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    ABSTRACT: We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.
    Journal of Public Economics 08/2013;
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    ABSTRACT: We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator—who can only become active with the consent of both parties—in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options. Journal of Economic Literature classification Number: C78.
    Games and Economic Behavior 08/2013;
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    ABSTRACT: Discussion paper Despite limited government control over the pre-1914 economy, opposition politicians were enthusiastic in blaming bad economic news on the incumbent. In a study of 458 by-elections between 1857 and 1914, we find that voters typically gave new governments a 'honeymoon' but thereafter held them responsible for high unemployment and high prices. Each 1% rise in the price level, on average, brought about a 0.21% swing against the government of the day, while each one-point rise in the percentage unemployed had double this effect. Attributing shorter- or longer-term memories to voters, as they used the past to determine what constituted unacceptable price and unemployment levels, makes little difference to this result. We also look at grievance asymmetry - the idea that voters give governments more blame for bad outcomes than they give credit for good ones - and find some evidence in its favour.
    12/2012;
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    ABSTRACT: In this paper, it is argued that previous estimates of the expected cost of equity and the expected arithmetic risk premium in the UK show a degree of upward bias. Given the importance of the risk premium in regulatory cost of capital in the UK, this has important policy implications. There are three reasons why previous estimates could be upward biased. The first two arise from the comparison of estimates of the realised returns on government bond (‘gilt’) with those of the realised and expected returns on equities. These estimates are frequently used to infer a risk premium relative to either the current yield on index-linked gilts or an ‘adjusted’ current yield measure. This is incorrect on two counts; first, inconsistent estimates of the risk-free rate are implied on the right-hand side of the capital asset pricing model; second, they compare the realised returns from a bond that carried inflation risk with the realised and expected returns from equities that may be expected to have at least some protection from inflation risk. The third, and most important, source of bias arises from uplifts to expected returns. If markets exhibit ‘excess volatility’, or if part of the historical return arises because of revisions to expected future cash flows, then estimates of variance derived from the historical returns or the price growth must be used with great care when uplifting average expected returns to derive simple discount rates. Adjusting expected returns for the effect of such biases leads to lower expected cost of equity and risk premia than those that are typically quoted. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
    Review of Behavioral Finance. 05/2011; 3(1):1 - 26.
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    ABSTRACT: A common feature of multi-jurisdictional systems is equalization programs. The implementation of such programs, that is based on some measurement of sub-national fiscal capacity and effort, is particularly complex. Within a political economy model, this paper analyzes the impact of such systems on accountability, identifying a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect arises because with equalized fiscal resources, a consequence of equalization, citizens attach more importance to any remaining variation in public good supplies and so punish rent-taking more severely. This induces politicians to restrain themselves and so accountability improves. The negative effect arises because the complexity of such programs reduces the informational content of observed public good supplies. This introduces a perverse fiscal incentive that reduces accountability. Thus, the overall impact of equalization programs on accountability depends on the balance of these effects.
    Journal of Public Economics. 01/2008;
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    ABSTRACT: This paper sets up an OLG economy with endogenous life expectancy to study how fiscal policy that redistributes between generations can open the door to sunspot equilibria. Agents invest independently in their own human capital, produce and consume output, and receive a pension upon retirement. The model produces an expectations coordination problem that can explain significant differences in growth paths followed by otherwise identical countries. In particular, we show that our economy may be characterized by local indeterminacy of dynamic equilibria, and hence feature fluctuations which are driven by extrinsic uncertainty.
    Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 02/2007;
  • Social Policy & Administration 01/2007; 2(1):23 - 30.
  • Social Policy & Administration 01/2007; 2(2):92 - 105.
  • Social Policy & Administration 01/2007; 7(2):106 - 125.
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    ABSTRACT: In this paper, we analyse the trade-distorting effects of state trading enterprises (STEs) which exist in some exporting countries. Because of these potential effects, several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO. The belief is that STEs in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy. STEs also exist in developing countries, though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case, the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax. We present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting STEs in developed and developing economies. The model is calibrated with data on two examples of STEs, one typical of an STE in a developed country, the other typical of an STE in a developing economy. In each case, we allow for differences in the nature of the STE's pay-off function. The overall conclusion is that STEs do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant.
    European Economic Review. 01/2007;
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