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Department of Management
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Department of Social Policy
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Department of Geography and Environment
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  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The original conceptualization of payments for ecosystem services (PES) promoted direct payments to motivate the provision of environmental public goods, but market imperfections and behavioral considerations can mean that PES that reduce market constraints are preferred. The main issue with the latter is how to include conditionality. We propose credit-based PES (CB-PES) as an incentive that links an environmental condition with the reduction of a key market constraint. Through a choice experiment in Ecuador, CB-PES was found to be a promising form of PES, with multiple desirable qualities of an incentive as cited in the behavioral economics and PES literatures.
    World Development 12/2014; 64:503–520.
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    ABSTRACT: Increasing the adoption of generic drugs has the potential to improve static efficiency in a health system without harming pharmaceutical innovation. However, very little is known about the timing of generic adoption and diffusion. No prior study has empirically examined the differential launch times of generics across a comprehensive set of markets, or more specifically the delays in country specific adoption of generics relative to the first country of (generic) adoption. Drawing on data containing significant country and product variation across a lengthy time period (1999 to 2008), we use duration analysis to examine relative delays, across countries, in the adoption of generic drugs. Our results suggest that price regulation has a significant effect on reducing the time to launch of generics, with faster adoption in higher priced markets. The latter result is dependent on the degree of competition and the expected market size.
    Journal of Health Economics 12/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: We study observational learning in environments with congestion costs: an agent's payoff from choosing an action decreases as more predecessors choose that action. Herds cannot occur if congestion on every action can get so large that an agent prefers a different action regardless of his beliefs about the state. To the extent that switching away from the more popular action reveals private information, it improves learning. The absence of herding does not guarantee complete (asymptotic) learning, however, as information cascades can occur through perpetual but uninformative switching between actions. We provide conditions on congestion costs that guarantee complete learning and conditions that guarantee bounded learning. Learning can be virtually complete even if each agent has only an infinitesimal effect on congestion costs. We apply our results to markets where congestion costs arise through responsive pricing and to queuing problems where agents dislike waiting for service.
    Games and Economic Behavior 09/2014;


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    London, United Kingdom
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Science 08/1999; 285(5426):384-7.

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