Comparative Strategy Journal Impact Factor & Information

Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

Journal description

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new, potentially hostile regional powers have totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind Western foreign and defense policy. Drawing on historical perspectives and insights from leading international analysts, Comparative Strategy provides a contextual framework for considering the critical security issues of today and tomorrow. Regular features of the journal include: timely commentary by leading U.S. and foreign policymakers comprehensive coverage of Russian and German perspectives on international security issues special issues on key topics such as "Ballistic Missile Defense: New Requirements for a New Century," "Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," The Future of Russia," and "Intelligence Reform" texts of the latest U.S. government, foreign, and NATO documentation on major defense issues, particularly with regard to proliferation and counter-proliferation policies.

Current impact factor: 0.00

Impact Factor Rankings

Additional details

5-year impact 0.00
Cited half-life 0.00
Immediacy index 0.00
Eigenfactor 0.00
Article influence 0.00
Website Comparative Strategy website
Other titles Comparative strategy (Online), Comparative strategy
ISSN 0149-5933
OCLC 47297400
Material type Document, Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Internet Resource, Computer File, Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Some individual journals may have policies prohibiting pre-print archiving
    • On author's personal website or departmental website immediately
    • On institutional repository or subject-based repository after a 18 months embargo
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • On a non-profit server
    • Published source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to publisher version
    • Set statements to accompany deposits (see policy)
    • The publisher will deposit in on behalf of authors to a designated institutional repository including PubMed Central, where a deposit agreement exists with the repository
    • SSH: Social Science and Humanities
    • Publisher last contacted on 25/03/2014
    • This policy is an exception to the default policies of 'Taylor & Francis (Routledge)'
  • Classification

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The increase in nuclear clients appears to be forthcoming, and with it a possible increase for nuclear use. Deterrence must focus on targeting nuclear decision makers and tailoring a strategy toward all levels of nuclear command and control, including tactical levels of decision making. What can be learned from historical examples of WMD dilemmas and the consequential role of a WMD operator in nuclear decision-making? Namely, that operators are in fact decision makers and not simply executers. The article analyzes the role of WMD operators as such decision makers by reflecting on three case studies that demonstrate operator dilemmas in light of standard operating procedures at critical moments of WMD engagement, and their results. It concludes by laying out an effective base on which to include operators in tailored deterrence efforts, as well as filling a need for creative and practical nuclear strategy efforts.
    Comparative Strategy 08/2015; 34(4). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069515

  • Comparative Strategy 07/2015; 34(4):00-00. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069520
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    ABSTRACT: This article explores an under-investigated policy tool for bringing about the transformation of foreign regimes. This policy—which we dub coercion demanding regime change (CDRC)—uses coercive threats to persuade autocratic rulers to relinquish power and step down. We provide an initial guide for how to optimally design CDRC policies and when to use it. Our recommendations are based on an analysis of autocratic rulers’ expected response in the face of CDRC threats. This analysis integrates a rational calculus with dictators’ common psychological traits. Finally, we identify several tactics dictators commonly use to counter coercive pressures and possible risks coercing powers should be aware of when pursuing CDRC.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2015; 34(4):00-00. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069511
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    ABSTRACT: India's national interest has been propelling the country toward becoming a valuable, cooperative partner with the United States. The growing power of China is pushing India to look for partners, especially the United States. The new Indian government, elected in May 2014, is committed to advancing India's national interests and growing India's power as a result of the changing balance of power in Asia. The government has brought a return of nationalism and closer relations with the United States. Therefore, U.S.–India relations are on track to develop more in line with the U.S. vision of an enhanced strategic partnership and an Indian role in the rebalance to Asia. India appears to be more willing and able to be a partner with the United States in the rebalance to Asia, including maintaining security and stability in the Indian Ocean region. To some extent, U.S. activity focused in Southeast Asia will be complemented by India's Look East policy and the U.S.–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean region. There is the prospect of Indo-U.S. cooperation with Myanmar, Vietnam, and other states.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2015; 34(4):00-00. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069517
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    ABSTRACT: U.S. strategists have generated a torrent of diverse ideas for how America should respond to the ascent of China. Consideration of the full range of strategic options available to future presidents broadly offers a means of forecasting whether Sino-American relations will evolve in an amicable or antagonistic direction. This article identifies six prospective choices of U.S. strategy toward China, each advancing unique assumptions of Chinese ambitions and capabilities, and appropriate means for checking them. While diverse in tactics, all are nevertheless united in a deeply embedded suspicion of China's long-term intentions and a commitment to thwarting any challenge to American preeminence in Asia. As tensions with China escalate, the United States will likely opt for provocative strategies that emphasize a strengthened military footprint and seek assurances of Beijing's peaceful intentions by pushing for democratization in China and pressing for its further integration in the liberal world order.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2015; 34(4):00-00. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069510
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    ABSTRACT: An examination of President Clinton's decision to launch military actions against Iraq in June 1993 is largely absent in professional defense literature. This article represents an attempt to test the descriptive accuracy and further develop the diversionary theory of war. The analysis employs a qualitative framework for diversionary use of force developed by another researcher, Ryan C. Hendrickson. This article finds that empirical support for the diversionary argument in this case is mixed. Two proposals to further develop qualitative tests for diversionary use of force are advanced.
    Comparative Strategy 07/2015; 34(4):00-00. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069519
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    ABSTRACT: This monograph, Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence, is the second in a series examining the U.S. goals of deterrence, extended deterrence and the assurance of allies, and how to think about the corresponding U.S. standards of adequacy for measuring “how much is enough?” It begins by examining the manifest character of the contemporary threat environment in which the United States must pursue its strategic goals of deterring foes and assuring allies. Fortunately, there is considerable available evidence regarding the character of the contemporary threat environment and its general directions. Noted historians have compared this threat environment not to the bipolar Cold War, but to the highly dynamic threat environments leading to World War I and World War II. The uncertainties involved are daunting given the great diversity of hostile and potentially hostile states and non-state actors, leaderships, goals, perceptions, and forces that could be involved.
    Comparative Strategy 05/2015; 34(3). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1050292
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    ABSTRACT: Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been relying heavily on drone strikes for counterterrorism. This policy remains controversial. I argue that assertive statecraft is needed to prevent drone strikes from undermining U.S. foreign and security policy over the long term. The article argues legally, comparatively, and historically, using President's Eisenhower restrictions on U.S. aerial espionage programs during the earlier Cold War, as a benchmark for President Obama's policy on missions by armed drones. A more limited drone program offers a better balance between what is necessary for security and what is politically sustainable.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017385
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    ABSTRACT: This article reviews national security decision-making in the Iranian context by focusing on institutions, formal process and individuals. It specifically examines the Supreme National Security Council, which formalizes and embodies the decision-making process, as well as the Revolutionary Guards, which epitomize both the influence of institutions as well as the centrality of the agent-individual. Despite the plurality of formal institutions and the existence of process, decision-making remains heavily centered on a small group of largely unelected individuals driven as much by ‘regime expediency’ as by mutual give-and-take along informal, microfactional lines. While he may have the last word, even Iran's current Supreme Leader is constrained by these ideological, negotiational and structural factors. These key figures are closely affiliated either with the politico-clerical founding kernel of the 1979 Revolution, or the powerful Revolutionary Guards—mainly the hardliners in any case—and are instrumental in determining the discursive boundaries of national security, the scope of which this article confines to defense and foreign policy. Finally, how all this coheres in the realm of strategy has as much to do with regime survival as with the art of reconciling ends and means.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017347
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    ABSTRACT: The question of how to measure a state's rationality and compatibility with deterrence must be confronted in order to address the broader theoretical discussion concerning the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence. This article broadens Janice Stein's three-condition model of potential constraints of deterrence as a theory and a strategy. It then applies this revised model as a means of identifying potential obstacles to a future nonconventional deterrence regime with Iran, concluding with an assessment as to whether this analysis can support the argument that such a future deterrence regime would be stable.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017349

  • Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017391

  • Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2):117-132. DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017341
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    ABSTRACT: Geography helps to explain why violent extremist organizations are difficult to counter; vast ungoverned spaces combined with weak states make it nearly impossible to decisively defeat them. However, partial success has been achieved by the United States in the Horn of Africa with a strategy of training, equipping, and supporting African intervention forces and attacking extremist leaders. In contrast, a strategy of containment in the Sahara, focusing on counterterrorism training for regional security forces and countering extremist ideology, did not succeed in preventing militant groups from taking over northern Mali and expanding their activities to other parts of the region.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017381
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    ABSTRACT: The use of cyber operations, as well as the interaction of other elements of power that have an effect on cyber operations, represents another method by which nations and non-state actors may attempt to achieve political ends. The Syrian civil war has encompassed many elements of warfare, including cyber operations. A study of the observed cyber operations by both direct and indirect participants in the Syrian civil war can lead to valuable lessons regarding who operates in the cyber domain, what these operators can accomplish, and how a nation-state can respond. These lessons may be applied to future conflicts.
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017342
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    ABSTRACT: Strategic debates have long characterized the discourse on military affairs. Three lively disputes concern: 1) Whether set “principles of war” can be codified and mastered; 2) The relative strengths and limitations of maritime and continental power; and 3) The potential for waging successful “short wars.” Carl von Clausewitz provided the sharpest critique of the principles of war, arguing that “friction” can overwhelm even highly refined military art. A.T. Mahan's concept of sea power was challenged by Halford Mackinder's theory of “heartland power.” Short-war notions animated by Moltke the Elder's victories in the 19th Century German wars of unification, and expanded upon by his successors, were rebutted by Ivan Bloch. Each debate remains relevant: technological advances prompt reappraisal of principles of war; the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia as great continental powers challenge American naval mastery; and insurgents and terrorists continue to prove the value of “long wars.”
    Comparative Strategy 03/2015; 34(2). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2015.1017370
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    ABSTRACT: The traditional view of ballistic missile defense is that defensive weapons are destabilizing. This article explains why the more broadly and traditionally accepted classical approach to deterrence is flawed and demonstrates the greater explanatory power and implications of conditional deterrence based on power parity theory. Given the implications that can be drawn from conditional deterrence, this article demonstrates that limited efforts at developing and deploying missile defenses enhance deterrence and reduce the ballistic missile threat in the short term and may also discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
    Comparative Strategy 02/2015; 34(1). DOI:10.1080/01495933.2014.962976