, the expectation of Israeli terror deterrence is not unrealistically zero attacks, but practical management to maintain a certain status quo. Israel, however, appears trapped in an endless cycle of pain with its adversaries, a cycle regulated by unspoken rules. This article evaluates the Israeli experience in terrorism deterrence, and concludes with observations concerning efforts to protect the U.S. homeland.
    Comparative Strategy 02/2015; 34(1). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.991631
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    ABSTRACT: The Khan network provided nuclear technology and assistance to at least four state nuclear programs over the course of three decades. This network was neither static nor a singular entity. Rather, it was a loose collection of actors whose methods evolved in response to a changing world. By the late 1990s, the Khan network was relying on ever increasing levels of subterfuge to procure machine tools from the West while cultivating new locales for the manufacture of centrifuge parts. The trajectory of the network's procurement methods suggests that current supply-side controls are not adequate to block a determined state proliferator.
    Comparative Strategy 02/2015; 34(1). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2014.962966