Publication HistoryView all

  • Biofouling, 01/2010: pages 306 - 318; , ISBN: 9781444315462

  • Biofouling, 01/2010: pages 388 - 395; , ISBN: 9781444315462

  • Journal of Law and Society 08/2008; 35(3):422 - 427. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6478.2008.00445_1.x

  • American Business Law Journal 06/2008; 36(4):579 - 632. DOI:10.1111/j.1744-1714.1999.tb00264.x
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    ABSTRACT: Successive studies have documented the institutionally marginalised status of many women academics. What remains unclear is whether such findings apply equally to women legal academics. This article begins the process of investigating the role, status and experiences of women legal academics, reporting the findings of the first survey into the representation of academic women in UK university law schools. The study presents a snapshot of the gender composition of law schools in October 1997, at all levels of seniority, together with data on the representation of women in each responding law school. It finds considerable differences between law schools, as well as an under-representation of women compared with men at senior levels. It is suggested that these patterns of the representation of women legal academics have important ramifications for legal education, the legal profession and the discipline of law itself.
    Legal Studies 04/2006; 19(1):68 - 92. DOI:10.1111/j.1748-121X.1999.tb00086.x
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    ABSTRACT: Hegel's political philosophy gives prominence to the theme that human beings have a need for recognition of those qualities, characteristics, and attributes that make them distinctive. Hegel thus speaks to the question whether human rights law should recognize and accommodate the nuances of individual make-up. Likewise, he speaks to the question whether human rights law should be applied in ways that are sensitive to the cultural contexts in which it operates. But Hegel's political philosophy evaluates norms and practices within particular cultures by reference to the higher-order and universal criterion of abstract right. In light of this point and the inadequacies of political philosophy that privileges local norms and practices, a third approach to the protection of human rights is canvassed. This approach prioritizes neither universal nor local norms. Its aim is to ensure that both human rights and the cultures in which they are applied are taken seriously.
    Journal of Law and Society 12/2003; 30(4):554 - 574. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6478.2003.00270.x
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    ABSTRACT: This article suggests that Europe faces four primary challenges today. The first relates to democracy, as all the anxieties about the ‘democratic deficit’ in Community are writ even larger in the Union. A second issue is that of liberal legalism. Lawyers have long presumed that the ‘new’ Europe has been integrated ‘through’ law. This article suggests that the role of law is of far less importance to the future of the Union. A third problem, perhaps the most pressing, relates to enlargement. Is the ‘new’ Europe fully prepared for the inevitable shock that will follow the much-vaunted ‘big bang’? Finally, there is the overarching problem of a continuing lack of ethos, or public philosophy, underpinning public life in the ‘new’ Europe.
    Journal of Law and Society 05/2003; 30(2):236 - 257. DOI:10.1111/1467-6478.00255
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    ABSTRACT: In Gender, Choice and Commitment, Hilary Sommerlad and Peter Sanderson argue that ‘gender remains a principal determinant in the career trajectories of women solicitors’ (p 4). Whilst to many this would appear to be obvious, the tragedy is that this is little recognised within the profession itself. Indeed, there would appear to be a silent conspiracy not to mention gender, let alone feminism, in any debates within the profession concerning women, paradoxical though this may seem. The result is a deeply unsatisfactory situation in which the gendered obstacles in the way of women’s full and equal participation in the profession remain ‘remarkably durable’ (p 13), but the strategies being adopted by campaigners seeking to improve women’s status overlook the significance of gender, focusing instead on what has been termed the ‘business case’ for sex equality. The ‘business case’ attempts to convince employers that the adoption of equal opportunity measures will bring economic and efficiency gains to their businesses, thereby encouraging them to adopt such practices. As argued by Opportunity 2000, an organisation established in the UK to promote the ‘business’ case for equality, this is not a strategy ‘rooted in a moral or social imperative’, but in ‘hard commercial facts’. In the light of Sommerlad and Sanderson’s study, I argue that the ‘business case’ strategy, as a means by which to improve the status of women solicitors, is wholly misconceived. It is based on erroneous assumptions about the reasons for women’s marginalised status and therefore can have only limited effect in eliminating discrimination. Furthermore, by privileging economic considerations, the business case may open the way for the removal of existing hard won gains. In order to develop this argument, the first part of this article will examine Sommerlad and Sanderson’s analysis of the status of women solicitors. The second and third parts go on to outline and examine the ‘business case’ strategy and assess whether, in the light of the arguments made by Sommerlad and Sanderson, it has the potential to bring about a situation in which women are equal participants in the solicitors’ profession. The final section will conclude by suggesting that those seeking change within the solicitors’ profession must re-focus their attention on gender and its role in the marginalisation of women solicitors.
    Modern Law Review 05/2003; 63(3):442 - 456. DOI:10.1111/1468-2230.00274

  • Modern Law Review 05/2003; 61(2):236 - 244. DOI:10.1111/1468-2230.00140

  • Journal of Law and Society 12/2002; 24(2):177 - 198. DOI:10.1111/1467-6478.00042
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